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Abstract 
 
This research aims at establishing the adequacy (or not), of the statutory framework 
available for business funding in the UK during corporate rescue, by undertaking a 
comparison between relevant laws in the UK, Canada and the United States of America. 
The thesis evaluates if the UK’s provision for funding mirrors the functions of the well-
established rescue funding structures found in Canada and the United States of America. 
The study begins with a historical analysis of the development of bankruptcy laws in order 
to establish the context within which a rescue culture developed within the comparator 
jurisdictions. It identifies a shift of focus from outright liquidation of companies to the 
rescue of parts or the whole of a distressed company. This forms the milieu within which 
the study undertakes an examination of statutory provisions for business funding. It 
explores both the formal and informal frameworks available for funding and does this by 
an in-depth comparative analysis of the theoretical and contextual factors responsible for 
the development of divergent rescue funding procedures. The research identifies the 
differences and similarities between the relevant laws of the three countries and attempts 
to identify a possible functionally equivalent solution to the common issue of funding 
rescues with the aim of ascertaining whether there are any weaknesses to the present 
statutory provisions for business funding in the UK and, if so, how they may be addressed. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Rescue financing plays a critical role in the successful reorganization of insolvent 
companies that have a high prospect of returning to viability. The presence of an avenue 
for rescue financing contributes to improving the prospects of these companies being 
preserved as ongoing concerns, rather than storehouses of assets awaiting liquidation.1 The 
availability of finance is one of the major concerns faced by distressed companies wishing 
to reorganize their affairs. In some cases the company will be able to resolve its financial 
difficulties informally through private arrangements with its creditors without resorting to 
formal proceedings to achieve a rescue. 2  However, where the company relies on the 
formality of procedures3 under the Insolvency Act 1986, finance is of pivotal importance. 
It is essential that a distressed company has access to finance during the period between 
when the company commences insolvency proceedings and enters into any of the formal 
rescue procedures provided by legislation and a rescue plan is approved.4  
At this point, it is likely that the company may have no liquidity and / or no collateral to act 
as security to obtain new or more financing.5 Also if the company is insolvent, lenders may 
be reluctant to advance funds to it. The importance of the role that funding plays in effecting 
a successful rescue was recognised by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) which stated that finance facilitates the achievement of the rescue 
                                                          
1 J B Martin, K Nelson, E Rudenberg, and J Squires ‘Freefalling with Parachute that May Not Open: 
Debtor-in-Possession Financing in the Wake of the Great Recession’ (2009) 4 University of Miami Law 
Review, Vol. 63. 
2 See J Franks and O Sussman, ‘The Cycle of Corporate Distress, Rescue and Dissolution: a Study of Small 
and Medium Size UK Companies’ (2000) Institute of Finance and Accounting 306 Working paper 
http://www.turnaround-sa.com/pdf/The%20cycle%20of%20corporate%20distress.pdf accessed 7th  June 
2014. 
3 Formal insolvency procedures in a majority of cases have a statutory stay attached to it which suspends all 
creditor actions against the debtor and ensures an orderly distribution of the debtor’s assets. 
4 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> accessed 24th September 2013 
para 95 (“UNCITRAL Guide”). 
5 G McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and Corporate Rescue’ [2007] J.B.L. 701-732. 
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objectives of the debtor company by ensuring that there are funds to meet the essential day 
to day monetary needs of the debtor company.6  
 A number of jurisdictions have acknowledged that funding plays an important role in 
achieving a favourable outcome during corporate rescue and have, as part of reforms to 
their insolvency laws, introduced one form or another of corporate rescue/post-
commencement financing. 7  This is a special type of financing available to insolvent 
companies that have formally filed for and commenced an insolvency procedure and are 
under court-supervised creditor protection.8 Examples of corporate rescue financing can be 
seen in countries all over the world; the United States of America (US) has Debtor-in-
Possession (DIP) financing and priming liens to support the debtor’s rescue; in France and 
Germany all creditors providing goods and services after the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings are classed as priority creditors;9 and Australia permits the debtor to borrow 
money on a super-priority basis after obtaining the consent of secured creditors.10  
The availability of post-commencement financing 11  allows the debtor to carry on its 
business as a going concern,12 thereby potentially increasing the value of the business. Post-
commencement financing is facilitated by incentives that are put in place to encourage 
would-be creditors to lend money and / or provide goods and services to the debtor post-
commencement. Without these incentives it might otherwise be near impossible for the 
                                                          
6 UNCITRAL Guide (n 4) at para 94, p113-114.  
7 The term rescue financing and post-commencement financing would be used inter-changeably in the thesis 
to reflect the different terminologies found in existing literature. These terms refer to financing obtained by 
the insolvent debtor during rescue. 
8 V Gaur, ‘Post-petition Financing in Corporate Insolvency Proceedings: A Comparative Study Across 
Various Jurisdictions’ [2012] 111 SCL 17. 
9 Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanism, Report by 
the Review Group’ (DTI, 2000) (“Review Report”) p40. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Post-commencement financing/corporate rescue financing (also known as debtor-in-possession “DIP” 
financing (US Chapter 11), interim financing (Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act “CCAA”, Canada) is 
a specialized type of financing offered to insolvent companies during corporate rescue. 
12 Gaur (n 8).  
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debtor to continue trading, as it is likely that all credit sources would have dried up and 
existing assets would be fully encumbered. These incentives range from super-priority 
payment for lenders who advance money to the debtor during the rescue period, priority 
payment for creditors who provide goods and services during rescue and the recognition of 
some creditors as “critical suppliers”.13 Thus it can be said that the priority status given to 
creditors who provide money and / or goods and services acts as a form of guarantee where 
there are no available assets to be put up as security. 
Whilst it appears to be fast becoming the norm for jurisdictions to incorporate post-
commencement  financing reforms into their insolvency laws, the US has a longer history 
than other jurisdictions of having post-commencement  financing provisions, or debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing as it is called in that jurisdiction, as part of its Bankruptcy 
Code.14 The US’s provision for DIP financing has its roots in the 19th century railway equity 
receiverships, where notes that were raised to fund the receiverships enjoyed priority.15 
Presently, the US appears to be the foremost jurisdiction with well-structured provisions 
for post-commencement financing and these provisions seem to be the ideal upon which 
other jurisdictions have modelled their post-commencement financing reforms. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom (UK)16 appears to have a limited statutory framework for 
the purpose of facilitating rescue finance and the issue of how corporate rescues can be 
financed has attracted some debate in the past. The Cork Report, 17  which laid the 
foundation for the rescue culture in the UK and brought about the enactment of the 
Insolvency Act in 1985, later consolidated as the Insolvency Act 1986, had been silent as 
                                                          
13 See 11 U.S.C., s 364, Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, (CCAA) s 11.2. 
14 11 U.S.C. 
15 See  Fosdick v Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1878). 
16 Reference to UK law in this thesis is, unless stated otherwise, a reference to the law as it applies in 
England and Wales. 
17 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982) (“Cork 
Report”).  
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to how the new rescue procedures which it proposed, and which were implemented under 
the Insolvency Acts of 1985-6, would be funded. The only reference in the report as to how 
the funding of corporate rescue can be accomplished is a recommendation that, where an 
administration order is discharged, creditors who advanced money, or gave credit to the 
administrator to enable the company’s business to be carried on as a going concern, should 
enjoy priority of payment as part of the administration expenses. 18  This particular 
recommendation can be said to form the basis for the super-priority status accorded to 
administration expenses under the Insolvency Act 1986. It is perhaps surprising that the 
issue of how corporate rescue would be funded was not considered more extensively by the 
Cork Committee in its Report, given that administration was intended as a vehicle for 
continuous trading while the company reorganizes itself.   
The Insolvency Act 1986 underwent a major reform with the passage of the Enterprise Act 
2002. 19  The main objective of these reforms was to improve on the administration 
procedure by making it easily accessible to insolvent companies. It was also hoped that 
these reforms would align the administration procedure with, and replicate the functions of 
the US Chapter 11 rescue procedure; 20  however it arguably fell short in the area of 
incentives for post-commencement finance to aid corporate rescue as no express provision 
was made in that regard. This was despite the numerous consultations undertaken on the 
issue and, more importantly, the debates in the House of Lords.21 
 It was proposed during the House of Lords debates preceding the enactment of the 
Enterprise Act 2002 that in order to bring greater certainty to the process of funding rescues, 
                                                          
18 Ibid, para 514.  
19 The provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 came into force on the 15th of September 2003. 
20 L Conway, ‘A Comparison: Company Rescue Under UK Administration and US Chapter 
11’(SN/HA/5527) 18 May 2010, Home Affairs Section, House of Commons Library.  
21 HL Deb 29 July 2002, vol 638, col 763-806.  
5 
 
there was a need to introduce DIP financing into UK insolvency legislation.22 However, 
Lord McIntosh of Haringey, a labour peer stated that DIP financing was essentially a 
commercial matter and one which ought to be left to the dictates of the parties involved.23 
In addition, Lord McIntosh opined that the introduction of DIP financing would be 
incompatible with the structure of lending in the UK which is built around fixed charge and 
floating charge security.24 For the administrator to be able to obtain DIP financing, he 
would need the consent of the floating charge holder as the DIP finance would enjoy super-
priority status as part of administration expenses in preference to the claims of the floating 
charge holder, 25  and UK courts were not disposed to interfering in contractual 
agreements,26 where the floating charge holder withholds his consent. 
As it is, the Insolvency Act 1986 provides a basic framework to support the provision of 
post-commencement  financing by giving priority to the payment of the administrators’ 
remuneration and expenses27 and authorising the administrator to do all such things that are 
necessary for the management of the affairs, business and property of the company.28 
However it is not as well-defined a structure as may be found in some jurisdictions that 
have made post-commencement financing part of their insolvency legislation. Presently, 
distressed companies in the UK are more likely to secure new finance to support rescue 
procedures from existing secured creditors who agree to provide additional funds, or if the 
company is fortunate enough to have uncharged assets or charged assets with sufficient 
equity, it may offer these assets as fresh security in exchange for funds.29 In the alternative, 
                                                          
22 Ibid at para 788 . 
23 Ibid, per Lord McIntosh of Haringey at para 789.   
24 Ibid. 
25 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, para 99. 
26 S J Taylor, ‘Repair or Recycle? Some Thoughts on Dip Financing and Pre-Packs’ (2010) 4 International 
Corporate Rescue 269-270.  
27 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, para 99. 
28 Ibid, Schedule B1, para 59. 
29 Review Report (n 9) at para 123.  
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companies could opt for pre-packed administration, which does not require the debtor, but 
rather the purchaser, to source for funds.  
A pre-packaged administration (pre-pack) is a business sale which is negotiated and agreed 
on by a “proposed insolvency practitioner” (representing the company) and a buyer before 
the commencement of the administration process, and the appointment of the insolvency 
practitioner as administrator once the administration process commences.30 The pre-pack 
evolved post-Enterprise Act 2002, and appears to be popular due to its ability to avoid the 
risk of publicity which could cause serious damage to the going concern value of a 
distressed company.31 In addition, it has the advantage of saving a good number of jobs and 
the burden of funding the company’s rescue is shifted to the new buyer who must have 
funding in place prior to the purchase of the company.32 Of relevance to this thesis is the 
ability of the pre-pack to remove the burden of funding business rescue from distressed 
companies. 
In light of the fact that a large number of companies would be over-extended at the point 
of insolvency with no other source of finance, pre-packs appear to be a more attractive 
alternative in many instances. This then raises the question of whether it is truly necessary 
that there should be provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986 to incentivize the funding of 
continued trading by struggling companies. In effect, the high reliance on pre-packs by 
distressed companies means that more business rescues are achieved in the UK than 
company rescues. Franks and Sussman have shown in their study that in the UK, where 
company rescue is intended, this takes place outside formal insolvency proceedings33 and 
                                                          
30 See generally S Frisby, ‘The Second-chance Culture and Beyond: Some Observations on the Pre-pack 
Contribution’ (2009) Law and Financial Markets Review 242-247, see also, V Dennis, ‘Packing Case’ The 
Lawyer (London, 10 July 2011) 31. 
31 S Manson, ‘Pre-packs from the Valuer’s Perspective’ (2006) Recovery (summer) 19. 
32 M Hyde & I White, ‘Pre-pack Administration: Unwrapped’ (2009) Law and Financial Markets Review. 
33 See J Franks and O Sussman, ‘The Cycle of Corporate Distress, Rescue and Dissolution: a Study of Small 
and Medium Size UK Companies’ (2000) Institute of Finance and Accounting 306 Working paper 
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in most cases, formal rescue proceedings are used for business and asset sales, most 
especially where the removal of incumbent management is intended.34 This domination of 
business rescue may be questioned as company rescue is the express primary objective of 
administration, as envisaged by legislation.35 Might it be the case that if companies had an 
alternative source of funding through the backing of legislation, more company rescues 
would be achieved? 
Comparatively, the US and Canada (which are the comparators that will be used to assess 
the adequacy of the UK’s post-commencement financing provisions) have taken a 
divergent approaches to post-commencement financing. Both countries have made clear 
and incentivized provisions under legislation as to how rescues may be funded. Canada is 
of specific interest to this research, as this jurisdiction was in a position comparable to that 
in which the UK presently finds itself. Canada’s insolvency legislation initially had no 
provision for post-commencement financing and debtor companies wishing to have access 
to some form of financing during a rescue had to rely on the discretion of the judges in 
order to obtain it.36 The manner in which judges approached priority post-commencement 
financing later became the basis of the country’s post-commencement financing provisions 
after the reforms in 2005.37  The US on the other hand can be regarded as the pioneer of 
post-commencement financing as this jurisdiction has a long established history of 
                                                          
http://www.turnaround-sa.com/pdf/The%20cycle%20of%20corporate%20distress.pdf accessed 7th June 
2014. 
34 J Armour and S Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership’ 21 (2000) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 73-102. 
35 Lord McIntosh, while supporting the proposed Enterprise Bill in the House of Lords stated that company 
rescue formed the core of the revised administration procedure. It was the intention of Parliament that the 
focus of the administration procedure would be the rescue of companies, in order to create more incentive 
for management to act promptly and utilize the administration process before it became too late to save the 
company, see  H.L. Deb. 29th July 2002, vol 638 at para 766; See also Insolvency Act 1986,  Sch B1 para 3. 
36 J Sarra, ‘Debtor in Possession Financing: the Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant Super-priority 
Financing in CCAA Applications’ (2000) 23 Dalhousie L.J 337. 
37 CCAA 1985, s 11.2. 
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facilitating post-commencement financing. Presently, both countries offer incentives for 
the provision of rescue finance to distressed companies. 
Continued trading can often enhance the level of going concern value. In the event of 
continued trading, it may be essential for the company to have access to some form of 
external funding. Where finance is lacking, there is a high probability that ongoing trading 
will not be possible and the company may be forced into liquidation.38 The importance of 
incentives for the provision of finance in such circumstances has been internationally 
recognised. It is recommended in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law that, 
where insolvency laws support insolvency proceedings that allow an insolvent business to 
continue trading, either for reorganization or the sale of the business in liquidation as a 
going concern, it is important that the issue of new funding is addressed.39   
It therefore seems that there is a general desirability for all jurisdictions which promote a 
rescue culture to have in place some sort of legislative structure as to how the process can 
be funded. UNCITRAL does not prescribe how this should be done, but stresses the 
importance of having some form of certainty regarding the issue of funding.  On the other 
hand, UNCITRAL also recognises that any solution to rescue financing that is adopted must 
take into consideration the interests of the parties who will be affected by the introduction 
of post-commencement financing laws. 
 
1.1 Research aims 
 
The issue of rescue financing is essentially a commercial one involving banks and financial 
institutions. Although there have been some notable instances in which governments have 
                                                          
38 Review Report (n 9) at para 112. 
39 UNCITRAL Guide (n 4) at para 97. 
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funded the rescues of some companies which it felt were “too big to fail”40 (owing to the 
potential adverse impact of their failure on the society) this thesis focuses on private sector 
rescue financing. 
This thesis therefore considers both the theoretical and practical issues underlying 
commercial post-commencement funding in the US, Canada and the UK. The main 
objectives of this research are to consider and analyse the statutory framework (if any) 
available for business funding in corporate rescue within the UK, to explore the possibility 
of adopting a more proactive framework for rescue funding within the UK through 
comparative analysis of the approach to funding in the US and Canadian jurisdictions, and 
to identify any conflict of interest that may arise as a result of any proposed reforms within 
the statutory framework available for rescue funding.  
There is a need for this research as corporate rescue funding is arguably vital to the success 
of a distressed company’s rescue, and having funding provisions within the Insolvency Act 
1986 may provide companies with the greater prospect of a trading administration41 as an 
alternative to pre-pack administration. The lack of availability of finance for a trading 
administration is often given as the reason why a pre-pack has been favoured in a particular 
case. Greater incentivisation of rescue finance would therefore perhaps lead to more rescues 
of whole companies rather than the business rescue/sale outcome that is currently 
prevalent.42  
                                                          
40 For example the bailout of GM Motors and Chrysler by the US and Canadian Governments 
respectively(Canada was only involved in the Chrysler bailout); the bailout of Canada Air and Algoma 
Steel Company by the Canadian Government and the bailouts offered by the UK Government to the 
banking sector ( Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, HBOS). 
41 In a trading administration, an administrator continues trading in an attempt to put the company back on 
sound footing. 
42 S Frisby, ‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’ presented to the Insolvency Service in August 2006. 
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Attempts have been made in the past by some interest groups to champion the introduction 
of post-commencement  finance provisions within the UK,43 but to date none have been 
successful. While the Insolvency Act 1986, Schedules 1 and B1 have provided the right 
foundation in enabling the administrator to raise funds which are repayable in priority even 
to his own remuneration, there is the possibility that this may not be enough to secure post-
commencement funding. What is arguably key and missing from these provisions are the 
necessary incentives required to encourage lenders to advance funds that are essential to 
the successful rescue of the company as whole. Perhaps the attachment of incentives to 
Schedules 1 and B1 would improve the administration process, and more often enable the 
achievement of the outcome that administration was initially created to achieve, i.e. 
company rescue. 
This research analyses and evaluates the framework for the funding of company rescue 
available in the UK, using the Canadian and the US’s post-commencement provisions as 
comparators. With the aid of these comparators, the research attempts to establish either 
the adequacy of existing statutory provisions or the need for reform. This research will 
therefore shed more light on the suitability (or otherwise) of the present financing regime 
available for corporate rescue in the UK, while analysing its inter-relationship with lending 
structures and creditors’ rights. While the research has as its main focus the funding of 
corporate rescue in the UK, it is hoped that more clarification will be gained regarding post-
commencement financing in the US and Canada and its inter-relationship, impact and effect 
on other associated issues that arise when a company is on the brink of insolvency. These 
issues range from creditors’ rights, the perceptions of debt in the jurisdictions under 
consideration, and how corporate rescues are funded. In this regard, it is envisaged that the 
                                                          
43 L Qi, ‘Availability of Continuing Financing in Corporate Reorganisation: the UK and US Perspective’ 
(2008) 29 Comp. Law. 162-167. 
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research will identify areas of shortcomings and strengths not only within the UK, but also 
in the US and Canada. 
 
1.2 Research methodology 
 
The research takes a doctrinal law approach, which is an in-depth analysis, aimed at seeking 
new insights in order to broaden an understanding of the research area. The research has 
been conducted with the aid of primary and secondary sources of law, incorporating a 
comprehensive analysis of existing literature, official government publications, statutes and 
case law. The study is accomplished by means of a comparative legal analysis with a bias 
towards the functional equivalence thesis. In order to establish the validity of the choice of 
methodology, two fundamental questions need to be answered and these are; why 
comparative law and why the choice of jurisdictions? 
 
1.2.1 Why comparative law? 
 
Comparative law may be seen as a distinctive legal subject within the wider body of 
comparative disciplines44  which enable the gathering of knowledge. 45  It is a genre of 
comparative analysis adopted by legal scholars to investigate law, through the examination 
of the similarities and differences of different social or cultural phenomena in order to 
broaden understanding of the law.46 It acts as an important gateway to foreign cultures and 
                                                          
44 N Jansen, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 2008). 
45 E J Eberle ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies 
Law Review, 451-486. 
46 J W Cairns, ‘Development of Comparative Law in Great Britain’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford  2008). 
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the insights gathered can provide useful clarification on the inner workings of a foreign 
legal system; these insights can then be applied to the legal system under investigation, 
helping to clarify different perspectives that may generate a deeper understanding of that 
legal order.47 
 In employing comparative law, the foreign element (which in the present context is the 
foreign law) must first be understood and explained prior to creating a system of similarities 
and differences on which additional analysis can then be based.48 Thus comparative law 
not only seeks to produce similarities between two distinct concepts but also to illustrate 
differences and highlight divergent characteristics between two phenomena, both in the 
nature and content of rules and in their operation. Differences in legal systems are often a 
result of economic, political, cultural and moral factors which are deeply entrenched within 
the foreign legal system and, more often than not, the foreign phenomenon or legal system 
is better explained from a historical standpoint. 49  This is not to say that comparative 
analysis merely reveals past legal history; but rather it uses these revelations to portray what 
the law may tend to be in years to come.50 
 It has been argued that if laws are meant to accomplish a purpose and meet societal 
requirements, then it is essential to develop laws that meet these needs (commonly referred 
to as social engineering) and comparative law can aid the evaluation of the ability of 
different solutions to solve similar problems and encourage similar degrees of progress.51 
In essence, comparative legal analysis is a comparison of different societies meeting 
                                                          
47 See (n 45). 
48 Jansen (n 44).  
49 W Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What was it like to try a Rat’ (1995) 143 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1889 ff & 1945 ff.   
50 F Pollock, ‘The History of Comparative Jurisprudence’ (1903) 5 Journal of the Society of Comparative 
Legislation 74.  
51 R Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 2008). 
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comparable societal needs with different solutions in an attempt to stimulate improvements 
to the law. 
 There are two underlying theses popular in today’s comparative analysis literature; the 
convergence thesis and the functional equivalence thesis. The convergence thesis is one 
which promotes internationalisation and globalisation.52 It supports the view that the laws 
of all nations are expected to converge towards parallel socio-economic structures.53 Thus, 
as the world becomes a global village, there should be a uniformity of socio-economic 
structure as well as legal systems. The problem with this argument is that comparative law 
recognises and admits the fact that each legal system is influenced by economic, 
geographical, moral and cultural factors that cannot be replicated from one jurisdiction to 
another. It then seems that expecting each and every legal system to converge and have 
similar structures may not be practicable. Moreover the benefit of convergence can only be 
found in the formal improvement it makes54 and it may be costly to implement.55  
The functional equivalence theory on the other hand, acknowledges that although each legal 
system originates from different traditional principles, rules and beliefs, they face similar 
problems which need solutions.56 Consequently, different legal systems adopt different 
solutions to deal with similar problems,57 and these solutions may only be similar in relation 
to the specific function that they perform within the society.58 The functional equivalence 
theory calls for an understanding of society and its sub-systems made up of the relationship 
between its elements rather than independent elements that have no connections. 59 
                                                          
52 G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New 
Divergences’ (1998) 1 MLR p 11-32. 
53 Ibid. 
54 U Mattei, ‘Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford  2008). 
55 Michaels (n 51). 
56 Teubner (n 52).  
57 Ibid. 
58 Michaels (n 51). 
59 Ibid. 
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Consequently, societies having the same societal problems can draw on other societies’ 
solutions to come up with a functional equivalent to tackle their problems. This does not 
necessarily mean that the change or solution would come in the same form or within the 
same area of the society. The fundamental principle of functional equivalence is that 
solutions to similar problems can be remedied in different ways. 
 
1.2.2 Why the choice of jurisdictions? 
 
The decision to use the Canadian and the US jurisdictions as benchmarks lies in the fact 
that they are both common law jurisdictions that share some legislative history with the 
UK, and may potentially provide some insight as to why the UK, on the issue of post-
commencement financing, has evolved differently. The US has a long history of having 
well established, incentive-based systems of post-commencement financing in place, which 
have evolved over time into the sophisticated system presently available. Canada, on the 
other hand, provides two approaches to rescue funding; the use of judicial fiat to assign 
funds during corporate rescue, and post-commencement statutory provisions which later 
replaced the earlier judge-made laws. In addition to Canada providing a more recent 
example of the development of post-commencement financing, it was also chosen because 
it gives a perspective on the ability of judges to bridge the gap where statute has left a 
vacuum, a position similar to that of the UK, with its history of judge-made rules through 
the use of precedents. 
 
1.3 Summary of chapters 
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One of the arguments put forward by proponents of comparative analysis is that in order to 
have a robust comparative analysis, the phenomenon under investigation ought to be broken 
down into sub-components. The structure of this thesis reflects this approach. Comparative 
law, by definition, examines the relationship between legal systems and the most prominent 
aspect of this relationship is arguably historical. History uncovers the source of a body of 
laws, its affiliation with other laws and the influences that may have shaped the 
development of the laws or legal system under investigation.60 As a result, Chapter II 
employs extensive comparisons in establishing the context of this thesis by tracing the 
history of bankruptcy laws in all three jurisdictions in order to ascertain when a corporate 
rescue culture came into existence in each of the countries. Having established the context, 
it examines the development of corporate rescue and the surrounding factors that influenced 
this development. Different factors influence the creation of laws, and this Chapter 
pinpoints a number of factors that may have influenced the development of a corporate 
rescue culture in each of the jurisdictions under investigation. This chapter also examines 
societal attitudes to debt and debtors in the UK, Canada and the US. Debt is central to 
bankruptcy, consequently laws that act as guidelines to administer issues arising out of 
bankruptcy may be influenced by how that society perceives the notion of debt. This chapter 
analyses the connection between these two concepts. 
In-depth comparative analysis continues in the subsequent chapters which reflect the 
relevant components that underlie rescue funding in corporate rescue, and realise the aims 
and objectives of the research. These components are considered in Chapters III – V. 
Chapter III builds on the development of corporate rescue. It begins with an examination 
of the importance of corporate rescue funding; thereafter it looks at how the rescue process 
is funded. In order to provide a detailed analysis, this chapter provides a historical overview 
                                                          
60 E M Wise, ‘The Transplant of Legal Patterns’ (1990) 38 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 1. 
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of the development of rescue funding in each of the jurisdictions to date, the players 
involved in rescue funding, and the incentives available to encourage access to different 
forms of rescue funding.  
Chapter IV explores secured lending and its relevance to the availability of rescue funding. 
It begins by discussing the concept of security and how the type of security found in a 
jurisdiction determines its lending structure. This in turn raises consequential issues when 
a company becomes insolvent, such as an insolvent company’s ability to access funds to 
continue trading during rescue. This chapter assesses the structure of lending in the UK and 
its capacity to support rescue funding. Creditors may be regarded as one of the key players 
in corporate rescue, particularly with regard to how the process can be funded. Chapter V 
considers the impact of post-commencement funding on creditors’ rights. It examines the 
role of creditors in corporate rescue and analyses how creditors’ rights could be affected 
during corporate rescue. The thesis ends with a conclusion and recommendation in Chapter 
VI and revisits the functional equivalence theory and the concept of legal transplants.  
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Chapter II: History of Corporate Rescue  
Introduction 
 In order to undertake a thorough comparative analysis of business funding in corporate 
rescue within the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) and Canada, there is a need to 
establish the origin of corporate rescue within these three jurisdictions. The history of 
corporate rescue is grounded deep within the history of bankruptcy laws. Although all three 
jurisdictions have a long and remarkable history of making bankruptcy enactments, some 
of which can be traced as far back as the reign of King Henry VIII (the United Kingdom), 
the act of making provisions for the rescue and rehabilitation of companies facing financial 
ruin cannot lay claim to such an extensive history. Statute-backed mechanisms for 
corporate rescue are of fairly recent origin when compared in the light of how long 
bankruptcy laws have been in existence, since companies were not formed until the early 
part of the 19th century. Consequently, the bankruptcy laws prior to the formation of 
companies were geared towards merchants and individuals.  
As commerce evolved and companies were formed to tackle complex commercial 
undertakings, bankruptcy laws developed to make provisions for the collapse of these 
business structures. These provisions were tailored towards the liquidation of companies 
with the intention of making some returns to the companies’ creditors. Subsequently, the 
financial and social impact of various economic depressions on companies and the society 
during the early part of the 20th century, in addition to the belief that creditors and the 
society had more to gain in avoiding liquidation, led to the adoption of rescue measures to 
assist debtor companies and in turn improve the economy. Presently, the main objective of 
most rescue systems is to preserve the company as a going concern regardless of its 
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financial troubles, on the condition that the company has the potential to become viable 
again.1 
Therefore this chapter is aimed at situating the origin and growth of corporate rescue. It 
considers the state of bankruptcy laws pre-and post-formation of companies and in doing 
so, it creates a trajectory of the development of corporate rescue from its inception until 
present time, while identifying the factors responsible for the shift of focus from liquidation 
of companies, to the rescue of businesses/companies within the UK, Canada and the US. In 
addition, it outlines the various rescue mechanisms available in the three jurisdictions and 
analyses how societal attitudes towards debt held by the three jurisdictions may have 
influenced the type of bankruptcy laws adopted by them. It does this by employing 
historical analysis so as to establish a context for the introduction of corporate rescue and 
the provision of enabling legislation to support the funding of rescues.  
Of all the three jurisdictions, the UK has a more extensive history of making bankruptcy 
laws and due to its historical ties with both the Canadian and the US jurisdictions, in 
addition to being a major world power, it became the ideal upon which America and Canada 
modelled their bankruptcy laws.2 This historical analysis forms the framework upon which 
an examination of business funding in corporate rescue and its related factors will be 
examined in the later chapters. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest (University of Toronto Press 2003) p 13-19. 
2 D A Skeel Jr., ‘The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act’ (1999) 15 Bank. Dev. J. 321. 
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2.1 Bankruptcy in the UK 
 
2.1.1 Early bankruptcy laws (pre-1844) 
 
The English jurisdiction has had a long history of having developed rules of bankruptcy 
and this can be traced to 1542 when the first such Act was enacted.3 As a result, the UK has 
played a prominent role in shaping both the Canadian and the US bankruptcy laws, as both 
jurisdictions had in the past looked to the UK for inspiration when drafting their respective 
bankruptcy laws. English bankruptcy law was an obvious choice because of the shared 
history of these jurisdictions as colonies of the UK.4 Up until 1844, commerce in the UK 
was largely conducted by merchants; as such the bankruptcy laws at the time were suited 
to deal with the collapses of the businesses of these merchants as well as issues of personal 
bankruptcy.5 Although these laws were mainly punitive in nature, as individual bankrupts 
were treated as criminals responsible for their bankruptcy,6 merchants however fared a lot 
better as they were not subjected to the same castigation as their non-trading counterparts.  
The treatment of both trade debtors and individual bankrupts under one Act was to change 
in 1844 as bankruptcy provisions in the UK underwent sweeping changes. These changes, 
as will be discussed below, were as a result of the development of complex commercial 
structures. While the main focus of this chapter is on corporate bankruptcy, the 
development of corporate bankruptcy will be examined alongside changes made to 
bankruptcy laws generally. This is because issues of corporate bankruptcies were carried 
along under the earlier bankruptcy statutes which dealt with individual bankruptcy.7 
                                                          
3 Act Against Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupt 1542 (34 and 35 Henry VIII, ch.4). 
4 Skeel (n 2). 
5 See the various Bankruptcy Acts enacted in 1705, 1831, 1844, 1849, 1861 and 1869. 
6 Bankruptcy Act 1542 (n 3).  
7 Although there are no statutory provisions to back this position, it is inferred from court practices at the 
time. 
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2.1.2 1844 (formation of companies) to 1883 
 
With the expansion of the British Empire and the growth of commerce, the need for a more 
complex structure to deal with trade became evident and this led to the birth of corporations 
with the passing of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 by Parliament. This Act recognised 
companies as distinct legal entities by drawing a distinction between a partnership and a 
joint stock company.8 Also the subsequent Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act 1844 
made it possible for these companies to be made bankrupt albeit in the same way as 
individuals. This represented the first acknowledgement of corporate bankruptcy within the 
UK.  
While changes were being made to bankruptcy laws by the recognition and introduction of 
laws dealing with corporate failures (Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act 1844), 
bankruptcy laws in general were undergoing some changes. One notable change which was 
effected by the Bankruptcy Consolidated Act 1849 was the introduction of voluntary 
bankruptcy which enabled a debtor petition for his own bankruptcy,9 a task which was 
usually carried out by one or more of the debtor’s creditors. Therefore a debtor could for 
the first time, of his own volition, initiate proceedings when he is unable to meet the debt 
requirement of his creditors. The Act also created an avenue for the debtor trader to reach 
an agreement with his creditors on how claims would be settled. 10  Also, like its 
predecessors, the Act dealt with bankrupt traders, however, it expressly excluded its 
                                                          
8 However, joint stock companies were still treated as partnerships and their members were all liable 
personally to creditors, although this liability came after the liability of the company itself. See C A Cooke 
Corporation, Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History (Manchester University Press 1951) p146. 
9 Bankruptcy Act 1849 (12 &13 Vict., c.106) s 93. 
10 Ibid, s 76. It should be noted that the filing of an arrangement before filing for bankruptcy was regarded 
as proof of bankruptcy at the time. This is in sharp contrast to what obtains presently, as a company can 
make use of a scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act to re-organize its affairs without being 
bankrupt.  
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provisions from being applied to “members or subscribers to any incorporation, commercial 
or trading established by charter or Act of Parliament”.11 This appeared to endorse the Joint 
Stock Winding-Up Act as the appropriate statute when it came to matters concerning the 
bankruptcy of complex commercial structures like corporations.12  
In 1861, a well-structured bankruptcy statute was enacted by Parliament which established 
“officialism” within the English bankruptcy structure by making provisions for the 
appointment of an official assignee to take charge of the debtor’s assets. 13  This new 
structure replaced the earlier system which was under the control of creditors and was used 
primarily as a collection device for individual creditors.14 While still a collection device as 
previous Acts were, the Bankruptcy Act 1861 moved the control of the bankruptcy system 
from individual creditors to a government appointed person.15 The Act also abolished the 
distinction between traders and non-traders16 thus all bankrupts were treated equally.  
It was not until the enactment of the first modern company law statue in 1862, the 
Companies Act 1862, that distinct and separate provisions which treated companies as 
separate legal entities from members and shareholders were in place to deal solely with 
companies and their collapses. The Companies Act 1862 consolidated both the provisions 
relating to winding up and those respecting the formations of the company under one Act. 
The Act gave powers to the court to wind up a debtor company17 in addition to enabling 
the voluntary winding up by the company18 and giving the creditors a right to wind up a 
                                                          
11 Bankruptcy Act 1849 (n 9) s 65. 
12 Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act 1849 appeared to support this notion as it provided that the Act had no 
effect on actions carried out under the Joint Stock Winding-Up Act, therefore companies to which the Joint 
Stock Winding-Up Act applied to, were not covered by the Bankruptcy Act.  
13 Bankruptcy Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict., c.134), s 108. This section makes provisions for the appointment of 
an official assignee to take charge of the debtors’ estate until the appointment of a creditors’ assignee. 
14 Skeel (n 2). 
15 To be appointed as a commissioner of the Court of Bankruptcy, the individual had to be a serjeant-at-law, 
or a barrister-at-law, of not less than twelve years’ standing at the bar in England”. See Bankruptcy Act 
1861, s 2. 
16 See Bankruptcy Act 1861 (n 13), s 69. 
17 Company Act 1862, s 79.  
18 Ibid, s 129. 
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debtor company.19 It also introduced the appointment of an official liquidator to manage 
the winding up of the company.20  
Further changes to Bankruptcy laws in general came in 1869. As it became clear that some 
debtors were victims of misfortune rather than a deliberate attempt on their part to defraud 
creditors, the general attitude of treating debtors as charlatans underwent transformation; 
as such bankruptcy laws were modified to reflect this shift in attitude. The changes in the 
laws came in the form of a new Bankruptcy Act 1869 and the Debtors Act 1869. The 
Bankruptcy Act which was enacted in 1869, although mainly a collect and divide 
mechanism designed to satisfy claims made by creditors, 21  provided an option for 
compromise for the debtor to come to some form of agreement with his creditors on how 
to satisfy their claims.22 The Act also clearly excluded its application to companies and 
large associations and partnerships registered under the Company Act 1862.23 It was also 
at this point that the Debtors Act 1869, which was aimed at reforming the powers of court 
to detain creditors, was enacted. It abolished the arbitrary imprisonment of debtors by the 
courts,24 taking away the threat of imprisonment which hung over debtors at the time. Thus, 
rather than face untold hardships, the laws were tailored in such a way as to assist the debtor 
to sort out his affairs. 
 
2.1.3 Modern bankruptcy laws (1883 to date) 
 
                                                          
19 Ibid, s 145.  
20 Ibid, s 92.  
21 D G Baird and T H Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on Bankruptcy (2nd edn, Little Brown 1989) 
chap1. 
22 See Bankruptcy Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict., c.62), s 126(composition with creditors) and s 125 (liquidation 
by arrangement). 
23 Ibid, s 5.This shows a clear recognition of the distinction between corporate and personal insolvency. 
24 Debtor Act 1869, s 4. This provision abolished the imprisonment for debts although ss 11 to 15 allowed 
for the punishment of fraudulent debtors.  
23 
 
At the later part of the 19th century, laws pertaining to bankruptcy were dealt with under 
the various Bankruptcy acts and Company acts and this is discussed below. 
2.1.3.1 Bankruptcy Act 
 
The Bankruptcy Act 1883 further consolidated the introduction of well-structured and 
comprehensive bankruptcy provisions. The only draw-back was that it dealt mainly with 
personal insolvency. As earlier stated, this did not preclude it from being used as a point of 
reference or when corporate bankruptcies were dealt with. It is interesting to note that the 
Act of 1883 was pivotal in the early reforms to bankruptcy laws that took place in Canada 
as that country relied heavily on the 1883 Act in enacting its Bankruptcy Act 1919.25 
However the US, which had always looked to the UK for guidance in the enactment of its 
bankruptcy laws was at this point (from 1883 onwards) radically deviating from the English 
precedents it had followed in the past with the enactment of its Bankruptcy Act 1898. This 
will be discussed in the second segment of this chapter. 
The 1883 Act introduced an organized ranking of claims with its underlying pari passu 
principle to guide the satisfaction of the claims of unsecured creditors.26 It also merged the 
specialist London Bankruptcy courts, which had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with 
bankruptcy matters, with the high court and therefore transferred jurisdiction to the High 
Court.27 In addition, courts were given the power to make administration orders for small 
bankruptcies, in order to facilitate the instalment payment of a debt owed. 28  Further 
Amendments were made to the Act in 1914, which consolidated the provisions of the 1883 
Act.29 The 1883 Act remained in force until it was merged with the provisions of the 
                                                          
25 L Duncan, Law and Practise of Bankruptcy in Canada 31, N.5 (Carswell Company, 1922). 
26 Bankruptcy Act 1883(46 & 47 Vict c. 52), s 40. 
27 Ibid, s 93-94. 
28 Ibid, s 121-122. 
29 Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo 5 c.59). 
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Companies Act 1929 to offer a well-structured bankruptcy regime which incorporated 
personal and corporate insolvency and made provisions for rehabilitation and winding-up 
of companies. 
 
2.1.3.2  Companies Act  
 
In 1908, amendments were made to enhance the 1862 Companies Act (the first statute to 
recognize companies as separate legal entities from their owners). 30  Whilst the Act 
essentially remained the same, section 120 of the consolidating Act of 1908 gave powers 
to the debtors to compromise with creditors before or during winding up. This could be 
seen in today’s rescue culture as an attempt to rehabilitate debtor companies. Subsequently, 
bankruptcy as it relates to corporations was covered by the various Companies Acts31 which 
only made provision initially for winding up, but thereafter introduced provisions which 
gave debtors leave to reach a compromise with their creditors.32 The reliance of distressed 
companies on the provisions of the Companies Act was to continue until the enactment of 
the Insolvency Act 1985 (consolidated as the Insolvency Act 1986) which made 
comprehensive provisions for the administration of corporate bankruptcy and introduced a 
comprehensive framework under which companies could reach an agreement with its 
creditors on how to settle their claims, thus signalling the beginning of a rescue culture in 
the UK. 
 
2.2 Corporate rescue in the UK 
 
                                                          
30 See p21-22 of the thesis. 
31 Such as the Companies Act 1908 & 1929. 
32 See Companies Act 1862, s 136; Companies Act 1908, s 191. 
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The UK has a history of treating debtors as quasi felons and this can be traced as far back 
as the mid-16th century where the preamble to the UK’s first Bankruptcy Act (1542)33 
portrayed debtors as criminals. The treatment of those who found themselves to be bankrupt 
and the society’s belief that they ought to be punished did not make a good foundation for 
encouraging the rehabilitation of debtors. As such, the laws at the time reflected this attitude 
and tended to be punitive in nature.34 Nevertheless the jurisdiction with the passage of time 
made provisions which were more sympathetic to debtors and this was first reflected in the 
1705 Bankruptcy Act.35 This supposed shift in attitude did not extend to the rehabilitation 
of debtors rather it acted to compensate debtors who did not hinder the administration of 
their estate.36  
Subsequent reforms to bankruptcy laws from 1884 upwards reflected a slow move towards 
a rescue culture, from provisions for compromise to the well-defined rescue structures 
provided by the Insolvency Act 1986.  In the next sub-section, the thesis would examine 
how the shift in attitude from 1884 towards bankrupt debtors, gave way to favourable 
provisions which eventually cumulated in the adoption of a rescue culture in 1985 to 
facilitate the rehabilitation of debtors. 
 
2.2.1 1844-1985 
 
                                                          
33 An Act against Such Persons as Do Make Bankrupt 1542 (34 & 35 Hen VIII, c.4). 
34 J Dufrene, A Treatise on the Law between Debtor and Creditors (2nd edn, London 1820). The author was 
a bankrupt who had suffered under the harsh provisions of the bankruptcy laws in force. He referred to the 
Bankruptcy Act as a criminal code and mourned the fact that the legislature focused more on the interest of 
creditors. He went further to state that the best way to protect the creditor is to begin with doing justice to 
the debtor, for the same cause which makes it easy to oppress the debtor produces injury to the creditor. 
35 See an Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts 1705 (4 Anne, c.17). It should be 
noted that consumer debtors were treated quite different from merchant traders who all fell under the 
provisions of the Act. The law was more sympathetic to merchant traders. 
36 J D Honsberger, ‘Philosophy and Design of Modern Fresh Start Policies: the Evolution of Canada’s 
Legislative Policy’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J 171. 
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The UK jurisdiction until the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1985, had two separate 
statutes which dealt with bankruptcy; the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 1926 for personal 
insolvency (which also included the insolvency of merchant traders) and the Companies 
Act 1984 which dealt with the winding up of corporations. Although the sub-topic relates 
to corporations, a brief examination of the rehabilitation of debtors under the various 
Bankruptcy Acts during this time will be undertaken as the Bankruptcy Acts acted as a 
point of reference for corporate bankruptcy.  
Notwithstanding that society began to acknowledge that, in a lot of cases, misfortune or the 
uncertain nature of economic tides may have had more to do with debtors failing than their 
innate desire to embark on a life of criminality, not much in way of rehabilitation was 
available to debtors. Most debtors ended up going through liquidation, with emphasis on 
the division of assets to satisfy the claims of creditors. Nevertheless, there were options for 
debtors to offer a compromise to creditors in order to gain some sort of reprieve in the form 
of having interests reduced, or an extension of time within which to pay their creditors’ 
claims.  
The provisions for composition within these Acts, while supporting the notion that debtors 
needed help sorting out the bankruptcy estate, also may have shown that debtors could be 
rehabilitated. Thus it could be assumed that the concept of rescue did exist at the time. A 
look at the Bankruptcy Act 1861 seems to support this theory. Section 109 states; 
“At the creditors’ meeting a majority in value of the creditors present shall 
determine whether any or what support shall be made to the bankrupt…..” 
Section 185 goes further to provide that; 
“at the first meeting of creditors held……or at any meeting to be called for the 
purpose and of which 10 days’ notice have been given…..three-quarter in number 
and value of the creditors present or represented…….may resolve that the estate 
ought to be wound up under a deed of agreement, composition or otherwise and an 
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application shall be made to the court to stay proceedings in bankruptcy for such a 
period as the court shall think fit.” 
 
Succeeding Acts introduced more structure to the availability of compositions and schemes 
of arrangement to debtors. The Bankruptcy Act 1883 gave powers to creditors to accept 
and courts to approve compositions.37 However it came with a caveat; the composition plan 
would not bind creditors except if it was confirmed by a resolution passed by three-quarter 
in value of all creditors who had proved their claim. 38  Thus compositions were not 
automatic and where there was none in place, the debtor’s assets were wound up without 
delay and thereafter sold off and distributed among the creditors to satisfy their claims.39 
The 1914 amending Bankruptcy Act reinforced these provisions by providing for 
liquidation and compositions or extensions as part of bankruptcy.40 It also opened up a way 
for debtors to use composition to terminate or prevent a bankruptcy without liquidation.41 
Even at that, the principal statute that regulated and managed the winding up of companies 
was the Companies Act 1913. 
The Companies Act of 1862 was the first modern statute which had provisions that dealt 
with corporate bankruptcy.42 While it dealt with the winding up of companies, it also 
allowed creditors and debtors to reach a compromise. Subsequent Acts such as the 
Companies (Consolidated) Act 190843 also made provisions for debtors to come to some 
agreement with creditors on how to restructure their debt during winding up. These laws 
provided an avenue for debtors to agree on a plan with their creditors on how the debt could 
be restructured. Although not a rescue mechanism in the true sense, they seemed to have 
                                                          
37 Bankruptcy Act 1883, s 18. 
38 Ibid, s 18(2). 
39 Ibid, s 18. 
40 Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo c.59), s 16. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Companies Act 1862, part 4. 
43 See Companies (Consolidated) Act 1908, s 120. 
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provided a sort of framework for rescue at the point of liquidation, but only with the view 
of making it easier for debtors to meet their obligations to creditors. This is relatively 
different from the underlying objective of corporate rescue which attempts rehabilitation at 
the point of bankruptcy with the aim of returning the business/company to viability.  
 Subsequent amendments to the Companies Act such as the 1948 Act dealt with 
reconstruction, compromises and arrangements of companies and gave companies the 
leeway to propose any plan as long as the scheme was not contrary to the general law or 
ultra vires the company.44  Despite these attempts at encouraging the rehabilitation of 
companies, the prevalent approach at the time was liquidation of companies and this 
persisted until 198545 when a new insolvency law representing findings presented by the 
Cork Committee was passed into law. The new law incorporated specific provisions which 
facilitated corporate rescue. 
It has been asserted that the reason why the UK was slow in adopting formal rescue 
procedures lay with the old receivership procedure.46 This procedure was an equitable 
remedy available to creditors with a floating charge under the jurisdiction of the Chancery 
court, where a receiver and manager was appointed by the court to manage the affairs of 
the debtor company on behalf of a creditor.47 Later, it became more convenient for the 
appointment of the receiver/manager to be done by the creditor concerned48 and this custom 
and practice was subsequently given legislative backing by the Law of Property Act 1925.49 
Gradually the procedure evolved with the development of intricate provision of credit and, 
in order to provide stronger protection for the credit sought by businesses, the modern 
                                                          
44 See Companies Act 1948, s 206. 
45 G Moss, ‘Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures, Rescue/Liquidation? Comparisons of Trends in National 
Law- England’ (1997) 23 Brook. J. Int’l.L. 115, 118. 
46 This can be deduced from the Cork Report where it acknowledged that the administrative receivership 
had been used in that manner. 
47 B. Hannigan, Company Law, (Butterworths 2003) p727. 
48  R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn Sweet and Maxwell 2010) p247. 
49 Law of property Act 1925, s 101(i) (iii) and s 109. 
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debenture evolved.50 The modern debenture created a fixed charge over fixed assets and 
floating charge over the remainder of the companies’ assets.51 Thus it became the purview 
of the debenture holder holding a floating charge to appoint a receiver/manager to manage 
the business on his behalf when the company defaulted. Whilst not tailored specifically to 
the rescue of a company, the old administrative receivership could successfully be used for 
rescue purposes if this was in the interest of the principal creditor who appointed the 
receiver and he was not prevented from doing so by opposing parties.52 This procedure 
played a major role in insolvency in the UK until it was virtually abolished by the Enterprise 
Act 2002.53 
 
2.2.2 The law as it is now (1985 to date) 
 
The facts which prompted major overhaul of the UK bankruptcy laws which occurred in 
the 1970s to 2000s included a combination of economic and social events.54 This fusion of 
elements generated a lot of pressure for reforms to the insolvency laws which were regarded 
as inadequate at the time.55 These factors were responsible for a shift in the way debtor 
companies were assisted and given a fresh start. The major catalyst for this change came in 
form of the report submitted by the Insolvency Review Committee headed by Sir Kenneth 
Cork which was set up by the Secretary of State for Trade in January 1977.56 Amongst the 
terms of reference set out for the committee was the need to come up with less formal 
                                                          
50 Goode (n 48) p248. 
51 Ibid. 
52 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency, Law Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University Press 2002) p 
253. 
53It was heavily criticised for not being sufficiently accountable to all stakeholders ant this was 
consequently thought to result in the wasteful closure of good businesses. See A Hsu and A Walters, ‘The 
Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisation and Costs in Corporate Rescue Proceedings’, a Report 
prepared for the Insolvency Service, December 2006. 
54 M Hunter, ‘The Nature and Function of a Rescue Culture’ [1999] JBL 491-520.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Cork Report. 
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procedures where appropriate, which would act as an opt – out from the more conventional 
exit of winding-up.57 This has been regarded as the first official indication of government’s 
willingness not only to encourage rescue culture58 but also to provide the tools to actualise 
it.  
The committee in its interim report acknowledged the inadequacies of the machineries 
available for the administration of bankruptcy in the UK and stated that there was need for 
a revamp.59 The committee stated that it was fundamental to good insolvency practice for 
a balance to be achieved between providing an efficient way of administering the 
bankrupt’s estate and giving the debtor a chance for rehabilitation where appropriate.60 It 
then follows that whilst the existing regimes at the time may have appeared to have 
achieved a modest amount of efficiency in the administration of the bankrupt’s estate, when 
it came to rehabilitation they were seemingly lacking. As earlier stated and acknowledged 
by the committee in its interim report, the bankruptcy system in the UK at the time had “a 
strong undercurrent of what can conveniently be described as retributive and punitive 
justice towards the debtor”.61 
The committee in its final report sought to correct this inefficiency and defined what the 
aims of modern insolvency should be and in chapter 4 sub paragraph (j), the report states 
that modern insolvency should provide a way to preserve viable businesses. On the basis 
of this report, the UK Insolvency Act 1985 was enacted, providing unprecedented 
opportunities for corporate reorganisation. It introduced the administration procedure to 
support the rehabilitation or re-organisation of companies facing difficulties in order to 
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
58 Hunter (n 54). 
59  Interim Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 7968, 1980) (“Interim 
Report”). 
60 Ibid, chapter 1 at para 2. 
61 Ibid, para 3. 
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enable them to be restored to profitability or viable elements of these companies to be 
preserved.62  Whilst the administration process might appear to have being fashioned after 
the US Chapter 11 procedure, it was in fact designed to emulate the old administrative 
receivership which the committee recognised as a valuable tool for the rescue of a company. 
The committee in its report stated that; 
“There is however, one aspect of the floating charge which we believe to have been 
of outstanding benefit to the general public and to society as a whole; we refer to 
the power to appoint a receiver and manager of the whole property and undertaking 
of a company.  In some cases they have been able to restore an ailing enterprise to 
profitability, and return it to its former owners. In others they have been able to 
dispose of the business as a going concern. In either case, the preservation of the 
profitable parts of the enterprise has been of advantage to the employees, the 
commercial community, and the general public.”63 
 
As a result the committee proposed the appointment of an administrator with all powers 
normally bestowed on a receiver or manager appointed by a floating charge holder.64 Thus 
the enactment of the 1985 Act, which combined provisions of the Companies Act and the 
Bankruptcy Act, made available a wide spectrum of mechanisms for debtor companies to 
effect rehabilitation. This Act was consolidated as the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Insolvency in the UK was to undergo more transformation as a result of the influence of a 
report published by a review group which was set up by the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Treasury in 2000.65 The report was centred on the old administrative 
receivership. Although the Cork Committee had noted that the provision could enable the 
preservation of companies, it was a procedure which was essentially a debt enforcement 
mechanism employed by a floating charge holder to ensure that he got returns on his 
security. The floating charge holder typically had a fixed charge over fixed assets of the 
                                                          
62 A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law (Cmnd 9175, 1984) p19 at para 31. 
63 Cork Report, para 495. 
64 Ibid, para 497. 
65 Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanism, Report by 
the Review Group’ (DTI, 2000) (“Review Report”).  
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company and a floating charge over all the rest of the company’s assets. This gave him 
powers to appoint a receiver and manager who had the authority to run the business of the 
company on the debenture holders’ behalf, dispose of assets or effect the sale of the 
business as a going concern.66  
What set this procedure apart from rescue mechanisms is the fact that the protection of the 
general interest of creditors was not the foremost aim of the old administrative receivership; 
rather its sole aim was to maximise realisation for the benefit of the debenture holder. The 
2000 review group came up with recommendations to virtually abolish the appointment of 
an administrative receiver by a floating charge holder where the charge was created after 
15 September 2003.67 A new streamlined administration procedure was also recommended 
by the review group and these recommendations were set out in the Enterprise Act 2002 
which amended the Insolvency Act 1986. 68  The new administration procedure has a 
hierarchy of three objectives which the administrator has to achieve in order to rescue a 
business.69 As its main objective, the administration procedure should, where practicable, 
rescue the company as a going concern, failing which the second objective, which is 
achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the 
company was liquidated without first being in administration, should be pursued. 
Presently, there are three main statute-backed procedures for achieving corporate rescue in 
the UK; firstly there is the administration procedure 70  in which a company facing 
bankruptcy is placed under the management of a qualified insolvency practitioner as an 
                                                          
66 Goode (n 48) p248. 
67 Exceptions were however allowed for the appointment of a receiver by a debenture holder such as large 
capital market arrangements, utility projects, public-private partnership projects incorporating step-in rights, 
urban re-generation projects, financial market charges, large-scale project finance incorporating step-in 
rights, collateral security charges, registered social landlords, system charges and protected railway 
companies. See Insolvency Act 1986, ss 72a- 72g and Sch. 2A. 
68 See generally Interim Report (n 59) para 73. 
69 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para.3. 
70 Ibid, part II. 
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external manager who manages the company with the help of the creditors’ committee.71 
The administration procedure is often used alongside either the company’s voluntary 
arrangement (CVA) or scheme of arrangement to effect a compromise or arrangement with 
creditors with a view to rescue the company. Conversely, where the administration process 
is used on its own, it is often used as a pre-pack administration procedure.72   
Another rescue route which can be used by debtor companies is the CVA.73 This is a 
composition made by a company with its creditors and members in satisfaction of its debt. 
It usually involves an agreement by the creditors to consent to a lesser amount of what is 
due them in satisfaction of their claims.74 This process is often used as an exit route during 
the administration process but may stand on its own as a rescue tool.  More often than not, 
CVAs can either be used as a quick-fix procedure whereby a sale of company’s assets is 
achieved and the resulting proceeds distributed among creditors or a continuing process 
which involves the company remaining in business and making periodic remittance to 
creditors from its trading income. The focal point of most CVAs is the preservation and 
sale of the business of the company as a going concern.75 This however does not prevent 
its use as a rescue tool aimed at returning the company to profitability.76  
An alternative to a CVA as a means to reach a compromise with creditors is a scheme of 
arrangement under section 895 of the Companies Act 2006. The provision allows courts to 
authorize a compromise or arrangement upon the approval of a majority amounting to 75 
per cent in value of the creditors (class of creditors) or members (class of members) voting 
                                                          
71 Goode (n 48), p312. 
72 G Yeowart, ‘Encouraging Company Rescue: What Changes are required to UK Insolvency Law?’ (2009) 
Law and Financial Market Review 517 -531. Pre-pack is a process whereby the sale of all or part of the 
company is negotiated with a buyer prior to the appointment of an administrator, and the company or parts 
of it, is sold off  as a going concern immediately after the commencement of the administration procedure. 
73 Insolvency Act 1986, part I. 
74 Goode (n 48) p 87. 
75 Ibid at p396. 
76 Ibid. 
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at a meeting convened for that purpose. Although not a provision under the Insolvency Act 
1986, it is accessible to all companies capable of being wound up under the Insolvency Act. 
Therefore a foreign company which is capable of being wound up under the Act can make 
use of the scheme of arrangement.  
Whilst great strides have been made with formal provisions of rescue mechanisms by the 
legislature, the UK practitioners developed their own informal rescue mechanisms 
(workouts) before those provided by the Insolvency Act 1985-6.  This they did through 
what is termed as the “London approach”. The “London approach” has been defined as; 
“A non-statutory and informal framework introduced with the support of the Bank 
of England for dealing with temporary support operations mounted by banks and 
other lenders to a company or group in financial difficulties, pending a possible 
restructuring.”77 
 
A lack of expansive information or literature on the operations of this mechanism makes it 
somewhat difficult to give a detailed explanation of the operations of this mechanism, but 
it is essentially a voluntary one which is organised by a consortia of banks to the debtor 
corporation and spearheaded by the bank with the largest exposure. 78  It provides a 
combined temporary support and stability base while permanent solutions are devised.79 
The use of the “London approach”80 began in the 1970’s when the UK banking secondary 
sector was in crisis and the Bank of England intervened to support financial institutions.81 
The expertise developed by the Bank of England in handling the crisis was put at the 
disposal of companies in need of restructuring.82 It was a procedure that was used by some 
                                                          
77 British Bankers Association, description of the London approach, unpublished memo 1986 culled from 
John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency: the London Approach to the Resolution of 
Financial Distress’ (2001) 1 JCLS 21. 
78 Hunter (n 54). 
79 Ibid. 
80Also discussed in section 3.5.2.1 of the thesis. 
81 S Slater, Corporate Recovery (Penguin 1984) p254. 
82 J Armour and S Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency: the London Approach to the Resolution of 
Financial Distress’ (2001) 1 JCLS 21. 
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large multi-banked companies to bypass formal insolvency procedures when faced with 
bankruptcy, to arrange a rescue on a contractual basis.83 The decision of the Bank of 
England to support workout solutions that encourage going concern value was based on a 
number of policy decisions which included but was not restricted to84; 
 Reducing the losses suffered by banks as a result of unavoidable company 
failures. 
 Preventing the unnecessary liquidation of viable companies facing short-term 
financial problems. 
 Preservation of employment and the productive capacity of the corporate sector. 
 Prevention of the immediate collapse of companies facing cash flow shortfalls by 
promoting the necessary tools needed to encourage the provision of interim 
financing to surviving companies. 
The London Approach played a significant role in overcoming the recession of the early 
1990s because, where it was successfully applied; it preserved value for creditors and 
shareholders, saved jobs and protected productive capacity. 85  Regrettably, its use has 
greatly declined since then and this has been due to a number of reasons, chief among which 
was the development of more complex structures86 and introduction of rescue mechanisms 
by the Insolvency Act 1986.87 Presently in the UK, there is a wide mix of procedures 
available for the rehabilitation of corporations. 
                                                          
83 Goode (n 48) p407. 
84 E C Buljevich, Cross-Border Debt : Innovative Approaches for Creditors, Corporate and Sovereigns 
(Euromoney Books, 2005). 
85 Ibid. 
86 P Kent, ‘Corporate Workouts – A UK Perspective’ (1997) International Insolvency Review. 
87 G E Meyerman ‘The London Approach and Corporate Debt  in East Asia’ available online at 
http://www.1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/DL_2_3_chapter10.pdf. 
36 
 
 
2.3 Bankruptcy in the US 
 
2.3.1 History of the US bankruptcy laws (1800-1898) 
 
The US’s earliest statutory approach to insolvencies was the Bankruptcy Act 1800 which 
established a uniform system of bankruptcy and was a federal enactment created as a 
response to the economic crises besieging the country.88 The Act made provisions for 
personal bankruptcy but there were no clear provisions for corporate bankruptcy. The 
prevalent form of insolvencies at the time was personal bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy 
Acts that were in place between 1800 and 1841 gave attention to this. Aside from the fact 
that complex business structures, such as corporations which would have given rise to 
corporate bankruptcies, were not customary at the time, Congress relied on the US’s 
colonial ties with the UK and borrowed heavily from the UK when it enacted the 
Bankruptcy Act 1800. The UK at the time had an established legislative structure that dealt 
with bankruptcy, although the bankruptcy laws at time were restricted to individuals and 
merchants. Consequently, the US bankruptcy laws mirrored the pattern set by the UK by 
focusing on personal insolvency.   
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Act 1841 after the repeal of the 1800 Act in 1803 saw 
some notable changes brought into bankruptcy legislation. The Act made references to the 
bankruptcy of “all persons being merchants or using the trade of merchandise, all retailers 
of merchandise and all bankers, factors, brokers, underwriters and marine insurers” thus 
including a wide range of trading professionals.89 In addition the Act introduced voluntary 
                                                          
88 See generally D A Skeel Jr., Debt’s Dominion: a History of Bankruptcy Laws in America (Princeton 
2001).See also E H. Levi and J Wm. Moore, ‘Bankruptcy and Reorganisation; a Survey of Changes’ (1937) 
5 U.Chi.bL.Rev.1. 
89 Bankruptcy Act 1841, s 1. 
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bankruptcy thereby opening up another option for debtors who were bankrupt. This Act 
acknowledged that the country was going through economic growth and as such needed to 
adjust to the likely failures that might occur. What is perhaps curious is the fact that the 
provisions of section 5 allowed for corporations to prove their claims against debtors yet 
no provisions were contained in the 1841 Act which recognised corporations and dealt with 
their bankruptcies. This is not to say the Act did not recognise the existence of business 
structures, the Act in fact did and made provisions for the insolvency of partnerships.90 
 It was not until 1867 that directions were given by the Bankruptcy Act 1867 on how to 
deal with bankrupt partnerships, corporations and joint stock companies authorized to carry 
on any business with the aim of making profits.91 With this provision companies could be 
declared bankrupt and all their assets distributed. Although the Act recognised and allowed 
for the fact that companies could declare bankruptcy, no provisions for the division of the 
company’s assets were included, instead the Act stated that corporate property and assets 
were to be distributed to creditors in the manner provided for natural persons.92 Therefore, 
whilst the Act recognised corporations, it treated the bankruptcies of these corporations as 
personal bankruptcies and did not truly embrace corporate bankruptcy. 
This recognition by the US of corporate entities came twenty-three years after the UK had 
recognised and made separate provisions for corporations within the Joint Stock Companies 
Act 1844. It may not be farfetched to assume that once again the US relied on UK to 
distinguish between corporate and personal insolvency. However in this case amendments 
to the 1867 Act included the provisions dealing with corporations within the Bankruptcy 
Act itself rather than having a separate provision for them, as was done in the UK. Thus the 
                                                          
90 Ibid, s 13. 
91 Bankruptcy Act 1867, s 36 and s 37. 
92 Ibid, s 37. 
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Bankruptcy Act 1867 marked the beginning of the recognition of a distinct legal entity 
within bankruptcy laws. 
Hitherto, the Bankruptcy Acts in force were essentially collection and distribution 
mechanisms carried over from the administration of personal bankruptcy and were used to 
satisfy claims of debtors. This was despite the fact that corporations had gained recognition 
by 1867. Perhaps because the earlier federal bankruptcy statutes were mainly a response to 
the economic crises93 they were not comprehensively equipped to take into consideration 
the more specialized aspects of either personal or corporate bankruptcy. Nevertheless, this 
was to change with further amendments to the Act in 1874. The amending Bankruptcy Act 
of 1874 revised the provisions of section 43 of the old Act and introduced compositions.94 
For the first time, a debtor could rely on a formal procedure backed by statute to propose a 
plan to his creditors on how his assets would be distributed to settle their claims. It should 
be noted at this point that debtor companies such as railway and utility corporations could 
rely on equity receivership which developed in 1846. While not statute backed, these 
receiverships had the support of all the key players in the field of bankruptcy. This 
procedure will be further dealt with under the history of corporate rescue. 
The leeway allowed to debtors by the 1874 Act marked a turning point in bankruptcy 
legislations in the US. What this perhaps tells us is that, although the US had borrowed UK 
bankruptcy laws with their underlying cultural and social perceptions regarding debtors, 
attitudes had begun to change. While America made great strides in the administration of 
bankruptcy within the seventy-four years from when the first federal bankruptcy legislation 
was enacted in 1800, a halt was called to federal legislative involvement in the creation of 
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bankruptcy provisions when the Bankruptcy Act 1867 was repealed in 1878. This marked 
the beginning of a federal hiatus from bankruptcy legislation that was to last until 1898. 
 Although federal bankruptcy laws were relatively unused and the jurisdiction went through 
long periods (between 1803 and 1841, 1878 and 1898) of having none at all, in times of 
national economic crises they were largely used as a tool to create economic stability.95 
Moreover, once the Bankruptcy Act had mitigated the fallout of an economic recession and 
conditions began to improve, Congress tended to repeal the federal legislation and left the 
enactment of bankruptcy laws to the individual states.96 Thus in the intervening periods 
before the enactment and repeal of the various Bankruptcy Acts, issues of bankruptcy were 
chiefly administered by state legislation. The reason why the Federal Bankruptcy Acts did 
not survive beyond the end of any of the various economic recessions has been attributed 
to the lack of consensus among the various interested parties97 on the need to have federal 
bankruptcy legislation.98 These somewhat erratic federal provisions on bankruptcy came to 
an end in 1898 with the enactment of a comprehensive federal bankruptcy law.  
 
2.3.2 Bankruptcy laws from 1898 to date 
 
The enactment of the 1898 Act brought to an end a hundred years of transitory bankruptcy 
laws99 which were to a large extent economy stabilisation tools. The Bankruptcy Act 1898 
was radically different from the UK provisions which the US hitherto relied on. Whilst the 
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UK bankruptcy laws were more inclined towards the protection of creditors, the 1898 Act 
placed the interest of debtors at the core of their provisions; this was despite the major 
influence the UK bankruptcy laws had on the initial development of bankruptcy laws in the 
US.100 
 A close study of the various Acts prior to the 1898 Act suggests that company rehabilitation 
or corporate rescue was not an important consideration. What was of paramount interest at 
the time was the protection of the creditors’ interests; therefore legislation was drafted in 
such a manner as to achieve the protection of these interests. Furthermore, debtors were 
generally regarded as rogues who needed to be punished for leaving their creditors out of 
pocket.101 Perhaps encouraging the rescue of a corporate debtor at the time may not have 
been viewed in a positive light especially as this would have defeated the purpose of 
ensuring retribution on debtors who to all intent and purpose, were regarded as criminals 
who needed to be punished. As it has been noted earlier, the laws changed with a shift in 
how debtors were perceived.  
The Bankruptcy Act 1898, which was the result of intensive lobbying by national 
commercial interest groups and their representatives,102 consolidated and advanced the 
notion that debtors may possibly not be responsible for their bankruptcies and should be 
given a fair chance at sorting out the bankruptcy estate and perhaps be allowed to start 
afresh. What is more, the 1898 Act firmly established the presence of corporate bankruptcy 
within bankruptcy legislation by defining and recognising corporations as having powers 
and privileges distinct from individuals and other business structures such partnerships.103 
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103 Bankruptcy Act 1898, s 1. 
41 
 
Extensive provisions for composition,104 classes of creditors and their meetings105 were to 
be found within the 1898 Act. Section 55(c) is of particular interest because it gave creditors 
the carte blanche to “take such steps that may be pertinent and necessary for the promotion 
of the best interest of the (bankrupt) estate and the enforcement of the Act”. This does 
suggest that creditors were given rather broad powers under this provision to influence the 
way the bankrupt estate was to be administered.  
Additional amendments were made to the 1898 Act between 1933-34 with the introduction 
of a new section 77b which dealt with the re-organisation of railway corporations, 
companies and personal bankruptcy arrangements.  The Chandler Act 1938 provided 
additional options for corporate re-organisation under Chapter X and arrangements under 
Chapter XI. The Chandler Act is regarded as being pivotal to the history of corporate 
bankruptcy as it relates to the rescue and rehabilitation of companies in the US. This is due 
to the well laid out provisions for providing a fresh start for debtors that could be found 
therein. After eight decades, the 1898 Act was finally replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, popularly known as the Bankruptcy Code. The 1978 Act was based on reviews 
to the existing Bankruptcy Act conducted by the Bankruptcy Review Commission set up 
to look at reforms. Both the Chandler Act and the Act of 1978 introduced different 
innovations which will now be examined under the history of corporate rescue. 
 
2.4 Corporate rescue in the United States of America 
 
The origin and history of corporate reorganisation is quite distinct from that of bankruptcy 
laws despite having operated alongside general bankruptcy laws.106 Earlier bankruptcy 
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laws, beginning from 1800 dealt mainly with personal bankruptcy, consequently their 
restricted scope of application, could not have taken into consideration a more sophisticated 
mechanism such as corporate reorganisation. It was not until the early part of the 20th 
Century, after the adoption of comprehensive bankruptcy laws, that the rehabilitation of 
debtors was given any thought.107 Whilst these statutes had as their aim the provision of a 
fresh start for debtors and the maximisation of returns for creditors,108 they were mainly 
focused towards individual debtors and not corporate entities. 
 
2.4.1 Equity receiverships 
 
The history of corporate rescue in the US can be traced to the railway equity receiverships 
of the 19th Century109 which arose out of the need for railway companies to reorganize their 
businesses as a result of railroad failures. It evolved under common law when it became 
increasingly difficult for these railway companies to meet the obligations on their bonds 
and indentures as and when they fell due,110 a common plight of distressed companies. 
Furthermore, the nature of railway companies’ assets, which were mainly rail tracks spread 
across different states, made it difficult for creditors to benefit from the collect and divide 
mechanism provided by the Bankruptcy Act to satisfy the debt owed them.111  
The lack of legislative direction on how such a bankruptcy scenario should be played out 
gave rise to ingenuity on the part of the railroad managers, their Wall Street bankers, 
                                                          
107 See Bankruptcy Act 1874. 
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lawyers and federal judges to create the equity receivership in order to resolve the financial 
and economic distress that affected the railroad companies.112 Under equity receivership, 
secured creditors and railroad managers appointed a receiver (in most cases, a member of 
management) to manage the company while management and creditors negotiated a 
restructuring of the debt.113 Once a new and adequate credit arrangement was agreed upon 
by both parties, it marked the beginning of the rescue process that rehabilitated the 
company.114 The arrangement so reached was usually in favour of the debtor company or a 
new entity which succeeded the old company.115  
The interests of creditors were best served by acquiescing to a compromise and allowing 
the railway company to carry on trading.116 The fact that equity receivership ensured that 
the distressed firm was kept intact to enable creditors get the best out of the realization of 
assets was one of its most redeeming features.117 Some of the features of this pioneer rescue 
mechanism are still being practised today. Elements such as “reorganisation”, “going 
concern value” and “preservation of jobs” may still be considered an integral part of the 
underlying principle of corporate rescue.  
 
2.4.2 Bankruptcy Acts 1898-1938 
 
The equity receivership which developed well before, and independently of, legislative 
interference was the basis on which future rescue mechanisms were structured. However 
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legislative attempts at providing respite for debtors began with the 1898 Act which not only 
made a clear demarcation between corporate and personal bankruptcy,118 but also may have 
had the markings of the beginning of corporate rescue. This may be presumed from the 
provisions of section 2(5) Bankruptcy Act 1898, which allowed the business of the debtor 
to be managed for limited periods by a receiver, bankruptcy marshal or trustees where 
necessary, in the interest of the debtors’ holdings. It therefore follows that where it was 
advantageous to continue trading where a debtor was facing bankruptcy, the Act authorized 
a sort of respite instead of an outright liquidation. In continuation of its attempt to bring 
some sort of relief to the debtor, section 12 of the 1898 Act allowed a composition between 
the debtor and its creditors where a majority of the creditors agreed to the compromise.  
The result being that, a debtor corporation could continue trading and therefore could meet 
its obligation to repay to all its creditors the amount that both parties had agreed on, which 
was usually a portion of the debt owed.119 The downside of composition allowed under the 
Act was that it did not bind secured creditors. In contrast the railway equity receivership 
was spearheaded by secured creditors and accordingly was binding on them. What is more, 
section 55(c)120 made provisions for creditors to take “steps as may be necessary and 
pertinent for the promotion of the best interest of the estate.” Therefore, where it became 
mandatory, creditors were permitted by the Act to take any action necessary that would 
promote the interest of the debtor’s estate and therefore, invariably furthering their own 
interests. This action might include coming to an arrangement with the debtor to restructure 
his indebtedness to his creditors. 
Thus the journey towards a more structured statutory provision for corporate rescue began 
with the 1898 Act and was further consolidated by the Chandlers Act in 1938. The 
                                                          
118 Bankruptcy Act 1898, s 1. In this section, the Act recognised the ability of a corporation to be a debtor.  
119 Baird and Jackson (n 21) chapter 12. 
120 Bankruptcy Act, 1898. 
45 
 
intervening period saw amendments being made to the 1898 Act which kept its basic tenets. 
In 1932, Congress embarked on bankruptcy reforms which led to the insertion of a new 
section 77 to the 1898 Act to oversee the reorganisation of railroad corporations. A further 
section 77B was added in 1934 to govern the reorganisation of corporations and generally 
left corporate reorganisation in the hands of Wall Street bankers and their lawyers.121 The 
expansion of the reorganisation process to include corporations generally was indicative of 
government’s recognition of the fact that financially distressed companies could be rescued 
and that this might very well be more beneficial to unsecured creditors than outright 
liquidation.122 
 Corporate reorganisation subsequently underwent notable changes which led to the 
incorporation of Chapter X into 1898 Act by the Chandlers Act of 1938.  The emergence 
of Chapter X fundamentally transformed the way in which large corporations were 
reorganised. It stripped existing management of the exclusive control of the reorganisation 
process which the equity receivership and a reorganisation under section 77(b)123 allowed. 
In its place, an objective and independent trustee was appointed to manage the company124 
and the control of the reorganisation process was placed in the hands of the Security and 
Exchange Commission. 125  Few companies came to depend on Chapter X for their 
reorganisations as a result of this sweeping change; instead managers of financially 
distressed companies relied on Chapter XI which allowed a debtor company to propose a 
plan for the settlement or an extension of the time of payment of its unsecured debts. This 
provision was exploited for reorganisation purposes despite its restriction to unsecured 
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debts because it allowed the managers control over the process and the company.126 Thus 
Chapter X suffered a steady decline127 and was left to disuse. It is evident that the reforms 
made by Congress during the 1930’s, were largely influenced by techniques derived from 
the railway equity receiverships.128  
It may therefore be safe to say that the railway equity receivership had a huge impact on 
how bankruptcy laws relating to corporate reorganisation were constructed. Equity 
receivership created a solid foundation on which corporate rescue laws could be established 
and modified with the passage of time. The influence of equity receivership shaped further 
reforms in 1970 when Congress consented to a study of the 1898 Act by the Commission 
on bankruptcy laws in the US with a view to proposing changes to the existing laws.129 
Three years later, the Bankruptcy Reform Commission came out with its report which 
proposed a new Bankruptcy Bill. 130  The proposed Bill amongst other things 131  made 
provisions for business rehabilitation132 and it was enacted in 1978 as the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act.133 The newly enacted laws, as codified in Title 11 of the United States Code 
(Bankruptcy Code), completely replaced prior statutes134 with Chapter 11 regulating the 
reorganisation of businesses. 135   One of the foremost guiding principles of the new 
Bankruptcy Code was to promote and enhance business reorganisation.136 Therefore, the 
reforms introduced by this new code returned the control of the reorganisation process to 
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the management of financially distressed companies.137 In so doing, Congress maintained 
the status quo as it was prior to the introduction of Chapter X by the Chandler’s Act of 
1938; making management the driving force in the rescue process. It was believed that the 
assurance of keeping their jobs would persuade the management to attempt reorganisation 
while the company could still be saved.138 
 
2.4.3 Modern provisions 
 
The 1978 Act introduced a more effective process for reorganisation and this created a more 
conducive framework to facilitate compromise between the financially distressed company 
and its creditors. The new process gave management the exclusive right to propose a 
reorganisation plan to creditors and shareholders within 120 days 139  and this ensured 
greater control for the debtor managers over the reorganisation process albeit at the expense 
of creditors who suffered from the abuse of the process by some debtors.140 Upon the 
confirmation of the plan by two-thirds in value of each class of creditors,141 the rescue 
process begins and the debtor is normally left in place142 instead of being replaced by a 
court appointee. The debtor’s status is automatically transformed into that of a quasi- trustee 
in bankruptcy143 status with all the powers of a bankruptcy trustee.144 Consequently the pre-
commencement debtor then becomes the debtor in possession (DIP), which is regarded as 
a separate legal entity from the pre-commencement debtor. 145  In addition, the Act 
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encourages the funding of the rescue process by according priority/super-priority146 to 
providers of new credit to the floundering business. The ability to access credit to fund the 
rescue process may possibly be regarded as fundamental to a successful rescue.  
The 1978 Act has been summed up as having three basic aims147 which are; the avoidance 
of the evil of liquidation, providing a fresh start for honest debtors and provision of a timely 
and efficient resolution of the bankrupt’s estate within a limited time. Presently, the filing 
of a Chapter 11 procedure may signify the existence of financial difficulties thereby kick-
starting the rescue process. Nevertheless the Chapter 11 procedure is not restricted to 
financially distressed companies and viable companies may also make use of the procedure 
for restructuring purposes.148 The Chapter 11 procedure is the main formal mechanism for 
corporate rescue in America. It allows a corporation to seek the protection of the courts in 
the form of an automatic stay which acts to suspend the enforcement of creditors’ rights 
while a plan of reorganisation is being put in place. The process is aimed at providing the 
company with a framework to enable the company to continue trading while it negotiates 
with its creditors on how to meet its liabilities to them.  
The United States bankruptcy laws have gone through amendments since the coming into 
force of the Bankruptcy Code; this has not affected the provisions available for corporate 
rescue. What obtains in US today with regards to corporate rescue has come a long way 
from the early days of equity receivership. Although the equity receivership sowed the 
seeds of corporate rescue and formed the basic framework for legislation on corporate 
rescue, a lot has been put in place to shape corporate rescue into what it is today. There are 
similarities between railway equity receivership and Chapter 11 rescue procedure in that 
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debtor management is left in charge of a new legal entity in both instances. On the other 
hand there are clear differences and these include; the protection the court gives under 
Chapter 11 to corporations to ensure the reorganisation plan succeeds by putting an 
automatic stay in place which suspends all creditors’ rights to enforce security and also the 
“cram down” mechanism which enables the debtor corporation to obtain the approval of 
the plan over opposition by dissenting creditors.149 
 
2.5 Bankruptcy in Canada 
 
2.5.1 History of bankruptcy laws (1869 to 1919) 
 
Very little literature is available on the federal bankruptcy laws in Canada prior to the turn 
of the 19th century. At that time Canada was made up of different provinces with each 
province having its own bankruptcy or debtor-creditor legislation and little information is 
available on the laws of each province. 150  The earliest federal statutory provision for 
bankruptcy laws in Canada was the Constitution Act which conferred exclusive rights on 
the Canadian Parliament to make laws in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency. 151 
Following confederation, Parliament passed the Insolvent Act 1869. 152  The Act 
consolidated the various Bankruptcy and Insolvency Acts in the several provinces of 
Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia 153 and dealt exclusively with the 
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bankruptcy of traders. 154  It provided for voluntary and compulsory bankruptcies and 
compositions.155  
The 1869 Act was later repealed by the Insolvent Act 1875 156 which attempted to give 
creditors greater control over bankruptcy proceedings. Thereafter calls by bankruptcy law 
antagonists led the government to repeal the 1875 Act in 1880 and relinquish its jurisdiction 
over bankruptcy and insolvency laws.157 The only recourse available to debtors was the 
individual debtor creditor legislation of each of the nine provinces in Canada158 and the 
Winding-up Act (WUA)159 which was adopted by Parliament in 1882.160 The WUA was 
however restricted to the winding up of insolvent trading corporations, railways, banks and 
other financial institutions and did not apply to individuals.  
 
2.5.2 Bankruptcy Act 1919 
 
It would take a little over two decades for the Canadian Parliament to get involved in the 
enactment of bankruptcy laws again and this it did with the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1919.161 The Act resulted from the Canadian government bowing to pressure from 
creditor lobby groups after a series of commercial failures, to create national bankruptcy 
laws to ensure consistency in the administration of bankruptcy estates. 162  The 1919 
Canadian Bankruptcy Act which dealt with both personal and corporate insolvencies was 
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largely influenced by the English Bankruptcy Act 1883 with additional contributions from 
a range of previous Canadian laws such as the Insolvent Act 1875, the Winding up Act 
1806 and several other provincial163 Assignments and Preference Acts.164  
The 1919 Act dealt mainly with liquidation and just like the early bankruptcy laws in UK 
and the US, it acted as a collection and distribution tool for the satisfaction of creditors’ 
claims.165 This was the state of affairs until the great depression of the 1930s saw the 
passing into law by the Canadian Parliament of two statutes; the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act166 and the Farm Creditors Arrangement Act.167 These statutes adopted a 
different approach to bankruptcy in Canada and allowed for the negotiation of an 
arrangement under which creditors could compromise their claims and debtors could carry 
on the business or farming operation. 
 
2.5.3 Modern framework  
 
After numerous amendments and reforms in 1949, 1992 and 1997, the 1919 Bankruptcy 
Act still forms the conceptual framework for the current Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.168 
Presently, Canada has three main insolvency statutes which have separate purposes. These 
are the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1985 (BIA), Companies’ Creditors Arrangement 
Act 1985 (CCAA) and the Winding-up and Restructuring Act 1985 (WUA). While the BIA 
provides for both personal and corporate insolvencies with options of outright liquidation 
                                                          
163 Canada was previously divided up into provinces. 
164 Duncan (n 25). 
165 Bankruptcy Act 1919,  c.36. 
166 S.C 1933, c.36. 
167 S.C 1934, c.53. 
168 J S Ziegel, ‘Canada’s Phased-in Bankruptcy Reforms’ (1996) 70 Am. Bankr. L.J 383. 
52 
 
or reorganisation for corporations, the CCAA applies to the reorganisation of businesses 
which are over $5million in debt.  
 
2.6    Corporate rescue in Canada 
 
Corporate rescue had no place within the early bankruptcy laws in Canada. As in the UK 
and the US there was an apparent reluctance to assist debtor corporations. This common 
aversion can be traced to the US and Canadian jurisdictions’ reliance on English bankruptcy 
law for guidance in adopting their own insolvency laws respectively. At the time when the 
two North American jurisdictions were looking to the UK for guidance, the UK was 
prejudiced against debtors169 and viewed them as charlatans and this was reflected in the 
UK bankruptcy laws at the time. Notwithstanding this, debtors in Canada could seek some 
form of relief from the provisions of existing statutes through a compromise with 
creditors170 even though they were sketchy at best and could not comprehensively achieve 
corporate rescue.   
Although the Canadian jurisdiction’s foray into corporate rescue is fairly recent when 
compared to the US jurisdiction, it has created several avenues (both specialist and non-
specialist)171 under which a debtor company can be rescued, however this chapter will be 
making mention of the non-specialist Bankruptcy Acts which include the Federal Winding-
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up Act (WUA), the Bankruptcy Act (later known as Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), 
with particular emphasis on the Company Creditors’ Arrangement Act (CCAA).  
 
2.6.1 Corporate Rescue (pre 1933, BIA to the present) 
 
Corporate rescue in Canada prior to the enactment of the CCAA in 1933172 was dependent 
solely on the sparse provisions found within the old Federal Winding-up Act173and the 1919 
Bankruptcy Act. The WUA had its antecedent in the English companies’ legislation and 
applied to companies incorporated under federal jurisdiction and to insolvent provincial 
companies.174 The WUA was limited in its scope of application, since it was mainly aimed 
at liquidation with some allowance for the reorganisation of some selected companies. The 
reorganisation allowed under the Act was in respect of new companies which were formed 
to buy out the assets of old debtor companies.175 Although the WUA underwent some 
reforms and later became known as the Winding-up and Restructuring Act,176 its provisions 
only apply generally to the winding-up of financial institutions under federal jurisdiction 
with a small provision for the  winding up of insurance companies.177 Consequently, unlike 
the CCAA and BIA, the WUA does not play a major role in the rehabilitation of large 
corporations. 
The Bankruptcy Act 1919 on the other hand, had as its main aim the effective 
administration and liquidation of the bankruptcy estate.178 Despite its limited structure and 
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scope of application, the Act made provisions for the debtor to make an offer of 
composition, extension or a scheme of arrangement with its creditors. 179  The plan of 
composition however, had to be sanctioned by three-fourths in amount of all proved claims 
before it was approved and the courts had complete discretion to approve or disapprove the 
plan on whatever grounds it deemed fit.180 
Further amendments were made to the Act in 1923. A proposal was made to introduce 
reforms to enable a restructuring or compromise prior to the occurrence of bankruptcy but 
this was rejected 181  in favour of the post-bankruptcy compromise that the 1919 Act 
favoured. The post-bankruptcy restructuring, as intended by the amending Act, did not 
enjoy much success because it proved to be quite difficult to rescue a company when it 
became bankrupt and as a result some companies went into premature liquidation.  
Despite its lack of use, in 1932, the Bankruptcy Act was amended to make room for debtor 
companies to propose a compromise with their creditors. Its aim was to provide respite for 
the company to enable it restructure its debt. This provision was further consolidated by 
section 27 of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act 1949 which allowed an insolvent company to 
make a proposal to its creditors for either a composition, extension of time or a scheme of 
arrangement. The aim of the proposal was to enable the debtor company to continue trading 
and to retain possession of its assets by going into an agreement with unsecured creditors 
to have its debt reduced or to seek an extension of time within which to meet its obligations.  
Further amendments were made to the Bankruptcy Act (which became the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act “BIA”) in 1992182 to cater for the restructuring of insolvent small and 
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medium-sized enterprises.183 The erstwhile inability of the court under the previous Act to 
bind secured creditors under compositions and schemes of arrangement was rectified by 
the amendments introduced to the 1992 Act. In general, the provisions of the BIA are 
designed for the restructuring of small to medium sized companies but they can also be 
used by large corporate debtors. The BIA has since undergone various amendments, the 
most recent being in 2009 which introduced provisions on corporate rescue funding184 and 
the assignment of priority to such funds. Nonetheless, the basic framework as it relates to 
corporate rescue still remains the same. 
 
2.6.2 Corporate Rescue (CCAA, 1933 onwards) 
 
 The administration of bankruptcy in Canada changed with the introduction of the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) in 1933. The CCAA was enacted in 
recognition of the limited procedures available under the existing statutes for 
restructuring. 185  Another factor that influenced the Act’s coming into being was the 
economic depressions of the 1930s186 which led to the failure of a lot of corporations. The 
aim of the CCAA, which was fashioned after the British Companies Act 1929,187 was to 
facilitate corporate rescue by promoting compromises and arrangements between 
corporations and their creditors. The CCAA which was enacted in response to the economic 
realities at the time may be seen as an illustration that the economy of a country influences 
the creation and the type of bankruptcy laws in force at a particular time. The US 
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jurisdiction also responded in like manner when faced with economic depression 
throughout its history of enacting bankruptcy laws.  
 The fundamental principle underscoring the 1933 CCAA was to provide an avenue for 
company rehabilitation as an alternative to liquidation.188 The CCAA allowed companies 
to restructure their debt under heavy supervision by the courts which had the power to 
exercise their discretion at every stage of the reorganisation process. Additionally, the 
CCAA acted to bind all creditors in order to facilitate the rescue process and this ability to 
provide a mechanism which binds both secured and unsecured creditors was one of the 
main objectives behind the creation of the CCAA as other pre-existing bankruptcy 
provisions were unduly lacking in this feature. 
Due to the dearth of a better option to effect a reorganisation under the CCAA and the 
courts’ broad powers and its willingness to exercise those powers in interpreting the CCAA, 
the CCAA became an important instrument of choice for both large and small companies 
who needed to be bailed out of the financial difficulties they found themselves in.189 The 
downside of rescue under the provisions of the CCAA also lay with the reason why it 
proved to be very attractive to corporations; the courts’ discretionary powers. Whilst these 
powers could be used to interpret the CCAA favourably, it also meant that any stay of 
creditors’ action was at the discretion of the court as this did not come automatically upon 
the initiation of the reorganisation process.190 This stay, prior to or during the reorganisation 
process, is distinct from the binding effect of an approved proposal under the CCAA. What 
this then meant, was that a secured creditor, where the court had not utilized its discretion 
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to impose a stay, could enforce his security, even where a plan had been approved and it 
was binding on all creditors.  
Criticisms of the potential for abuse under the CCAA led to amendments in 1953 which 
restricted debtor companies with an outstanding issue of bonds and a trustee representing 
the bondholders’ interest from having access to the Act. 191  The CCAA was largely 
abandoned for decades thereafter due to the restrictions imposed by the amendment and its 
inability to satisfactorily handle major reorganisations.192  The effects of the economic 
recessions of the 1980s and 1990s however brought out ingenuity on the part of the 
Canadian courts who adapted the Act to meet the crisis.193 At this point a parallel could be 
drawn between what debtors, secured creditors and judges in the US jurisdiction did with 
the equity receivership and what the Canadian courts resorted to when faced with financial 
crisis and not enough legislative clout to handle it, due to the rigid approach adopted by the 
Bankruptcy Act in dealing with corporate insolvencies. 
 On the whole, what the Canadian courts did was to assume inherent powers194 under the 
CCAA to ensure that Parliament’s intention to create a successful rescue culture for 
companies facing insolvency was met.195 Consequently, the Canadian jurisdiction was able 
to develop a set of power and practices which emulated the US Chapter 11 rescue 
mechanism devoid of the formal safeguards and restrictions imposed for the protection of 
creditors’ rights which the latter provided for.196 Subsequent amendments to the CCAA by 
Bill C-36 in 1997 still maintained the basic elements of the CCAA, but introduced some 
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changes which included the requirement that a ‘monitor’ be appointed to oversee the 
business and financial affairs of the company.197  
 
2.6.3 Post- CCAA reforms 
 
The corporate rescue procedure under the present CCAA198 remains relatively the same 
with the exception of the provision on interim financing 199  introduced by the 2009 
amendment. This provision gives judges express powers to approve corporate rescue 
funding and to assign priority in the hierarchy of claims as it relates to both pre-
commencement financing and post-commencement financing. In the past, this was one area 
in which judges had to rely on their discretionary powers to approve corporate rescue 
funding and to assign priority in respect of it.  
The Canadian jurisdiction presently has two main statutes governing insolvency and 
bankruptcy, one is the BIA which deals with insolvent small to medium sized businesses 
and is mainly concerned with the structured sharing of assets among creditors upon a 
company’s bankruptcy.200 The CCAA on the other hand deals with the large corporations 
and is intended for the period in which the company becomes insolvent and is making 
reorganisation plans.201 These two statutes provide distinct but corresponding procedures 
by which companies can facilitate a rescue through proposals, plans of arrangement and 
compromises with the aim of restructuring their debt and returning to viability.202 This 
model of having two statutes dealing with insolvency was practised in the UK before the 
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enactment of the Insolvency Act 1985 which saw the unification of corporate bankruptcy 
and personal bankruptcy under one statute. This is where the similarity ends as the 
Canadian jurisdiction administers both corporate (albeit small companies) and personal 
bankruptcy under the BIA with the CCAA dealing exclusively with big corporations. 
Apart from these statute backed rescue mechanisms, the Canadian jurisdiction makes use 
of private workouts to facilitate the rescue of a company and oftentimes this is the first 
option that corporations adopt (usually companies with few creditors).203 One of the major 
advantages of private workout is that it does not easily draw attention to the company’s 
financial difficulties.204 Such workouts are often quicker, faster and cheaper than the court 
supervised process. However, one of their major drawbacks is that the procedure is best 
suited to small companies and in most cases, corporate insolvency involves large 
corporations.205  
It appears that in most jurisdictions, there are opportunities for companies to effect private 
restructuring when faced with financial difficulties. Oftentimes, it is done in conjunction 
with major creditors (in most cases, banks) to the companies, who come to a form of 
agreement to restructure the debt owed them. These efforts are usually confidential in 
nature and are more often than not, exhausted as a means of corporate rehabilitation before 
these companies attempt the statute backed mechanisms. 
 
2.7 Perception of debt and its influence on bankruptcy laws 
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Free enterprise enables the creation of credit and as a result increases the risk of 
insolvency.206 Insolvency/bankruptcy is a legal concept but the issues arising from it extend 
beyond the law. A country’s attitude to bankruptcy is often a consideration of a multitude 
of broader issues.207  The earliest concept of bankruptcy and a punitive societal attitude to 
debt was very much centred on personal bankruptcy and this seems to have somehow 
transcended to corporate entities.208 While it remains important to punish the dishonest or 
reckless insolvent, it is also important to devise a system of law to deal compassionately 
with the honest though unfortunate debtor. The system must arguably enable the insolvent 
to extricate himself from a situation of hopeless debt as quickly and as cheaply and with as 
little fuss as possible.209  The perception of a society concerning the forgiveness of debts 
may impact on the success of a second chance opportunity given to a debtor. This is so, 
because law is a mirror of society210 and is often a reflection of the influence of the accepted 
social morality.211 Often these laws reflect what is happening in the society and assume the 
shape of these societies. Therefore it may be presumed that a society’s insolvency laws, 
especially as they relate to corporate rescue, are a reflection of its attitude towards debt and 
in most cases its moral view on the subject has some bearing on this attitude. 
Each of the three jurisdictions, the UK, Canada and the US, have approached corporate 
rescue in different ways and their laws reflect this. It is remarkable that the three countries 
have chosen to tackle issues of bankruptcy differently, considering that Canada and the US 
had previously transplanted English laws on a large scale. When viewed from the 
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standpoint of what the intended aims of these laws are, it does appear that all three have a 
similar objective; that is to rescue a failing company which has a good forecast of returning 
to viability. However, an in-depth examination reveals a clear difference in the structures 
put in place and what is actually achieved; business rescue as opposed to company rescue 
in the UK and company rescue in most cases in the US and Canada. Although both the US 
and Canada borrowed heavily from English laws,212 the US for one, did not adopt the 
unforgiving and highly administrative English bankruptcy process. 213  This may be 
attributed to the fact that the US economy evolved into a much more competitive and 
capitalistic one and therefore needed to encourage debt forgiveness which was seen as 
critical to a vibrant US economy.214 The focal point of the US system shifted to one of 
attempting to achieve a balance between the desires of creditor groups and debtor groups 
and promoting commerce.215 
Presently, the US Chapter 11 regime is, on the surface, debtor centred216 and is more 
considerate and accommodating of the management when the company runs into financial 
troubles.217 The process of rescue is initiated by the management of the debtor company 
(except where a trustee is appointed) who retains his position and functions as the debtor-
in-possession (DIP), on the commencement of the re-organisation of the company (albeit 
with a newly acquired legal status as a quasi-trustee in bankruptcy).218 The DIP continues 
to run the business of the company, but has no say over major decisions without the 
approval of the bankruptcy court.219 Despite this, the DIP is given a lot of powers under 
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Chapter 11. The most important of these is an exclusive period of 120 days in which to file 
a re-organisation plan220 with a further extension of 180 days221 up to a maximum of 18 
months. In essence the DIP is the pivot on which the whole rescue process rests.  
In the US it has been observed that debtors are celebrated as savvy businessmen for 
undertaking risky business ventures while creditors are scorned for being greedy.222 The 
Chapter 11 regime is intensely focused around the prevention of the social cost of 
liquidation and the preservation of the company as a going concern.223 As a result, society 
is more accepting of debtors. The procedure has the full backing of the courts in the US, 
which have been praised for their efforts regarding the debtor in possession procedure. The 
US judiciary’s efforts towards the procedure have been regarded as “pragmatic and 
compassionate, facilitating enterprise and initiative and contributing to the creation of the 
most successful economy in the world”.224 
In the UK, business failure has tended to be viewed negatively225 and an early example of 
this attitude towards debt is rooted in the first English bankruptcy law226 which was enacted 
in 1542. The preamble to the 1542 Bankruptcy Act which read thus; “where divers and 
sundry persons, craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men’s 
goods…” describing the debtor as an anti-social, immoral character who often took 
advantage of others. 227  These early laws were designed solely for the benefit of the 
creditor,228 in debt enforcement and were highly retributive in nature.229 In effect they 
                                                          
220 11 U.S.C., s 1121 (b). 
221 Ibid, s 1121(c) (3). 
222 Moss (n 218). 
223 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd edn, Cambridge, 2009). 
224 Hunter (n 54) at 519. 
225 Skeel (n 88) at p37-38. 
226 Although these laws were geared towards personal insolvency, it gives an overview of how debt was 
viewed generally 
227 1542-43 (34 & 35 Hen. 8, c.4). 
228 R Weisberg, ‘Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character and the History of the Voidable Preference’ 
(1986) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 21. 
229 C J Tabb, ‘The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge’ (1991) 65 Amer. Bankr. L.J. 325, 336. 
63 
 
became a tool used by creditors against a debtor. 230   Whereas bankruptcy laws have 
changed and appear to be more magnanimous towards debtors, the underlying attitude 
towards debtors has not arguably evolved at the same rate. It has been observed that English 
society still to a large extent remains unforgiving about financial failure231 and generally 
considers it a weakness of character regardless of what caused the failure.232 
This attitude continued in diminishing strength until the 1985-6 reforms to insolvency 
law.233 The Cork Committee234 which deliberated on insolvency reforms observed that 
previously, within the policy of the UK insolvency laws, two major objectives existed.235  
These were; 
 Debt collection, under which insolvency laws were treated essentially by the trading 
community as tools for debt recovery, as a weapon of persuasion to induce 
defaulting debtors to pay or make proposals for the settlement of debts. 
 Upholding commercial morality through the investigative processes of insolvency 
laws and the imposition of disciplinary measures against debtors who the 
investigations revealed were culpable. 
While the Cork Committee de-emphasised these objectives, it nevertheless supported what 
these policies aimed to achieve.236 The Insolvency Act 1986, influenced by the Cork Report 
and which was further amended by the Enterprise Act 2002, reformed the administration 
process which appeared to give the debtor a second chance. However, a study of the 
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administration process paints a different picture. Management is displaced and an 
insolvency practitioner is appointed to run the affairs of the company during the rescue 
process. 237  Administration gives more priority to creditors, as can be seen from the 
objectives of the administration order which an administrator is duty bound to achieve.238 
While the company is under administration, the administrator takes over all management 
functions and may do anything necessary to manage the assets, business and affairs of the 
company.239 An administrator has powers to take control and possession of the company’s 
properties, to sell and dispose of them, to bring and defend any legal action on behalf of the 
company. The administrator also has powers to dismiss and appoint directors to the 
company.240 
It has been observed that in the UK, debtors are liable to be punished as risk takers241 who 
must be made to pay for whatever financial troubles a company finds itself and this is 
supported by provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986 242  and the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986.243 The provisions of these statutes bring a threat of court actions 
against the company directors in the event that the company becomes insolvent,244 and if is 
discovered inter alia that the directors continued trading after becoming aware that there 
was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation. 
Also creditors in the UK have a propensity to firmly believe that once a company faces 
financial ruin, the management of the company should be taken out of the debtor’s hands 
and put into those of professionals.245 This perception is documented by authors such as 
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Goode who stated that  insolvency law in the UK is based on the premise that where a 
company is in financial difficulties, it is as a result of mismanagement and therefore those 
responsible for the company’s financial woes should not be left in control of the 
company.246 
The Canadian bankruptcy system on the other hand, while sharing the same historical origin 
as the US system, did not adopt the same sympathetic stance as in the US, rather English 
law and its underlying retributive attitude was integrated into Canadian laws.247 Although 
discharge was available for traders,248 in general the issue of debt was not looked upon 
favourably. Bankruptcy was regarded as “commercial immorality and fraud which brought 
disgrace to Canada in the eyes of other nations.”249 Things have however improved since 
then; there has been a gradual shift from an intolerant attitude towards debt to a more 
forgiving one. The Canadian system has evolved to one that aspires to ensure fairness for 
the debtor and the introduction of rescue mechanisms under the BIA and the CCAA bears 
testament to this. The aim of these mechanisms is to provide debtors with tools to avoid 
bankruptcy and this is balanced against fairness to creditors who expect full payment on a 
timely basis.250  
The review committee251 set up in 2003 to look at improving the insolvency procedures 
available in Canada, acknowledged that insolvency is not always as a result of financial 
mismanagement and that risk taking behaviour contributes to success in a market-based 
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economy, despite some attendant failures. Therefore, while encouraging responsible 
behaviour, opportunity must be given to the debtor to recover.   
The CCAA plays a major role in the rehabilitation of debtors and was essentially enacted 
for that purpose. It stands between the UK administration and US Chapter 11 procedures 
in the sense that management is not displaced, but a monitor is appointed to assist 
management during reorganisation.252 Provision is also made within the Act to enable the 
debtor raise funds to possibly ensure the success of the company’s reorganisation. It 
therefore appears that Canada seems to have completely moved away from its retributive 
past. 
 
2.8 Comparative analysis 
 
It is interesting that the early history of bankruptcy laws in the three jurisdictions under 
comparison shows that at one time Canada and the US relied on the UK bankruptcy law as 
a point of reference and guide to draw up their respective bankruptcy laws. These 
bankruptcy laws were mainly directed at traders and non-traders and they all had similar 
provisions with an underlying notion of retribution for the wrongs of debtors. Corporate 
bankruptcy was not officially recognised within these early laws because complex 
commercial structures, whose collapse would have warranted the adoption of a framework 
to deal with their collapses, were not in existence during the period when those early 
bankruptcy laws were in force.  
In the UK, the Joint Stock Company Act 1844 along with its corresponding Winding-Up 
Act represented the first acknowledgement of corporate bankruptcy. This was the first 
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legislative attempt by the UK to formally address the problem of corporate failures. The 
US on the other hand recognized corporate failures for the first time with the Bankruptcy 
Act 1867 which made provisions for the collapse of partnerships, corporations and joint 
stock companies authorized to carry on any business with the aim of making profits. In 
Canada, the Winding-Up Act 1882 was the first legislative acknowledgement of corporate 
bankruptcies. The Act dealt the winding up of insolvent trading corporations, railways, 
banks and other financial institutions.  
A review of the history of corporate rescue shows that all three jurisdictions had provisions 
for compromise in their early bankruptcy laws, which seem to indicate that the early 
bankruptcy statues provided an opportunity for a debtor company to re-organize its affairs. 
However, the US was the first to incorporate a corporate rescue culture into their 
bankruptcy laws in 1898 and the 19th century railway equity receivership had a huge impact 
on how bankruptcy laws relating to corporate reorganisation were constructed. Canada 
followed with the enactment of the CCAA in 1933 which facilitated corporate rescue by 
promoting compromises and arrangements between corporations and their creditors. In the 
UK, the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986 represented the first official legislative 
implementation of a rescue culture.  
The three jurisdictions share one common feature in their adoption of rescue mechanisms, 
which is ingenuity in the creation and application of the procedures which facilitate 
corporate rescue. While the US’s equity receivership was a result of the initiative of 
creditors, judges and lawyers, the judges while interpreting the provisions of the CCAA 
were able to rely on ingenuity to adapt the laws so as to successfully rehabilitate companies. 
The UK on the other hand, had through the Chancery Courts developed the administrative 
receivership which, when used as a rescue tool, was effective in its application. This move 
towards rescue-oriented bankruptcy laws by all three jurisdictions demonstrates a shift from 
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the hitherto collection and distribution mechanism for creditors that previous bankruptcy 
laws represented. With corporate rescue, debtors were given a chance not only to come to 
an agreement on how creditors’ claims would be met but also an opportunity for a fresh 
start.  
When it comes to corporate rescue mechanisms, the three jurisdictions display variety in 
the ways in which they have created tools of corporate rescue. While the US relies mainly 
on the Chapter 11 procedure for rehabilitation of companies, the UK and Canada make 
available a variety of options to the debtor. Canada, as earlier discussed, relies chiefly on 
the CCAA and the BIA, giving debtors a choice of which to adopt to suit their purposes. 
The UK on the other hand, has a variety of procedures available for debtors to follow and 
like Canada; these procedures can be found in two different statutes. In the management of 
the rescue process, the UK and Canada have to some extent adopted comparable styles, in 
that they have chosen to have an independent party to manage the rescue process.253 
However, in Canada, management continues to direct the affairs of the company, whereas 
in the UK management is displaced. In the US, management is left at the helm of affairs 
and is given exclusive powers to start the rescue process. Whilst it does appear that the 
debtor has an overwhelming influence on the rescue process in the US, it must be noted 
that the courts play a supervisory role in the rescue process and can exert a lot of influence 
on how the process is managed.254 
An analysis of bankruptcy provisions in the three jurisdictions appears to portray the US 
and Canada as having a more debtor-friendly bankruptcy law than the UK which is seen as 
still seemingly less debtor- friendly. Whilst reforms which have been made within the UK 
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with the introduction of the rescue culture, paint a picture of a jurisdiction willing to leave 
behind its historical antecedence of treating debtors as pariahs, the strict provisions255 
relating to directors’ liability in the Insolvency Act 1986 before and during the bankruptcy 
seem to undermine the view that the perceptions about debtors have changed. However a 
closer analysis of directors’ liability in insolvency shows that a director who has taken every 
step by entering into a formal/informal insolvency procedure so as to minimise losses to 
creditors, need not fear liability.  
The reason behind these three jurisdictions taking different approaches to corporate 
bankruptcy, considering they all had a common philosophy at some point within their 
history, has its roots in politics. The move by the US and Canada from a creditor-friendly 
system to a more debtor-friendly system was influenced by intense lobby groups made of 
businessmen, farmers (in the case of Canada) and politicians256 who favoured such an 
approach. These lobbyists were able to rally enough support to push their ideas forward. 
Mention must also be made of the role that the American Bar Association (ABA) and the 
Commercial Law League played in shaping the bankruptcy laws in the US. These two 
groups, most especially the ABA, exerted a lot of influence and were actively involved in 
advocating and expanding bankruptcy laws over the years.257  
In addition to the political impetus driving reforms, a combination of economic necessities 
and the existence of a government in favour of these changes assured a shift in paradigm. 
It should be pointed out here that while the US and Canadian bankruptcy laws may be 
regarded as children of economic depressions, the UK does seem to have, amongst the 
numerous provisions it had on bankruptcy, enacted just one in response to an economic 
depression i.e. the Insolvency Act 1985 which was consolidated as the Insolvency Act 
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1986. It therefore seems probable that economic depressions are likely to lead to bankruptcy 
law reforms; however reforms appears to be dependent on the ability of interested parties 
to successfully lobby for change and the government’s willingness to see such reforms 
passed into law. In the past, banks in the UK have been able to exert their influence258 on 
changes that have been made to insolvency laws. The status of banks as one of the major 
providers of credit makes them key players in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, it remains to be 
seen if future reforms to UK insolvency laws will come under the steam of creditor lobby 
groups (made up generally of banks) or debtor lobby groups. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
It is clear from history that the creation of laws supporting corporate rescue is an ongoing 
process which will continue to be fine-tuned through the years. The US is well on its way 
to its next phase with the creation of the Chapter 11 Commission which was set up in April 
2012 to look at ways in which the Chapter 11 process could be reformed to meet present 
economic realities.259 There have also been consultations on the possibility of reforms to 
the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK). History shows that legislative reform is a gradual process 
that checks the workability of what is available at a particular point in time and different 
factors which cannot be duplicated have made corporate rescue laws what they are. Each 
jurisdiction has been able to adopt a functional equivalence of these rescue mechanisms to 
suit its own underlying cultural, economic and political nuances. One thing is clear; a 
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country’s economy, politics and the ability of interested parties to assert sufficient influence 
are key factors in shaping corporate rescue laws.  
Also, societal needs have an immense influence on political, economic, social and legal 
structures that are put in place and a great part of this is dependent on perceived notions 
held by the society. Most times, laws are a reflection of the society. Generally, the UK, 
Canada and the US started off with an approach of retributive justice against debtors, but 
as societal needs changed, their perception of debt did, albeit in varying degrees. A great 
divide seems to exist in how the UK, on the one hand, and Canada and the US on the other 
hand, perceive debt. The result of this is that, corporate rescue is conducted differently in 
all three jurisdictions, more so when it comes to how rescues are funded. 
 In encouraging corporate rescue all three jurisdictions have recognised the importance of 
the availability of continuing finance to support the process. Both Canada and the US have 
made clear provisions in their quest to facilitate the effective rescue of companies by 
enacting enabling laws which incentivize and so encourage debtor-in possession financing 
(DIP financing). This is a process whereby debtors can offer super-priority to new credit 
obtained after the onset of bankruptcy, to enable them access much needed funds to 
continue trading.  DIP financing and its associated elements which is the particular focus 
of this thesis will form the basis of the next and subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter III: Funding of the corporate rescue process1 
 
Introduction 
‘An army may march on its stomach, but for companies, it is liquidity that keeps the 
business going’.2 Continuing finance is fundamental to any corporate rescue plan and often 
when a company is financially distressed it inevitably finds itself in a situation where access 
to finance is limited. The distressed state of the company may disincentivize existing and 
potential lenders from lending money to the company, as it is likely that at this point the 
company’s assets may be heavily leveraged and lending money to an insolvent company 
without any form of security may be counter-productive. Negotiating for the much needed 
finance becomes a challenging task as the conflicting interests of all stakeholders3 must be 
taken into account. 
Consequently an established provision that clearly incentivizes prospective post-
commencement financing, i.e. funds needed by the debtor company to enable it continue 
trading during the rescue period,4 and which outlines how these new creditors (who often 
demand priority payments over pre-existing creditors) will fit into the debtor’s repayment 
plans,5 is important in achieving an effective rescue of the company. Therefore, this chapter 
                                                          
1This chapter has been previously incorporated into two articles published in the Annual review of Insolvency 
Law 2013 and the IALS Student Law Review 2014. See appendix for details. 
2 B Eisenbach, ‘DIP Financing: How Chapter 11’s Bankruptcy Loan Rules Can Be Used To Help A 
Business Access Liquidity’(In the Red®- The Business Bankruptcy Blog, 5th November 2013) 
http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2013/11/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/dip-financing-how-chapter-11s-
bankruptcy-loan-rules-can-be-used-to-help-a-business-access-liquidity/ accessed 13th July 2014. 
3 Rescue funding comes with some attendant issues, foremost of which is the ability of the courts to adjust 
creditors’ priorities within the hierarchy of claims. Rescue funding can interfere with the rights and interests 
of pre-existing creditors. Pre-existing rights and priorities of existing lenders/creditors are often displaced 
by the claims of post-commencement lenders/creditors. See section 5.3 of the thesis for an in-depth 
discussion on how rescue funding re-assigns creditors’ priorities. 
4 However, it should be noted that where it is a pre-packed administration such funds are not needed as the 
business would have been sold off prior to the administration commencing. This is discussed in further 
details in section 3.4.2.1 of the thesis. 
5 L Qi, ‘Availability of Continuing Financing in Corporate Reorganisation: the UK and US Perspective’ 
(2008) 29 Comp. Law. 162-167. 
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examines how statutory frameworks may provide incentives to encourage creditors to make 
available new money or additional funds during the rescue process.  
The need for post-commencement financing is not only restricted to statutory frameworks 
for formal rescue proceedings; it also extends to quasi-formal rescue frameworks.6 Quasi-
formal rescue frameworks such as private workouts play an important role as the first point 
of call for struggling businesses. In most cases, the opportunities for rescue provided by 
informal frameworks may have been exhausted by the debtor company before the debtor 
company enters into any of the formal statutory-backed frameworks for rescue. As a result, 
the interrelationship between quasi-formal rescue frameworks such as the pre-pack 
administration and private workouts and the availability of post-commencement funding 
will also be evaluated.  
Many jurisdictions have come to the realisation that employing rescue strategies to tackle 
insolvency requires finding a way of funding the business of the company until a favourable 
outcome can be achieved.7 UNCITRAL recognized this fact when it stated that new finance 
is a vital requirement needed to ensure the continued operation of the business while its 
future is being determined.8 While some governments have been known to offer financial 
bailouts to rescue failing companies,9 the private sector is where most businesses look to 
for support.10 From what has already been stated, it seems clear that in most instances a 
                                                          
6 See section 3.4.2 of thesis for detailed definition of quasi-formal rescue frameworks.  
7 This could either be a restructuring of debt and equity, a going concern sale or a liquidating sale. See J 
Sarra, ‘Financing Insolvency Restructurings in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Stalking Horses, Rogue 
White Knights and Circling Vulture’ (2010-2011) 29 Penn St. Int’L. Rev 581. 
8 UNCITRAL Guide.  
9 See D Teather, ‘US bails out General Motors-related Company GMAC with further $3.8 bn’ The 
Guardian (London, 1 January 2010) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/01/us-bails-out-gmac-
general-motors> accessed 12TH October 2012. The US Government has given financial bailouts to both 
Chrysler and GM Motors. Note that while the UK government have in the past been able to bail out failing 
banks such as RBS, this was done under strict adherence to EU Regulations as the provision of state aid is 
strictly monitored and controlled in the EU.  
10 R D Vriesendorp and M A Gramatikov, ‘Funding Corporate Rescue: The Impact of the Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) Int. Insolv. Rev. Vol. 19: 209-237. 
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successful rescue cannot be divorced from the issue of new funding being obtained during 
the rescue process. 
The discussion in this chapter will begin with a brief explanation of the importance of 
corporate rescue funding. This will be followed by an analytical discussion of rescue 
funding in the three jurisdictions that have been selected for this study, beginning with the 
US.  
 
3.1  The importance of funding in corporate rescue 
 
Bankruptcy procedures have evolved from being tailored towards the winding up of a 
debtor company in order to satisfy creditors’ claims, to having, at their core, the rescue of 
a company or its business, as the case may be. However, this does not detract from the fact 
that some companies are simply not suited to corporate rescue proceedings or re-
organization because they are not economically viable, and therefore creditors are better 
served if those companies are liquidated. 11  Generally speaking, the main theory 
underpinning corporate rescue is that a company may be worth significantly more if 
preserved or, where this is impracticable, sold, as a going concern12 as opposed to the 
piecemeal sale of its assets.13 While this is a laudable goal in light of the potential for job 
preservation and retaining the company within the economy, there are sundry issues that 
make up the rescue regime and with which the debtor company has to contend with in order 
achieve a successful rescue.  
                                                          
11 UNCITRAL Guide. 
12 A company rescue is achieved where the company is rescued as a whole as opposed to a business rescue 
where the business or parts of the business is sold as a going concern, leaving the empty shell that is the 
company behind. 
13 G McCormack, Corporate rescue law- an Anglo American Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2008). 
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Corporate rescue is a multi-faceted procedure. Each facet must be dealt with appropriately 
in order to achieve the overall aim of rescuing the company, its business or parts thereof. 
First and foremost, the debtor company has to decide which of the available rescue 
procedures is appropriate to its circumstances, taking into account the nature and magnitude 
of the problem and the type of resources available to the company.14 Whilst the choice of 
rescue mechanism forms the foundation of the rescue process, other ancillary matters, such 
as the business plan which is the blueprint for the rescue process, creditors’ rights and the 
availability of funds to manage the rescue process, are the structures needed to build a 
successful rescue.  
While all the various elements of a corporate rescue process undeniably play an important 
role, the main focus of this chapter will be on funding the rescue process. Creditors’ rights 
in relation to the availability and accessibility of funds during the rescue process will be 
discussed in Chapter five (V). What is key in the rescue process is the ability of the debtor 
company to continue trading, and this is premised on the availability of credit.15 At the 
point of insolvency, it is likely that the company’s assets will be fully subject to security 
held by existing creditors; the debtor company may have exhausted all available lines of 
credit and may need to source funds to manage its rescue16 Even existing lenders may 
terminate whatever arrangements they have with the debtor so as to limit any additional 
exposure to losses.17   
The point that the provision of additional funding during the rescue process will be required 
in order to enable struggling companies to continue operations is further reiterated by 
                                                          
14 R Parry, Corporate Rescue (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) chap 3. 
15 UNCITRAL Guide. The use of the term credit in relation to corporate rescue in this thesis extends to 
goods and services supplied by trade creditors. 
16 G McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and Corporate Rescue’ [2007] J.B.L. 701-732.  
17 R J Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain and Corporate 
Liquidation’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400, 440-443. 
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Westbrook and Gottlieb18 who state that a successful restructuring entails meeting liquidity 
needs and obtaining post-commencement financing. Additionally, it has been suggested 
that there is strong support globally for super-priority new financing19 forming part of 
insolvency reforms.20 This apparent global consensus is evidenced by the proposals put 
forward by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in its 10 Core 
Principles for an Insolvency Law Regime. The EBRD advocate that where restructuring is 
the appropriate remedy, new priority finance should be permitted.21 The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) also affirms that the continued 
operation of the debtor’s business is crucial to reorganization, and additional finance is vital 
to this objective.22 It was recommended in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law that, where insolvency laws support insolvency proceedings that allow an insolvent 
business to continue trading, either for reorganization or the sale of the business in 
liquidation as a going concern, it is important that new funding is considered. Research 
conducted in the past showed that obtaining financing during the rescue had a correlative 
effect on the reduced possibility of liquidation.23 While it is recognised that finance is 
pivotal to corporate rescue, access to such finance still poses considerable challenges. The 
impact that its availability and terms may have on stakeholders and the overall integrity of 
the insolvency system may be significant.24 
                                                          
18 J Westbrook & L Gottlieb, ‘Reorganisations, Exemption of Financial Assets’ (2009) 27 ABIJ 10. 
19 See section 3.6 of the thesis for detailed meaning of super-priority financing. 
20 M Uttamchandani, ‘The Case for DIP Financing in Early Transition Countries; Taking a DIP in The 
Distressed Debt Pool’ (2004) LIT <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit042.pdf> See, in 
particular, text accompanying fnn. 19-22) accessed 24th September 2012. 
21 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EDBR) Core principle 8. 
<http://www.ebrd.com/russian/downloads/legal/insolvency/principle.pdf> accessed 24th September 2012.    
22 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> accessed 24th September   
23  This research was conducted in America, see A Elayan & T Meyer, ‘The Impact of Receiving Debtor-in-
Possession Financing on the Probability of Successful Emergence and the Time Spent Under (CHAP 11)’ 
(2001). 28(7), BJBFA 905-942. 
24 Sarra (n 7). 
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Differing approaches to rescue finance can be seen in the three jurisdictions considered in 
this thesis. In the US, the problem of attracting funding during the rescue process has been 
surmounted by statutory provisions25 that incentivize rescue funding to assist the rescue. 
Corporate rescue funding provisions, along with the automatic stay,26 are undeniably the 
most important parts of the US Chapter 11 procedure. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides a hierarchy for obtaining funds and incentives in the way of super-priority so that 
lenders may be more amenable to the idea of advancing new money at a time when the 
company is already in financial distress. Canada, on the other hand, initially addressed the 
problem of funding rescues through judicial fiat, whereby judges relied on their inherent 
jurisdiction to assign super-priority to lenders of new funds, over existing creditors.27 This 
was the position until recent reforms gave statutory backing to corporate rescue funding. 
While the UK provisions for corporate rescue funding are not as comprehensive as the US 
and Canadian provisions, they do make provision for the borrowing of funds as part of the 
administration expenses.  
 
3.2  Rescue funding in the United States of America (US) 
 
Rescue funding or ‘debtor-in-possession (DIP) funding as it is known in the US, is 
financing authorised by the court for a bankrupt firm which has sought the protection of the 
Chapter 11 rescue procedure.28 The availability of this type of financing does not take place 
in a vacuum; the presence of an ‘automatic stay’29 and the granting of super-priority to 
                                                          
25 11 U.S.C., s 364. 
26 Ibid., s 362; L Qi (n 4); see also S J Davido, ‘Making Sense of US Bankruptcy Law’ (1992) 3 I.C.C.L.R 
12, 406-413. 
27 This is discussed in detail under section 3.3.1 of the thesis. 
28 L J Abbot, S Parker & G F Peters, ‘The Effect of Post-bankruptcy Financing on Going Concern 
Reporting’ (2000) 21 AICPA. 
29 An automatic stay is a self-activating injunction which suspends the commencement or continuation of 
any action, or proceeding by creditors against the debtor. See 5.2 of the thesis for more discussion on 
automatic stays. 
78 
 
potential lenders by the court are what make this type of financing possible.30 DIP funding 
is not a product of modern insolvency laws. It has a long history which is rooted in the 20th 
century railway equity receiverships which laid down the foundation for the Chapter 11 
rescue procedure. 
 
3.2.1 Historical development of DIP funding 
 
Many of the changes in the political economy31 of the 19th century US can be traced back 
to the railroads.32 The railway equity receivership may be regarded as one of the notable 
changes introduced by the development of railroads as it formed the foundation upon which 
the US Chapter 11 is based. DIP financing has its origin in the equity receiverships that 
were used to reorganize distressed railway companies.33 It arose out of the need for funds 
to support the reorganization of the railway companies.34  These loans were known as 
receiver’s certificates and enjoyed special priority from the courts to the lenders who were 
willing to advance funds to aid the reorganization efforts of the railway companies.35 
 
3.2.1.1 How railway receiverships worked 
 
The railway equity receivership was very much an informal procedure developed by 
railway companies and their secured creditors with the aid of the courts. As such, the 
approach to financing during the reorganization process was in effect the result of judge 
                                                          
30 11 U.S.C., s 362. 
31 Reference is made to industrialization and the growth of capitalism. 
32 A Martin, ‘Railroads and The Equity Receivership: an Essay on Institutional Change’ (1974) The Journal 
of Economic History, vol.34, pp. 685-709 
33 D Skeel Jr., ‘The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing’ (2003-2004) 25 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1905.  
34 See section 2.4.1 of the thesis for the history of the development of the railway equity receiverships. 
35 Skeel (n 33). 
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made rules. The courts developed “super-priority” through the creation of a “six months 
rule” which authorized the debtor to satisfy suppliers’ claims in full, ahead of other 
creditors, provided that the supplies were made within six months of the commencement 
of a receivership. 36  The courts based this rule on the assumption that the railway 
companies’ predominant creditors would concede that suppliers were essential to the 
continued running of the railway company, and were likely to cease supplies at the first 
sign of trouble. It was for this reason that these creditors were paid first.37 
In the initial stages of the application of the six month rule adopted by the courts, it only 
applied to supplies, wages and essential services. The rule was later adapted to incorporate 
the “doctrine of necessity”, thereby also covering important trade creditors.38 While the six 
month rule took care of the problem of preserving supply lines, the most pertinent problem 
was raising actual cash to fund the receivership.39 To this end the courts approved the 
issuing of “receiver’s certificates” by the receiver.40 These certificates were used by the 
receiver to borrow money from investors for a short term against the whole of the assets of 
the railway company.41 These funds were then used to fund the receivership. The receiver’s 
certificates enjoyed priority because they were classed as the receiver’s responsibility and 
not the debtor’s, despite the fact that they interfered with existing mortgages.42   
The access that a receiver had to fund-raising facilities did not mean that he could arbitrarily 
request the authorization of the court to issue receiver’s certificates. The receiver had to 
identify the pressing cash needs of the railway company, and this was often based on 
projected expenses.43 The reason why courts were willing to authorize the issuance of 
                                                          
36 See  Fosdick v Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1878). 
37 Ibid. 
38 B Wham, ‘Preference in Railroad Receiverships’ (1928) 23 ILL.L.REV.141, 147. 
39 Skeel (33). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42Ibid.  
43Ibid.  
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receiver’s certificates was based on the principle that there was a public interest in 
sustaining the continued operation of distressed railway companies.44 However, in cases 
where there was no possibility of a successful rescue, the court sometimes rejected the 
receiver’s request for the sale of certificates to raise funds.45 It was upon this innovation by 
the courts that the process of DIP funding was ultimately founded. 
Statutory backing for DIP funding came with the inclusion of the railroad receivership in 
the Chandler Act of 1938.46 The Act clearly stated that courts could authorize a receiver, 
trustee or debtor-in-possession to issue certificates of indebtedness for cash, property, or 
other consideration upon such terms and conditions and with such security and priority in 
payment, over existing obligations. 47  DIP funding enjoyed a reformation with the 
enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. The Act introduced a well-defined funding 
provision which enabled the debtor-in-possession manager to fund the rescue process.48 To 
date, this provision is still relied on by DIP managers to obtain funding for the rescue 
process. 
 
3.2.2 The modern day funding process 
 
It has been asserted that the reason why DIP financing was codified was to provide 
companies with all the necessary tools required to give them a fighting chance of survival.49 
The impact of the failure of a company is felt in the loss of income and revenue to both 
individual employees and society at large. Conversely, a company’s survival benefits the 
                                                          
44 H J Baker, ‘Certificates of Indebtedness in Reorganization Proceedings: Analysis and Legislative 
Proposals’ (1976) 50 AM.BANKR. L.J. 18-16. 
45 Skeel  (n 33). 
46 Section 77 for Railroad Receivership and Section 77(b) for non-railroad companies. 
47 11 U.S.C., s 116(2) & s 516(2). 
48 Ibid, s 364. 
49 B A Henoch, ‘Post petition Financing: is There Life After Debt?’ (1991) BANKR. DEV. J. 575. 
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society, 50  the debtor and creditors most especially, as the going concern value of the 
company may exceed the liquidation value.51  
Although there is general consensus that DIP funding is vital to the rescue process,52 it is a 
highly risky venture for a lender due to the possibility of the company not having a 
successful rescue and therefore not being able to repay the lender. Thus the capacity to raise 
such funds would have been near impossible because of the risk involved, if there were no 
statutory provisions for incentives such as super-priority and priming liens as contained in 
section 364. 
Even where a debtor does not have an immediate need for the DIP funding, it may be 
essential to its survival to secure authorization from the courts to establish credit lines for 
future use.53 In addition, the possibility of new money being put into the business may 
inspire confidence in the vendors to keep supply lines open, skilled manpower to remain in 
their jobs and customers to keep patronising the debtor for goods and services.54  
 
3.2.3        The DIP financing process 
 
The current process for approval for DIP financing is typically a two stage one.55 The debtor 
begins by filing a motion56 for authorization to obtain credit (at this point a DIP lender will 
already have been arranged). The motion may be filed at the same time as the Chapter 11 
                                                          
50 This is in terms of generation of revenue and creation of jobs. 
51 Henoch (n 49). 
52 See p74-76 of thesis. 
53 S D Cousins, ‘Post-petition Financing of Dot-coms’ (2002) 27 Del. J. Corp. L 759. 
54 Ibid. 
55 S Dahiya, K John, M Puri & G Ramirez, ‘Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: 
Empirical Evidences’ (2003) 69 JFE 259-280. 
56 This is brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2010, r 4001(b) (1) (b) and r 4001(c) 
(1) (b). These rules cover relief from automatic stay; prohibiting or conditioning the use, sale or lease of 
property.  
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petition, or immediately thereafter. The final hearing on the motion may commence not 
earlier than 14 days after service of the motion on the bankruptcy trustee 57  and any 
creditor’s committees.58 Thereafter the request for DIP financing moves on to the second 
stage, where a permanent financing order is entered by the court in the amount requested. 
At this point there is room for the court to entertain any objections from creditors.59 
3.2.3.1  Potential lenders in DIP funding 
 
In most cases, the financing of the rescue process is provided by pre-bankruptcy secured, 
under-secured and unsecured creditors60 who already have an existing relationship with the 
debtor61and are in the best position to understand the debtor’s finances.62 DIP financing 
attracts high fees63 due to the risks involved, and it also enjoys priority which ensures that 
DIP lenders are entitled to be paid first.64 As a result, most pre-bankruptcy secured creditors 
would rather advance more money to the distressed company to protect their security than 
have their rights over existing security subordinated in favour of new creditors. In addition, 
maintaining support for the business would ensure that the pre-commencement creditor’s 
collateral retains its value as opposed to the possibility of it being worthless upon 
liquidation.65 For the unsecured and under secured pre-commencement creditor, loaning 
                                                          
57 A bankruptcy trustee is a person appointed by the court (or creditors in some cases) to act on behalf of the 
debtor to ensure that both the creditors’ and debtor’s interest are upheld. 
58 See Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 2010, r 4001(c) (2). However where there is a risk of irreparable 
damage, then the court can hear the motion before the expiry of the 14 days limit. 
59 Ibid, r 4001(c) (2) & (3). 
60 More often than not, these pre-bankruptcy creditors are banks and financial institutions. 
61 Bankruptcy Bulletin, ‘A Roundup of Decisions’ (Mar/April 1993-1994) 3 Bus. L. Today 46. 
62 Skeel (n 33). 
63 Cost of DIP financing would typically include a fee at the initial stage when the debtor and the DIP lender 
commit to a DIP financing agreement, further fees are paid at the end of the DIP loan agreement, ongoing 
commitment fees and interest on the DIP loan itself, see M S Huebner, ‘Debtor-in-Possession Financing’ 
The RMA Journal April 2005 p32. 
64 D Baird & M Bienenstock, ‘Debtor-In-Possession Financing (Pre-petition & Lock-Up Agreements)’ 
(2002-2003) 1 DePaul Bus.& Comm .L.J 589. 
65 J M Landers & K A Dunwoody, ‘Post-petition Credit: Why and How’ (1990) 2 Faulkner & Gray’s 
Bankr.L.ReV.13-14. It should be noted that under Chapter 11 reorganization, the company typically keeps 
doing business and this may maintain the value of the company’s assets including those it has given out as 
collateral. On the other hand, when a company files for liquidation, it stops trading and secured creditors 
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money to the debtor may open up an opportunity to cross-collateralize. 66  Cross-
collateralization in bankruptcy terms is the securing of an under-secured pre-
commencement debt with post-commencement assets from the debtor company’s assets.67  
In this regard, DIP loans provided by pre-existing creditors can be regarded as defensive 
DIP loans68 because the DIP loan secures the pre-existing creditor’s pre-commencement 
exposure. 
Trade creditors also play a part in the funding of the rescue process, irrespective of the fact 
that they may be doing so reluctantly. This is because trade creditors provide goods and 
services for which they may not be paid and this can be equated to providing funding as the 
company cannot operate or re-organize its affairs without the continued supply of goods 
and services.69 Their continued support during the rescue process may be perceived as a 
tactical one, as keeping supply lines open may keep the rescue process going and in turn 
result in a higher probability of recovery of their pre-commencement claims70 if the rescue 
is successful.  
 
3.2.3.2  Lending under 11 U.S.C., section 364 
 
                                                          
would have their collateral returned to them or, where the assets are sold off, the proceeds of the sale.  In 
some cases the value of the assets would have depreciated. 
66 Henoch (n 49). This process of cross-collateralisation is being frowned upon as it places a pre-
commencement creditor in an advantageous position post-bankruptcy. 
67 Saybrook Manufacturing Co. 936 F.2nd 1490 11th Cir. 1992. See section 3.2.5 of the thesis for more 
discussion on cross-collateralization. 
68 A Carlsson, ‘DIP financing: a rough road to recovery. A summary of developments covered by PLC US’ 
(Practical Law Company, 20-July-2009) < http://uk.practicallaw.com/3-386-
6889?q=dip+financing;+a+rough+road+to+recovery> accessed 31st October 2012. 
69 Bankruptcy Bulletin (n 61). 
70 Ibid. 
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One of the factors that may contribute to the ease with which funds can be obtained via DIP 
lending is the presence of an automatic stay.71 The automatic stay72 puts on hold, as soon 
as a Chapter 11 petition is filed, the right of all creditors to enforce their security73 and this 
stay remains in place until the end of the Chapter 11 proceedings. The automatic stay 
mitigates the financial distress confronting the debtor prior to filing for a Chapter 11 
protection.74 This is because it defers the accumulation of interest on all claims that are not 
over secured75 as well as putting a hold on creditors’ rights to enforce their claims on the 
debtor’s assets.76 The automatic stay, which acts to suspend all contractual and legal rights 
of a pre-commencement lender,77 can only be waived by the courts.  
The automatic stay, as well as the power of the court to consent to funding arrangements 
that undermine the rights of pre-commencement creditors without first obtaining their 
consent, makes for easy accessibility to finance. 78  It has been held that requiring a 
precondition to obtain the consent of pre-commencement creditors before giving judicial 
authorization to a DIP loan would subvert the authority of the bankruptcy court.79 Also, the 
judge’s approval would be based on the best interest of all the parties involved, as opposed 
to a creditor’s consent which would in all probability, be based on self-interest.80 It is 
plausible that the absence of these two components would mean that the DIP manager may 
likely not have access to secured assets as permitted under the Bankruptcy Code, to raise 
the much needed funds.  
                                                          
71 D D Moore, ‘How to Finance a Debtor in Possession’ (1990-1991) 6 com. Lending Rev. 3. 
72 Also known as the moratorium in the UK. 
73 11 U.S.C, s 362. 
74 G Trantis, ‘A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-financing’ (1993) 46 Vand. L. Rev. 901. 
75 11 U.S.C., s 502(b) (2). 
76 Ibid, s 362(a). 
77 See generally 11 U.S.C., s 105; Abbot, Parker & Peters (n 27). 
78 11 U.S.C., s 364. 
79 See Burchinal v Central Washington Bank (In re Apple, Inc.) 82 F. 2d 1484, 1491 (9th Cir. 1987). 
80 Ibid. 
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The nature of DIP financing a debtor has access to, is determined by the structure of the 
assets and liabilities it has.81 One of the attractions of the provision for DIP funding within 
the Bankruptcy Code, is that it creates different avenues for borrowing money during the 
rescue process. Section 364 of Bankruptcy Code, which provides for DIP financing, takes 
into consideration, and makes provision for, four major classes of loans with reference to 
the debtor’s assets and liabilities. These are; 
 Section 364(a); under the provisions of this paragraph an unsecured loan can be 
obtained by the debtor in the ordinary course of business without the need for the 
court’s approval. It enjoys priority, as part of the administrative expenses, over other 
priority claims and unsecured claims.82 More often than not, trade creditors and 
suppliers rely on the provisions of this section to keep supply lines open.83 This is 
the only circumstance under which a debtor could obtain DIP funding without prior 
judicial authorization.84 
 Section 364(b); under this paragraph debtors are allowed to obtain unsecured credit 
for expenses that fall outside the ordinary course of the debtor’s business. However, 
the court’s approval (after notice and a hearing) is needed before the debtor can 
borrow money under this section, and the debt incurred, or credit obtained, enjoys 
priority as an administration expense. Typically, charges of vendors of products and 
services such as insurance premiums and fees of non-professional consultants, 
                                                          
81 Moore (n 71). For example, a company whose assets are fully encumbered would require a different type 
of DIP funding arrangement (e.g. a priming lien) from a company that has some free assets that can used as 
collateral.  
82 11 U.S.C, s. 503(b) (1). 
83 P B Jones & C E Cutler, ‘Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Revisited’ (2002), 
<http://www.fredlaw.com/articles/banking/bank_0203_pbj.html> accessed 23rd October 2012.  
84 11 U.S.C, s 364(a). 
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which do not form part of the ordinary course of the debtor’s business fall within 
this provision.85 
 Section 364(c); this provision takes care of circumstances where the debtor cannot 
obtain unsecured credit for administrative expenses.86 Under this paragraph, after 
authorization by the court, the debtor can obtain credit which will; 
 have priority over all administrative claims, 87  thereby enjoying 
super-priority, or 
 be secured by a lien88 on the debtor’s unsecured assets, or 
 secure a junior lien 89  on the debtor’s property which is already 
subject to a lien.  
 Section 364(c) acts as a “catch-all” net for all DIP funding that cannot be obtained under 
section 364(a) and (b). Apparently the majority of DIP funding is obtained and agreed upon 
pursuant to the provisions of this section.90 Before this type of funding is made available, 
the debtor must show that it cannot obtain unsecured credit under paragraphs (a) or (b) of 
section 364 and, regardless of the fact that the pre-commencement creditors’ consent is not 
needed prior to the court giving its approval, a hearing must be held and notice given to 
pre-commencement creditors. Lenders advancing money pursuant to this section may (and 
                                                          
85 Jones & Cutler (n 83). 
86 11 U.S.C., s 364(b)(1). 
87 These are administrative expenses found in section 503(b) and section 507(b) and this includes costs of 
preserving the estate, including taxes, wages and fines, compensation, various expenses incurred by 
creditors, professional fees, and trustees’ expenses amongst other things. 
88 A lien is a security interest granted in a property to secure the payment of a debt or the performance of an 
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often do) secure the loan with a junior lien on encumbered assets or first lien on unsecured 
assets in addition to having a super-priority over all other administrative expenses.91 
 Section 364(d); one of the possible reasons for DIP funding provisions is that, at the 
point of the commencement of the rescue process, most debtors have few or no 
unencumbered assets. The provision of this paragraph comes into its own in such 
situations. This provision allows the court, after notice and a hearing, to authorize 
DIP funding which is then secured by a senior or equal lien on assets that are already 
subject to pre-existing liens. This is known as a priming lien within bankruptcy 
parlance. Before the court will permit this form of DIP funding, the debtor must 
demonstrate92 its inability to obtain DIP funding under one of the other paragraphs 
of section 364 and that the existing lien holders will suffer no prejudice93 as their 
interest will be adequately protected.94 The existing lien holders need not establish 
the facts, as the burden of proof rests on the debtor.95  
There are conflicting views concerning what constitutes “adequate protection” under 
section 364(d). Section 36196 defines “adequate protection” to include cash payments or 
periodic payments to the existing lien holder, providing an additional or replacement lien 
and any other compensation.97 However “adequate protection” within the perspective of 
this provision could also be interpreted to mean an over-collateralization of the existing 
lien,98 whereby the value of the assets exceeds the value of the pre-existing lien on it. The 
                                                          
91 Ibid; also Jones & Cutler (n 83). 
92 11 U.S.C., s 364(d)(1). 
93 Such as the depreciation in value of his security interest. 
94 Ibid, s 364(d) (1b). 
95 Ibid, s 364(d) (2). 
96 11 U.S.C. 
97 See In re Debbie Reynolds Hotel & Casino, Inc., 255 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001), where post-
commencement financing was approved under s 364(c), based on the fact that the super-priority loan did 
not alter the rights of secured creditor and this constituted an adequate protection of existing creditors’ 
interest . 
98 Jones & Cutler (n 83).  
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courts have also held that what constitutes “adequate protection” is a matter of judicial 
decision and a question of fact which is embedded in the measurement of value and the 
credibility of witnesses.99 
The definition provided by section 361 does present some complications as it may be near 
impossible to meet the criteria laid down in that section; a debtor seeking additional finance 
is not likely have the means to make cash payments or the assets to put up as replacement 
collateral. The alternative would be for the pre-existing lien holder to consent to the 
devaluation of its security by allowing another lender in. The possibility of this occurring 
is quite slim, as no creditor is likely to give up the value of its security without any 
corresponding compensation. The restrictive nature of this provision may therefore mean 
that funding under this provision may have to come from the pre-existing lien holders and, 
where this is not forthcoming and the lien holder withholds his consent, the restructuring 
may fail.100 
The US Senate Judiciary Committee 101  explained the reasoning behind “adequate 
protection”. The Committee acknowledged the fact that there may be situations where it 
may undermine the policy of bankruptcy laws, or make it near impossible to honour the 
secured creditors’ rights, and in order to protect creditors’ interests, this section makes 
available a means of ensuring that the secured creditor gets value for his lien. Whatever the 
case may be, it does provide a powerful tool for the debtor to obtain funding. With this 
provision, two options are open to the debtor, either he uses it to find a new post-
commencement lender or he uses it as a leverage to negotiate with pre-commencement 
                                                          
99 See Re Snow Shoe Co., 789 F.2d at 1008 (4th Cir. 1986). 
100 K S Atlas & K E Andersen, ‘DIP Super-priorities and Secured Creditors’ Dilemma’ (2009) 
ANNREVINSOLV 6. 
101 US Rep No. 989, 95th Congress 2d Session 53(1978). 
89 
 
lenders for fresh funding. For the pre-existing creditor, the aim of the “adequate protection” 
clause is to ensure that he is not denied the value which he initially bargained for.102 
Although the provisions of section 364 is drafted mainly from the perspective of securing 
the loan, under section 364(e) adequate provision is also made for the protection of the 
lender, after the DIP funds have been secured, from variation or reversal of the DIP loan 
agreement. The importance of this protection has been emphasised by the courts103 which 
have held that the protection offered by section 364(e) gives lenders the assurance that, as 
long as they relied in good faith on the approval of the DIP funding agreement given by the 
court, a challenge under which a creditor is trying to have the agreement reversed on appeal 
will have no bearing on their priority status. The key here is for the lender to have acted in 
good faith. 
 
3.2.4    Conflicts in Section 364 
 
The drafting of section 364 threw up two often conflicting objectives of the rescue process 
which Congress had to resolve; the need for the fair treatment of creditors and the need for 
rehabilitation of struggling but viable debtors.104 There was a need to reconcile and balance 
the effect that DIP funding would have on the rights of creditors as the framework for DIP 
funding is constructed such that these two conflicting objectives are dependent on each 
other. The rescue process would rely on the creditor advancing further credit or having his 
security being subjugated to raise additional funds, in return for the creditors getting better 
value for their money after a successful reorganization.105  This inter-dependency acts to 
                                                          
102 McCormack (n 13). 
103 See In Re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2D 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1982). 
104 See Re Ames Department stores, 115 Bankr. 34, 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
105 Re Roblin Industry Inc. 52 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).  It is often the case that this is the only way for 
unsecured creditors to recover any part of their claim. 
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balance the conflicting rights. The danger in this balancing act is that, in some 
circumstances, the scale may tilt to favour the opposing side. 
 
3.2.5   A critique of the DIP funding mechanism 
 
The US bankruptcy process is viewed as more debtor friendly in contrast to the UK 
insolvency process which may be regarded as having a bias for creditors.106 Whilst the 
wording of Chapter 11 under the Bankruptcy Code appears to support this position, the 
reality appears to be quite different, especially when taking into consideration the hold that 
creditors have over the rescue process through the funding they provide. The Bankruptcy 
Code clearly allows the suppression of creditors’ rights by way of “cram down”, 107 
authorising the judge to approve DIP funding without the prior consent of all classes of 
creditors, amongst other things. This therefore puts the debtor’s interest above that of the 
creditors. Nonetheless secured creditors tend to wrestle back control through the influence 
that they exert with the DIP funding agreements.108 These agreements have been converted 
by creditors into valuable corporate governance tools.109 Consequently, it is not unusual for 
lenders to secure preferential treatment of both their pre-commencement and post-
commencement debts in addition to the high interest rates and fees they demand.110  
One area in which the creditor’s control can be felt is in the management of the rescue 
process. If the lender thinks that the debtor’s management needs to be replaced, he will 
insist on this change as part of the terms of the loan.111 In other words, a lender can use the 
                                                          
106 See section 2.7 of this thesis for analysis on the perception of debt and its influence on bankruptcy laws. 
107 11 U.S.C., s 1129(b). 
108 G W Kuney, ‘Hijacking Chapter 11’ (2004-2005) 21 Emory Bankr. Dev J. 19. 
109 D Skeel Jr., ‘Creditors’ ball: the “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003-2004) 152 U. 
Pa. L. Rev 917.  
110 Kuney (n 108). 
111 Skeel (n 109). 
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terms of a loan to usurp existing management and supplant them with his minion as head 
of the company. This effectively portends loss of control of the rescue process by the debtor 
and its management while the creditor directs the rescue process through his control over 
the debtor. 
Criticisms of DIP financing have arisen in relation to the “cross-collateralization” of pre-
commencement and post-commencement loans. Although not authorized by the 
Bankruptcy Code, the courts have defined “cross-collateralization” as the securing of pre-
commencement debt by post-commencement assets. 112  This occurs when the pre-
commencement and post-commencement lender is the same and he uses a cross-
collateralization113 clause to cover his pre-commencement exposure. What happens is that, 
in order to secure both the pre-commencement and post-commencement loans, the lender 
is given liens and security interests in either of the debtor’s pre-commencement or post-
commencement assets.114  
The controversy behind cross-collateralization lies in the fact that it goes against the 
bankruptcy principle of equal treatment of pre-commencement creditors of the same 
class. 115  It is arguably unfair that a pre-commencement unsecured or under-secured 
creditor, who is in a position to loan money during the rescue, would use that as a leverage 
to better place his pre-commencement claim within the hierarchy of claims. On the other 
hand, if viewed from the position of the creditor/lender, DIP funding does tend to be high 
risk with no absolute certainty of success attached. So, therefore, using all available means 
to shield the lenders’ exposure may be tolerated. As a result a number of courts in the past 
have authorised cross-collateralization clauses in DIP funding agreements.  
                                                          
112 See Otte v Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp (In re Texlon Corp.) 596 F.2D 1092, 1094. 
113 Cousins (n 53). 
114 Ibid. 
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In Texlon Corp116 it was held that cross-collateralization could be authorized on the basis 
that adequate notice and hearing provided procedural protection for creditors, or a better 
option of financing was not available, or the survival of the estate was dependent on the 
loan and it was in the best interest of all the creditors. However the Eleventh Circuit Court 
in the case of Shapiro v Saybrook Manufacturing Co. (In re Saybrook Manufacturing 
Co.),117 held that using a cross-collateralization clause to obtain funding was not authorised 
by the Bankruptcy Code and it went against the priority classification118 in the Bankruptcy 
Code. The position in Saybrook has been viewed as going against the very foundation of 
the Chapter 11 philosophy, which is the rehabilitation of debtors.119  
The criticism of the decision in Saybrook raises the question of how conflicting interests in 
the administration of the debtor’s rescue should be addressed in order to give the debtor’s 
rescue purpose. In balancing these opposing interests in an attempt to ensure that no 
prejudice is suffered by interested parties, some flexibility will have be allowed, this 
perhaps explains the rationale behind the courts’ permission of cross-collateralization. The 
position in Saybrook still remains in place, although some courts120 have continued to 
honour cross- collateralization clauses as long as they fulfilled the pre-requisite conditions 
laid down in the Texlon case.   
DIP funding has come a long way since the receivership certificates of the 19th century. It 
is clear that funding the rescue of a company has evolved into a more sophisticated concept. 
While the Bankruptcy Code covers all the bases under section 364 by providing different 
avenues for the debtor to raise funds, it also comes with the risk of abuse, which perhaps is 
                                                          
116 Otte v Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp, supra (n 111). 
117 936 F.2nd 1490 (11th Cir. 1992). 
118 11 U.S.C., s 507. 
119 See C J Tabb, ‘Requiem for Cross Collateralisation?’ (1993) 2 J Bankr. L. & Prac. 109, 109-10  at 111. 
120 See Bland v Farmworker Creditors 308 B.R. 109 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003; In re Fla. W. Gateway, Inc., 
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not surprising. Despite the risk of abuse, section 364 plays an important role in the success 
of the rescue process. Skeel acknowledges the importance of funding during the rescue 
process as more companies rely on section 364 to raise much needed funds. He attributes 
this reliance on the fact that, unlike during the 1980’s when companies had little secured 
debt, a lot of companies presently have most of their assets heavily encumbered prior to 
bankruptcy and thus have to rely on DIP funding.121  
 Furthermore, Congress, in factoring the DIP provision into the Bankruptcy Code, has 
created an avenue for a debtor to be effectively rehabilitated while at the same time offering 
protection to potential lenders by including caveats in the section. It can also be argued that 
the inclusion of a financing provision within the Bankruptcy Code represents the underlying 
aim of bankruptcy laws in the US, which is the total rehabilitation of the debtor.  
  
3.3 Rescue funding in Canada 
 
Rescue funding in the Canadian context is financing which is made available in the interim 
period between filing a proposal under the CCAA and the development of a viable and 
acceptable business plan.122 Whilst interim financing is not exclusive to the CCAA, for the 
purpose of this thesis it will be analysed from the standpoint of the CCAA because the 
CCAA has been used in every major Canadian restructuring in the last 25 years.123  The 
issue of rescue funding, or interim financing124 as it is termed in Canada, is two pronged 
and is better understood if viewed from both perspectives. These perspectives examine 
rescue funding from the pre-statutory and the post-statutory reform angle. Canada has 
                                                          
121 Skeel (n 109). 
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always made provisions for interim financing,125 however it was not until reforms in 2009 
that Canada introduced statutory provisions for interim financing into both the CCAA and 
BIA. Prior to the reforms, debtors who required some form of interim finance had to rely 
on the discretion of bankruptcy judges to permit it. The judges relied on their inherent 
jurisdiction to assign the necessary funds to debtors.  
Presently, the courts have the backing of legislation to perform this function. Although not 
as exhaustive as section 364 of the US Bankruptcy Code, the CCAA does offer some form 
of guidance to judges while explicitly recognising the importance of finance to rescue. In 
order to fully understand the Canadian position, it is necessary to examine how it all started, 
i.e. with the exercise of pre-statutory judicial discretion.  
 
3.3.1 Judicial discretion to assign funds 
 
In recognition of the potential value that rescuing an insolvent company can have in 
negating the social and economic consequences of firm failure, and that financing can be 
the key ingredient of a successful rescue, Canadian courts in the past relied on their inherent 
jurisdiction to approve such financing.126 This was because the CCAA which was, and still 
is, the principal restructuring legislation, provided the courts with little guidance as to how 
the restructuring process could be financed. 
The granting of interim financing plays an important role in the negotiation of a plan of 
arrangement or compromise under the CCAA. The reasons being that, financing would 
allow the debtor to continue trading until an effective plan is worked out.127  A company 
                                                          
125 At least from the time of renewed interest in the use of the CCAA for restructuring. 
126 J Sarra, ‘Debtor in Possession Financing: the Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant Super-priority 
Financing in CCAA Applications’ (2000) 23 Dalhousie L.J 337. 
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95 
 
which has no pre-filing credit readily available or any access to post-commencement funds 
would only be delaying liquidation by filing a CCAA petition.128  While it is a recognized 
fact that the provision of interim financing can compromise creditors’ well established 
rights, 129  the Canadian courts in the past assumed jurisdiction to make orders which 
included interim financing on a super-priority basis, which furthered the intrinsic purpose 
of the CCAA.130 
 
3.3.2 How judicial discretion to assign funds worked 
 
The CCAA pre-reform was very much a court-supervised process wherein a debtor was 
allowed to propose a plan of arrangement or compromise with its creditors. Under such a 
plan, a debtor could carry on its business for its benefit and that of the creditors, and at the 
same time avoid bankruptcy.131 The initial application to propose a plan of compromise or 
arrangement was either done by the debtor or a creditor; however it is was commonly done 
by the debtor. The CCAA made provisions for the court to grant an automatic stay to 
accompany a plan of compromise at the initial application or for the court to grant an order 
for a stay at any time other than the initial application.132 The objective in granting the stay 
was to maintain the status quo for a limited period so that a plan could be negotiated with 
the creditors.133  
Before the 2009 reforms, Canadian judges, in acknowledgement of the debtor’s need for 
finance during the interim phase while it sorted out its affairs with its creditors, and in the 
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(Ont.Gen.Div [Commercial list]). 
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absence of legislative direction, construed their equitable or inherent jurisdiction to include 
the ability to approve interim financing.134 What was ill-defined under the CCAA plan of 
arrangement, prior to reforms that brought in statutory backing for interim financing, was 
how the process of application for interim financing actually worked. Since interim 
financing was not a product of statutes in Canada at this point, it remains unclear how it all 
started. It has been proffered that interim financing in Canada owed its origin to the US 
Chapter 11 process. 135  In the US an application for a Chapter 11 protection is often 
accompanied by an application for DIP financing. At first glance this appears to be so; on 
the other hand, a general look at the history of DIP funding in the US situates the Canadian 
experience prior to statutory reforms which introduced interim financing, within the period 
where rescue funding during equity receivership relied on the courts to approve 
receivership certificates.136  
A review of Canadian cases which were decided during this timeframe gives some 
understanding as to the mechanism of applying for interim financing. Evidently, a debtor 
company could apply for an order pursuant to the CCAA and in so doing seek reliefs 
including a stay and “debtor in possession super-priority financing”.137 One thing which is 
clear is that the courts, in the absence of statutory provisions, granted relief in the form of 
interim financing and on a super-priority basis while relying on their inherent jurisdiction. 
Re Fairview Industries Ltd 138  was one of the first cases that considered the issue of 
financing under the CCAA. An initial court order issued by the court in a CCAA proceeding 
in respect of Fairview Industries and five other related companies included amongst other 
things permission for the bankruptcy monitor and other restructuring professionals to be 
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paid in priority to all creditors. Upon the application of some creditors, the court rescinded 
its earlier order on the basis that it did not have the authority to subordinate pre-existing 
secured claims.139   
In the subsequent case of Re Westar Mining Ltd140 the court’s position on granting priority 
over secured claims changed. In this case, an initial order was granted by the court requiring 
suppliers of goods and services to extend further credit to Westar beyond the date of the 
initial order. The court subsequently held that it did not have the power to make that 
particular order to secure further credit from suppliers which granted a first charge over 
Westar’s interest in the Greenhills mine. The court reviewed and upheld its earlier order 
which created the charge and established that where a company had a viable basis for 
restructuring, it could borrow money for administration expenses and grant security which 
would rank ahead of unsecured creditors.  
Another case which showcased the courts’ reliance on its inherent jurisdiction, in this 
instance over the express objection of an existing creditor, was Re Dylex Ltd.141 Dylex had 
established that it needed 30 million Canadian dollars as a loan to meet its operating needs 
during restructuring. The Royal Bank of Scotland and Bank of Montreal were Dylex’s 
existing lenders and the obvious sources of the 30million Canadian Dollars facility. At the 
time of the CCAA application, Dylex owed both banks 90 million Canadian Dollars and 
both banks held comprehensive security over virtually all of Dylex’s assets. When 
approached for DIP financing the Royal Bank of Scotland said that it was prepared to 
provide the DIP loan as long as the Bank of Montreal agreed to be part of the arrangement. 
The Bank of Montreal refused to extend any further loan to Dylex, but was willing to agree 
to a charge ranking equally with existing security held by both banks for any loans given 
                                                          
139 Fairview (see footnote above) at 59-10. 
140 (1992) 14 C.B.R. (3d) 88. 
141 [1995] O.J. No. 595 (QL), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div. - Commercial List). 
98 
 
by the Royal Bank of Scotland to Dylex during the restructuring period. Dylex and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland applied to court for an order permitting the Royal Bank of Scotland 
to provide the DIP loan which would be secured by a first charge on inventory and 
receivables ranking in priority over the existing security over such assets in favour of both 
banks, as well as a charge on all other assets of Dylex ranking behind the other security 
held by both banks. The Bank of Montreal opposed the application. The court approved the 
DIP loan and held that the Bank of Montreal would not be adversely affected by the order 
approving the DIP loan.  
 
3.3.2.1 Inherent jurisdiction 
 
There have been different definitions of the term “inherent jurisdiction” and conflicting 
views on the source of the courts’ reliance on their inherent jurisdiction has been put 
forward. Sarra makes reference to the definitions of inherent jurisdiction found in the 
Black’s Law Dictionary142 and Halsbury’s Laws of England143  as the possible meanings of 
“inherent jurisdiction” in Canada,144 this is however far from how the Canadian courts have 
viewed inherent jurisdiction. To the courts, inherent jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction 
are mutually inclusive145 and the courts may rely on their inherent jurisdiction to deliberate 
on matters regulated by statute as long as it does not infringe or conflict with the statutory 
provisions.146  
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143 Vol. 37 (4TH edn, Butterworths, 1982) at para 14.  Halsbury describes “inherent jurisdiction” as referring 
more to the administration of justice rather than substantive law. 
144 Sarra (n 126).  
145 Societe des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick v Association of Parents for Fairness in Education (1986) 
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The support for this position embraced by the court appears to be located within legislation. 
One relevant provision is section 12 of the Interpretation Act (still in force) 147 which 
provides that every enactment is considered beneficial and should be given fair, large and 
liberal construction and interpretation that best ensures that its objectives are met. It 
therefore followed that in order to give full rein to the intention of Parliament in creating 
the CCAA provisions, the court had to ensure that it did everything within its power to 
effectively maintain the status quo of an insolvent company while it endeavoured to reach 
a compromise with its creditors.148 If approving an order for interim financing ensured the 
fulfilment of the objectives of the CCAA, then it was well within the courts’ powers to 
approve interim financing. Another statutory provision which the courts exploited to 
support their ability to grant interim financing order was section 11(3) and section 11(4) 
(now section 11 of the current statute) of the CCAA.149 The provisions permitted the court 
to make “orders on such terms as it may impose…..” therefore the courts could rely on this 
provision to grant an order for interim financing. 
 In addition to the reliance on statutory provisions to determine the source of the courts’ 
jurisdiction, Sarra states that a detailed analysis of the courts’ motive for acting without 
statutory provisions reveals that the courts’ authority stemmed from their inherent 
jurisdiction to deal with matters pertaining to fairness of processes and also to look to 
principles of equity to grant exceptional remedies in order to effectively ensure that the 
aims of the legislation are achieved.150  Consequently, the courts had jurisdiction over 
procedural matters which were intended to ensure fairness and judicious resolution of 
applications under the CCAA.151 
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Furthermore, the courts, in authorising interim financing acted under their equitable 
jurisdiction on the basis that where a statute is silent on an issue or fails to address some 
risk or harm, equity bridges the gap.152 The test for determining if the courts could, under 
their equitable jurisdiction, authorise interim financing required that the debtor 
demonstrated that the financing was essential to the continued operation of the business, 
and this would in turn enable the debtor to effectively reorganize its affairs.153 
In employing their inherent jurisdiction the courts followed two principles. To begin with, 
the subject matter had to be within the jurisdiction of the courts and secondly, the courts 
had to take into consideration all the relevant factors.154 In applying these principles to 
interim funding, the courts were able to authorise interim funding because, firstly, issues of 
insolvency fell within their jurisdiction and secondly, to ensure fairness in the CCAA 
process, the debtor ought be given every opportunity to attempt an advantageous outcome 
before senior creditors sought to enforce their claims through liquidation.155 
  
3.3.3 Factors the court considered when granting interim financing 
(pre-reforms) 
 
One important factor which the court considered when approving interim financing or 
financing on super-priority basis, was the balance of prejudices between the parties.156 The 
court, in so doing, ensured that any outcome reached was what would have been within the 
reasonable expectations of all stakeholders. 157  The implication of this was that some 
sacrifices had to be made, usually on the part of secured creditors158 who may have their 
                                                          
152 Re United Used Auto & Truck Parts (1999), 12 C.B.R. 144 at para 29.  
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claims subjugated by super-priority financing. Therefore, courts were admonished to grant 
an order for interim financing only where there were reasonable forecasts of successful 
restructurings.159 While this was the central premise upon which the courts acted in granting 
interim financing, a case-by-case approach was also adopted160 to ensure that a “one-cap-
fits all” system was not applied to an issue as sensitive as interim financing.  
Additionally, the courts over time developed some additional principles through their 
judgements which not only acted as a guide for parties, and created a level of certainty in 
the process, but also aided the courts in the balancing of parties’ interests. 161  These 
principles are still relevant today and aid the courts in decisions regarding super-priority 
interim financing. These principles can be summarised as follows; 
 A company with a feasible chance of restructuring will be allowed to borrow money 
for operational capital and grant security for such loans ranking ahead of unsecured 
claims.162 
 Super-priority DIP financing will be approved where all or substantially all the 
existing secured creditors agree.163  
 The interests of existing secured creditors can be prejudiced by the granting of 
super-priority DIP financing only if the court is satisfied that the granting of the DIP 
financing is warranted in the particular circumstances of the case before it.164 
 Deciding whether to grant super-priority DIP financing is an exercise of balancing 
the interests of all interested parties, but “cogent evidence” will be have to be shown 
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that the benefit of the DIP financing clearly outweighs the potential prejudice to 
secured creditors before the court will exercise its jurisdiction.165 
 The requested DIP financing should be kept to what is reasonably necessary to 
allow the company to continue to trade and to meet expenses required to “keep the 
lights on” while the company is trying to restructure its affairs.166 
  Sufficient notice had to be given to the creditors. In exceptional circumstances the 
requirement for notice was waived by the courts and only in relation to a restricted 
amount of money and for a limited time. But a debtor seeking to compromise 
claims, no matter the circumstances, was required to give adequate notice to 
creditors.167 
Generally, where the court was satisfied these principles and a significant number of all the 
existing secured creditors had consented to the interim financing, or where it could be 
established that secured creditors whose security interests were being subordinated were 
not immensely disadvantaged by the interim financing, the order for financing was 
approved.168 
These principles have in no small measure guided the hands of the courts to abridge the 
need for interim financing. Although it created a support system for both the courts and all 
other parties involved, concerns were raised regarding the court’s practice of weighing 
prejudice in order to grant interim financing. It was suggested that the practice in some 
ways lacked certainty.169 If viewed in light of the fact that the CCAA process involves the 
weighing of interests of and prejudices to all parties concerned, from the order to seek 
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CCAA protection, to the conclusion of the process,170 it does appear that the consideration 
of all factors measured against the impact on all the parties is a thread that runs through the 
CCAA. Accordingly, the balancing of prejudices is an integral part of the CCAA process.  
Secured lenders also expressed dissatisfaction over the possible loss of priority to super-
priority financiers.171 Not only were they reluctantly giving up their fundamental property 
rights, there was also the spill-over effect that super-priority financing could have on the 
availability and/or cost of loans.172 Despite these legitimate concerns raised regarding the 
courts’ reliance on their inherent jurisdiction to approve interim financing, generally the 
courts were resourceful and displayed remarkable determination in ensuring that the 
underlying principles of the CCAA were fulfilled. 
 
3.3.4 Reforms to the CCAA 
 
 In November 2005 Canada’s Bill C-55, which proposed sweeping reforms to existing laws, 
received Royal Assent. While this could be seen as kick-starting the process of change, it 
was not until 2009 that reforms bearing transformation in the form of interim financing, 
amongst other things, came into force. The main focus of the reforms was to bring clarity 
to the scope of judicial discretion in insolvency matters so as to create certainty and 
consistency to Canada’s insolvency system. One area, which it had been suggested lacked 
clarity and certainty, was the approval of interim financing by the court.  It was claimed 
that the court’s reliance on statutory discretion or inherent jurisdiction gave rise to 
ambiguity as to the scope and extent of the court’s power to grant the interim financing 
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order.173 Consequently, one of the reforms introduced by Bill C-5 was statutory support for 
the grant of interim financing. It was believed that the uniformity and certainty provided by 
statute would protect the rights of new lenders and the pre-existing creditors that could be 
primed by super-priority charges.174  
 The background for the introduction of interim financing reforms was set by various lobby 
groups which prepared and presented papers detailing areas within the Canadian insolvency 
laws that needed to be addressed. One such report was prepared by the Joint Task Force on 
Business Insolvency Law Reform of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian 
Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals.175 One of the focal points of the 
report was the need to provide express statutory power to authorize “DIP Loans” and to 
grant security in specific amounts for post-filing expenses in CCAA cases. Suggestions 
were also made on the nature of benchmarks176 which the judges could rely on before 
authorizing interim financing, some of which were later incorporated in section 11(4) of 
the CCAA. 
The Report of the Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce supported the 
call for reforms permitting interim financing. The committee was of the view that Canadian 
laws needed to be drafted to ensure high predictability for all stakeholders as this would 
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enable stakeholders to make suitable choices. The report 177  called for amendments to 
permit interim financing and for jurisdiction to be given to the courts to authorize super-
priority financing, by allowing the new lender to rank prior ahead of other existing security 
interests.  
Furthermore, it suggested that notice of the court hearing to authorize a super-priority loan 
should be given to any secured creditor affected by such priority. Whilst the final report 
supported the need for super-priority financing, the Canadian Bankers Association 178 
dissented on the issue of super-priority. In supporting most parts of the recommendations 
of the joint task force, the Association also expressed concern regarding the potential for 
super-priority financing to create uncertainty and limit the accessibility of pre-insolvency 
lending because of its subjugation of pre-existing rights.  
 The report179 also recommended that the seven factors outlined by the joint task force on 
Business Insolvency Law Reforms in its report180 should be compulsorily considered by 
the courts before authorizing interim financing loans. These were to provide some guidance 
for the courts in deciding whether to approve interim financing. It was the committee’s 
belief that ensuring availability of interim financing, providing criteria to guide the court’s 
decision making, putting secured creditors on notice and giving priority to lenders would 
meet the fundamental principles of fairness, predictability and efficiency.181 
                                                          
177 Canadian Parliament, Senate standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce,  Debtors and 
Creditors Sharing the Burden, a Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies Creditors 
Arrangement Act (Nov 2003) <http://www.cfs-
fcee.ca/html/english/campaigns/Senate_Cmte_Report_2003_11-a.pdf >accessed 31st October 2012. 
(“Review of CCAA & BIA”.). 
178 See Commercial Insolvency Law Reform: Recommendations by the Standing Committee for 
Amendments to the Companies’ Creditors arrangement Act and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. 
http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/Commercial%20Insolvency%20Law%20Reform_Kent_Maerov_0104FR.pdf 
accessed 7 June 2014. 
179 Review of CCAA & BIA (n 177). 
180 Final Report of the Joint Taskforce (n 175). 
181 Ibid. 
106 
 
The proposals put forward by the Joint Task Force of Business Insolvency Reforms appear 
to be a skeletal representation of the Chapter 11 DIP financing requirements. While it 
seemed that Canada borrowed a few elements from their US neighbour, it can be argued 
that these were in any event ideologies that the courts pursued under their inherent 
jurisdiction. What was lacking was the certainty that a statute would create. The Canadian 
system, being one which substantially favours secured creditors, 182  would most likely 
oppose the importation of the Chapter 11 concept as the American scheme stems from a 
highly rehabilitative debtor oriented regime which is at variance with the Canadian 
system.183 
 
3.3.5 Current Canadian approach to interim financing 
 
The 2005/2007 amendments empowers the courts to authorize interim financing by 
codifying their erstwhile powers to grant interim financing orders.184 The amended CCAA 
authorizes the court, after notice has been given to the affected secured creditor, to approve 
a charge over all or part of the debtor’s assets in an amount it considers appropriate, in 
favour of a person who agrees to lend an amount which is approved by the court as being 
required by the company, having deduced this from the cash-flow statement.185 Therefore 
a debtor could make an application for interim financing, which the courts would approve 
after perusing the debtor’s cash-flow statement. It is on the basis of this statement that the 
court determines how much the debtor needs and approves the loan.  
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Likewise the court holds the power to determine how much of the debtor’s assets can be 
subject to a security charge. This clearly points to the fact that the court holds the decision 
as to how much of the pre-existing secured creditor’s interest can be subordinated to that 
of the DIP lender.186 Therefore much of the authority of the courts to grant interim financing 
under the CCAA still remains discretionary. This has been confirmed by the courts which 
have recognized that their powers to order super-priority financing, are discretionary and 
not mandatory.187 
With the codification of the ability of the courts to authorize interim financing, the statute 
identifies various super-priority financing measures that the courts can authorize. A close 
study of the CCAA identifies two main forms of such financing. Under section 11.2(1),188 
the first super-priority charge authorized by the statute over all of or part of the debtor’s 
assets, is the one given to post-commencement lenders who are willing to advance the 
money that the company needs to support the restructuring process. The Act goes further 
to provide that, where there has been a previous order made under section 11.2(1) for 
interim financing, the court may order that a new charge or security ranks in priority to the 
previous order with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was 
made.189 This provision seems to indicate that, where a previous order for interim financing 
has been made and there is need for further finance, the court may make an order priming190 
the pre-existing charge or security from the previous interim financing order. Therefore in 
cases where all of the debtor company’s assets are fully encumbered and the debtor is 
unable to obtain financing, subsection (3) provides the debtor with an opportunity to get 
finance by giving would-be lenders priority over an existing super-priority charge. In 
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essence, what this provision appears to give the lender is an “elevated” super-priority 
charge.   
Section 11.2 appears to be a catchall provision that covers most rescue expenses that may 
arise during the process. While the section makes no detailed mention of what these items 
are, it is clear from section 11.4 that credit needed to fund essential/critical supplies required 
by the debtor is excluded; however this credit also enjoys super-priority over secured 
creditors’ interests. According to section 11.4,191 a critical supplier is a person who supplies 
goods or services which are critical to the company’s continued operation. Where the court 
acknowledges a person as a critical supplier and gives an order requiring the person to 
supply goods and services,192 the court may grant a security or charge in favour of the 
critical supplier over all or part of the debtor’s assets.193 Suppliers play an important role in 
the success of a rescue operation. This is evidenced by the priority that they are commonly 
given by bankruptcy laws during restructuring. Typically, suppliers may be classified as 
unsecured creditors, however the debtor may need to rely on their continued support, and 
as a result they may sometimes be accorded super-priority status194 to ensure that supply 
lines are kept open.  
Prior to amendments to the CCAA, suppliers were under no obligation to keep the lines of 
supply of goods and services open and could not be coerced by the debtor to ensure 
supply, 195  a position which could prove detrimental to a successful rescue. The 2009 
amendments reversed this previous stance and recognized the importance of critical 
suppliers during corporate rescue by giving powers to the court to order a supplier which 
the court has designated as critical to the business of the company to keep lines of supply 
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of goods and services open. In return the critical suppliers are allowed super-priority 
payments and/or a charge over the company’s assets.  
The importance of critical suppliers to the success of a company’s restructuring effort has 
been reiterated by the courts in some recent post-amendment restructuring cases. In Re 
Catalyst Paper Corporation196 certain subsidiaries of Catalyst Paper obtained a further 
order from the Supreme Court of British Columbia which declared some named suppliers 
of the company to be “critical suppliers”. The order required that the suppliers continue to 
supply goods and/or services on the existing terms and conditions it had with the company. 
The order also gave the critical suppliers a charge to secure amounts that they extended to 
the company. Also, in Re Northstar Aerospace, Inc,197 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
ordered that a critical supplier should be paid in priority to secured creditors in order to 
ensure that lines of supply were kept open and the restructuring efforts of the debtor 
company kept on course.  
 
3.3.6 Factors that a court would consider under the CCAA before 
granting interim financing 
  
Whilst the Canadian criteria have some similarities with their US counter-part,198 they do 
not require the debtor to establish that there are no other sources of financing available, nor 
is it required that the pre-commencement secured creditors are adequately protected. The 
CCAA199 lists a number of factors for the Canadian courts to take into consideration. These 
are (but not limited to); 
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 The timeframe in which the company is likely to be subject to the restructuring 
proceeding; 
 How the management of the business is to be carried out during the proceeding; 
 Whether the management has the backing of the debtor’s major creditors; 
 Whether the loan would improve the chances of a viable compromise or plan of 
arrangement being made; 
 The nature and value of the company’s property; 
 Whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the charge; 
 The monitor’s view, which is usually an objective examination of the need for and 
effectiveness of any interim financing request. 
The statutory conditions provided by CCAA, while not an exact replica of the pre-reforms 
judicial principles, mirror the principles developed by the courts in relation to what needs 
to be established and confirmed before approving interim financing.  The principles stated 
in the CCAA offer greater transparency and predictability for creditors and new players in 
the proceedings,200 as opposed to the judge-made rules. The overall aim of the CCAA 
principles is to prevent any prejudice, failing which, to ensure that a balance is achieved 
between what will be lost and what is to be gained.  
 
3.3.7 Why DIP? 
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Generally, in deciding whether to lend money to a company, financial institutions take into 
consideration a number of factors and these range from interests and fees offered and the 
creditworthiness of the borrower.201 The principal motive behind a lender providing interim 
financing is profit as is the case with all financing agreements. Interim financing allows 
lenders to charge higher than normal interest rates in addition to a variety of fees associated 
with the arrangement of the financing. 202  The higher risk associated with interim 
financing,203 allows the lender to demand a higher fee and this offsets the risk associated 
with interim financing. The provision of super-priority status also helps to significantly 
reduce the lender’s exposure to the debtor’s default. Therefore, where the rescue fails and 
the company inevitably ends up in liquidation, the lender can realise his claims in priority 
to other claimants because of his super-priority status.204 Super-priority status appears to 
be an important factor for lenders who provide the interim financing. It was noted by 
Morawetz J. in Re Trimminco205 that it is unrealistic to expect any DIP lender to advance 
funds without receiving a super-priority charge. It has consequently become an expected 
part of a DIP financing arrangement.  
Another reason why interim financing may hold some attraction is that it can be used as a 
defensive mechanism to protect the lenders’ existing position, or to prevent another lender 
from gaining a perceived advantage. 206  This may inadvertently amount to cross-
collateralization which is expressly forbidden by section 11.2 (1) of the CCAA.207 The 
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inclusion of the provision that expressly bars a creditor’s ability to cross-collateralize has 
been viewed as an apparent attempt to avoid abuse,208 a situation which is likely due to the 
ability of cross-collateralization to place a creditor in a more advantageous position. 
However, in Re Cow Harbour Construction Ltd.,209 the court concluded that, so long as the 
interim financing is used to fund the debtor’s rescue, section 11.2(1) is not flouted by the 
collection of pre-filing and post-filing receivables being used to permanently reduce a 
secured pre-filing capital line.210 
Control of the debtor’s management may be viewed as a probable advantage for providing 
DIP finance. A pre-commencement lender (who becomes a post-commencement lender) or 
post-commencement lender, who advances funds to the debtor, may use the financing 
contract to his advantage by writing in clauses which further his objectives or exert control 
over the management with the aid of the finance agreement.211 To the creditor, this provides 
him with some amount of control over the restructuring. But from a policy standpoint, this 
may not be a good outcome since it potentially gives more room than is necessary for 
lenders to have a considerable amount of control or influence over the restructuring.212 It is 
worth mentioning that it is funding from post-commencement lenders that gives the 
company a chance to be rescued, therefore benefitting other pre-commencement lenders. 
But for super-priority, the post-commencement lender would get insufficient reward.  
 
3.3.8 Critique 
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The guidelines set down by the CCAA for the authorization of interim funding by the courts 
was viewed as a welcome development because it introduced certainty and predictability 
which was previously lacking. However, it has been faulted for failing to provide clear tests 
on which the courts may rely on when faced with a decision as to whether to grant a priming 
lien,213 over the objections of the secured creditors whose rights are being primed.214 It has 
been asserted that this shortcoming brings with it a certain amount of ambiguity which 
increases the risk to secured lenders.215 The knock-on effect of this will be uncertainty in 
making credit decisions in the acquisition of both new and old loans, which will bring about 
stiffer terms and stricter lending controls that could further tighten the availability of 
credit.216 
This shortcoming is one that could have been addressed by Parliament during the enactment 
of the CCAA. Whilst the CCAA appears to have re-confirmed the pre-reform guiding 
principles developed by the court, it stopped short of providing a comprehensive framework 
for managing the authorization of interim financing by the courts. The CCAA gives the 
court broad discretion to authorize interim financing with no clear limits217 as to the extent 
of its powers. It is within this unrestricted authority that judges have been able to prime the 
liens of secured creditors. The only consideration that the Act gives to their rights lies with 
one of the factors that the court needs to ascertain prior to authorizing DIP financing. It 
directs the court to ensure that the secured creditor does not suffer any material loss as a 
result of the super-priority finance.218  The statement seems a bit all-embracing to offer any 
concrete form of protection for secured creditors. While it gives a broad allusion to the 
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prospect that a secured creditor may suffer materially, there are no provisions to guard 
against this. The US Chapter 11 procedure, in contrast, requires that the debtor must show 
that the interest of the secured creditor is adequately protected219  and that the debtor could 
not obtain any other form of finance before the court can approve a priming lien.  
 The issue of adequate protection for the interest of secured creditors in super-priority 
financing was one of the items debated prior to and during the Canadian reform process.220 
It was argued that the concept of adequate protection was an American one which might 
not fit in with the peculiarities of the Canadian system.221 Furthermore, the Joint Task Force 
on Business Insolvency Reforms in its paper rejected the adoption of the concept of 
adequate protection and viewed it as being “time consuming, litigious and inflexible”.222 
While it is not being advocated that a strict adoption of the US concept should have been 
undertaken by Canada, it was arguably a missed opportunity on the part of the Canadian 
Parliament to provide a control mechanism which would guide the courts in adequately 
establishing that the secured creditor will not be materially affected by a priming lien. It 
can be argued that the failure of Parliament to address the issue of adequate protection may 
have a correlative effect on the cost of lending generally, as potential lenders may demand 
high interest or include very strict conditions that may not be favourable to borrowers, and 
this may also extend to post-commencement financing. Consequently, while the 
codification does appear to bring predictability and certainty to the process, the broad 
discretion given to the court seems to challenge this notion. 
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3.4 Corporate rescue funding in the UK 
 
The process of corporate rescue funding in the UK is not as developed as it is in the US or 
Canada. The latter jurisdictions have individually made clear and identifiable provisions 
with incentives attached, to enable the funding of the rescue process. The process in the 
UK is unique in the sense that it appears to combine a mixture of both formal and quasi-
formal procedures. The formal procedure encompasses legislative efforts which are 
manifested in statute, while the quasi-formal routes touch on other policies or strategies 
developed by the debtor, their lawyers and / or creditors and / or bankers. When it comes 
to rescue funding in the UK, a lot of important factors are operative and these factors need 
to be analysed, in order to have a clear picture of how rescues are funded. 
 
3.4.1 Formal mechanism for post-commencement funding 
 
The Cork Report223 led to the introduction of the administration procedure which is aimed 
at supporting the rehabilitation or re-organisation of companies facing difficulties in order 
that they might be restored to profitability or that viable elements of the company’s business 
might be preserved as a going concern. 224  However, the Cork Report, which shaped 
corporate rehabilitation and rescue in the UK, was silent on how the administration process 
would be funded. Nonetheless, the report considered that, where an administration order is 
discharged, creditors who advanced money or gave credit to the administrator to enable the 
company’s business to be carried on as a going concern should enjoy priority of payment.225 
It therefore follows that post-commencement credit which is used to fund the rescue 
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process, will form part of expenses incurred by the administrator to enable a going concern 
value to be preserved and so it should enjoy priority payment. This notion was consolidated 
in the Insolvency Act 1986 which gives priority to the payment of the administrators’ 
remuneration and expenses.226  
The Act also authorises the administrator to do all such things that are necessary for the 
management of the affairs, business and property of the company.227 Accordingly, when an 
administrator is appointed, he assumes all the management powers in respect of the 
company including the power to borrow money and grant security. 228  Therefore, if 
borrowing money is necessary for the continued running of the business of the company 
during the rescue, the administrator has the power to do so and lenders who advance the 
necessary funds will enjoy priority payments.  
It has been suggested by McCormack229 and Finch230 that section 19(5) and schedule B1 
paragraph 99 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provide a potential route to post-commencement 
financing. Although retroactive in nature, the provisions deal with contracts entered into by 
the administrator in the course of carrying out his functions. These debts enjoy priority 
payment over the administrator’s remuneration, expenses and all other claims except 
secured creditors.231 These provisions provide a framework that gives administrators the 
authority to enter into loan agreements with post-commencement lenders. Presently, the 
provisions deal with post-commencement contracts in a general way and do not make 
specific reference to post-commencement financing as is done under US Chapter 11 and 
the Canadian CCAA. 
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Rescue funding seems to be a company rescue issue and Canada and the US took that into 
consideration in their rescue framework. In the UK, administration, which was initially 
framed as a company rescue mechanism, in practice achieves more of a business rescue232 
and makes no mention of how the process can be funded. Consequently, the elaborate set-
up found in the US and Canada is absent in the UK. It is these well laid provisions found 
in the US and Canada that make for an organised corporate rescue funding structure. 
Perhaps the reason behind the absence of well-defined rescue financing provisions in the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (especially as it relates to administration) can be traced to the old 
receivership having provided the foundation for the creation of the administration 
procedure. The old receivership, despite being used in some cases to achieve a rescue, was 
not created primarily for that purpose233 and so would not have taken into consideration the 
need for rescue funding. 
 Be that as it may, the courts have in the past relied on the administrator’s powers to enter 
into contracts to approve super-priority financing, for example Bibby Trade Finance Ltd v 
McKay.234 Also in Freakley v Centre Reinsurance International Co235 the House of Lords 
stated that it was within the administrator’s powers to determine which expenses are 
necessary for the purposes of the administration and which should, subject to the court’s 
supervision, receive priority. In view of this, it is possible for courts to rely on schedule B1, 
paragraph 99 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and their inherent jurisdiction to approve post-
commencement financing and, just like their Canadian counter-parts, establish precedents 
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and court practices to take care of post-commencement financing and ensuing super-
priority incentives.  
This possibility is not being fully explored by the courts. The reason for this has been 
attributed to the rise of pre-packaged administrations which have reduced the need for a 
creative interpretation of paragraph 99, given that pre-packs are likely to come with their 
own funding arrangements already taken care of by the prospective buyers. 236 
Notwithstanding this, there will be some occasions where a pre-packaged administration is 
not utilized; instead what will be in place may be a trading administration. In a situation 
such as this, rescue funding is primarily important as the administrator will need funds to 
continue trading during the process. The question is whether a well-developed and 
incentivising approach to rescue finance will facilitate greater efforts towards corporate 
rescue, rather than pre-packaged business sales. However prior to a consideration of 
statutory provisions for rescue funding in the UK, it is necessary to consider possible routes 
to corporate rescue funding without the need for statutory insolvency frameworks. 
 
3.4.2 Quasi-formal mechanism for post-commencement funding 
 
In most cases a company going through insolvency will have exhausted all available 
informal processes of restructuring before resorting to the statute-backed regimes. There 
are different avenues for informal restructuring and these are commonly categorized as 
private workouts. An informal process could be in the form of a private arrangement with 
major creditors, who in most cases are banks and financial institutions. The focus here is 
going to be briefly on private workouts and then an in depth analysis of pre-packed 
                                                          
236 See generally V Finch, ‘Pre-packaged Administrations: Bargaining in the Shadow of Insolvency or 
Shadowy Bargains’ (2006) J.B.L. 568; P Walton, ‘Pre-packaged Administrations—Trick or Treat? (2006) 
19 Insolvency Intelligence 113. 
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administrations. This analysis is going to be undertaken on account of the importance of 
these forms of rescue in business funding. 
 
3.4.2.1 Private workouts 
 
Informal rescue mechanisms have long played an important role in corporate rescue and in 
most cases the informal avenue for rescue is driven by secured creditors who take the view 
that the company is worth saving.237 In the past, large companies with complex multi-lender 
debts relied on the “London Approach”, which was an informal framework introduced with 
the support of the Bank of England, to restructure their debts and rescue the company.238 
This approach involved two distinct stages in order for it to become fully operational.239 
Firstly, the debtor would notify its banks that it was in financial difficulties and would like 
to commence a workout. Thereafter, by mutual consent the banks would agree to a 
“standstill”240 which would stay all enforcement action against the debtor and all existing 
lines of credit would be left open to the extent to which they had been expended.241 The 
banks would also agree to extend more working capital where it was necessary for the 
continued survival of the debtor. The new credit extended to the debtor would be accorded 
priority over existing loans.242  
                                                          
237 J Amour, A Hsu & A Walters, ‘The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisation and Costs in 
Corporate Rescue Proceedings, a Report Prepared for the Insolvency Service (December 2006). 
238 J M Garrido, Out-of-Court Debt Restructuring (World Bank, 2012) p40-41. 
239 J Amour & S Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency: the “London Approach” to the Resolution of 
Financial Distress’ (2001) 1 J.Corp. L. Stud. 21. 
240 The Bank of England was the facilitator of the standstill. It was able to achieve a standstill, by relying on 
its authority and prestige to call participating banks together under the auspices of a lead bank and 
persuading those banks which wished to call on their loans not to do so. See P Kent, ‘The London 
Approach: Distressed Debt Trading’ (1994) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin for more details. 
241 See generally, P Kent, ‘The London Approach: Distressed Debt Trading’ (1994) Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin. 
242 Armour and Deakin (n 239) at p34-35. 
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Although the “London Approach” was popular during the 1990s recession, the use of it has 
since declined. The reason for its decline has been attributed to its possible incompatibility 
with the current financing structures in existence.243 Suggestions have been made for some 
key factors such as the standstill, its unanimity and priority payment to be adapted in order 
to make it more relevant to today’s restructuring issues.244  
Private workouts presently available may involve multiple creditors and it has been asserted 
that they often achieve faster rescues of businesses than formal procedures.245 Also, debtors 
tend to rely more on these measures246 at the initial onset of insolvency rather than formal 
frameworks. Basically, a private workout is an agreement between the company and some 
of its financial creditors.247 Its aim is to create an effective framework for negotiations 
between the debtor and its creditors. In most cases it comes with a voluntary standstill and, 
if necessary, interim financing.248 The difference between private workouts presently used 
by distressed companies and the “London Approach” is the supervision process. The Bank 
of England was directly involved in the restructurings that occurred under the “London 
Approach” and acted in a supervisory and advisory role. At present, private or informal 
workouts are conducted without the active participation of the Bank of England. Generally, 
workouts are often viewed by experienced practitioners as the best option for restructuring 
a company where it is deemed viable.249 The financial creditors and the debtor are able to 
                                                          
243 EHYA UCL Roundtable Discussion’ ‘Is it Time for the UK to Adopt a Formal Proceeding for 
Restructuring Distressed Companies?’ (4th March 2009) 
http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/policychange/Roundtable%20-
%20Insolvency%20Discussion%20Record%2017032009.pdf  accessed 31st October 2012. 
244 Ibid. 
245 G Yeowart, ‘Encouraging Company Rescue: What Changes are required to UK Insolvency Law?’ 
(2009) Law and Financial Market Review 517 -531. 
246  Armour, Hsu & Walters (n 237). 
247 See INSOL, Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-creditor Workouts (1st edn, INSOL 
2000). 
248 The Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
‘Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises- Corporate Workouts’ (2001) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/series/04/> accessed 7 June 2014. 
249 Yeowart (n 245). 
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agree how new money will be provided to enable the business to continue as a going 
concern. Where new credit is secured, the debtor can continue to pay its trade creditors.250  
 
3.4.2.2  Pre-packs 
 
A pre-pack is basically a method of selling the business of an insolvent company as a going 
concern.251 It is generally used hand in hand with the administration process and can be 
traced to the old receivership regime.252 There is no express provision for the use of pre-
packs under the Insolvency Act 1986, but it has enjoyed extensive judicial support.253 The 
use of pre-packs gained popularity following the reforms to the Insolvency Act 1986 under 
the Enterprise Act 2002.254 
For the most part, pre-packs take place where there is a need to sell the business quickly 
without publicity in order to avoid negative reactions from staff and / or customers and 
suppliers.255 An insolvency practitioner negotiates the sale of the business or its assets prior 
to the onset of the insolvency process256 and the sale is then executed shortly after the 
commencement of an administration.257 Consequently, in most cases a buyer, who may be 
new to the company, or a competitor, or the existing management,258 is quickly found, and 
the business sold off before the knowledge of the debtor’s financial distress is made public.  
                                                          
250 Ibid. 
251 S Frisby, ‘The Second-chance Culture and Beyond: Some Observations on the Pre-pack Contribution’ 
(2009) Law and Financial Markets Review 242-247. 
252 M Haywood, ‘Pre-pack Administrations’ (2010) Insolv. Int. 23(2), 17-22. The new Administration 
process is the one provided for under Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B1. 
253 See DKLL Solicitors v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (2007) EWHC 2067 (Ch), here the court 
appeared to support the use of a pre-pack as a legitimate technique. See also RE Kayley Vending Ltd [2009] 
EWHC 904(Ch).  
254 S Manson, ‘Pre-packs from the Valuer’s Perspective’ (2006) Recovery (summer) 19. 
255 C Swain, ‘Mind the Pre-pack’ The Lawyer (London, 3 July 2006) 32. 
256 V Dennis, ‘Packing Case’ The Lawyer  (London, 10 July 2011) 31, 
257 L Conway, Pre-pack administration procedure, Briefing Paper 
(SN/HA/5035)<www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05035.pdf>. 
258 Ibid. 
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One of the effects of pre-packs is that they blur the boundary between formal and 
informal 259  procedures because they combine the use of an unofficial process (pre-
administration negotiation for a business sale) with a statutory mechanism (administration) 
to achieve their aim. A distressed company, when confronted with impending insolvency, 
has to make a decision as to which statutory strategy to adopt in order to effectively tackle 
the financial distress. However, a combination of factors may make it imperative for a 
debtor to adopt a mechanism such as the pre-pack which combines a statutory mechanism 
with an informal process. The most important of these factors are;260 
 Absence of funding to enable trading in administration; 
 Preservation of goodwill; 
 Employee retention; especially in relation to highly skilled staff who 
are in demand and where the businesses depend heavily on their 
skills; 
 Reduction of liability arising from debts. 
 
Thus, the pre-pack has become a very useful corporate rescue tool, particularly because a 
continuing business is worth more to its stakeholders than one that is fully distressed and 
out of trading.261 What the pre-pack does is to achieve a rescue of the business, with the 
onus for funding the rescue on the new buyer who will be tasked with injecting fresh funds 
into the business. Perhaps the fact that funding is somewhat assured with a pre-pack, is one 
                                                          
259 V Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: Who is interested? (2012) 3 J.B.L. 190-212. 
260 M Hyde & I White, ‘Pre-pack Administration: Unwrapped’ (2009) Law and Financial Markets Review. 
261 Ibid. 
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of its redeeming features. Frisby, in her report on pre-packaged administrations,262 noted 
that one of the driving forces behind the increased use of pre-packs is the scarcity of 
resources with which to trade, through the duration of the administration. She also noted 
that continued trading is essential if there is to be any prospect of a going concern sale, and 
a lack of funding will, in many cases, act as a barrier to continued trading. 
Pre-packs are not the result of any legislative exercise; therefore there are no express 
guidelines on their application to be found in statute books. The relevant document that 
provides guiding principles on its application is the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 
(SIP 16). SIP 16 is not a statement of law on pre-packs, but a policy document that provides 
professional guidance on how pre-pack sales should be managed. SIP 16 is based on 
procedures agreed upon by the insolvency regulatory authorities acting through the Joint 
Insolvency Committee, and was produced by the Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals with the authorization of the Joint Insolvency Committee.263 While not a 
body of laws in the strictest sense, it sets out basic principles and essential procedures which 
insolvency practitioners are required to follow,264 and compliance with SIP 16 is monitored 
by the Insolvency Service. On the whole, SIP 16 is centred on the principle of full 
disclosure.265 In other words, the administrator must make known, and justify, the reason 
for the pre-pack to the creditors, most especially the unsecured creditors. The requirement 
of full disclosure arises because by their nature pre-packs do not give unsecured creditors 
the opportunity to consider the sale before it takes place.266  
                                                          
262 S Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administration’ (2007) Report to the Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals 
<http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/preliminary_analysis_of_pre-
packed_administrations.pdf> accessed 7 June 2014. 
263 Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 “SIP 16” (E&W) 2009 p1. 
264 Ibid., at p2. 
265 Ibid, para 8-10. 
266 Ibid, para 8. 
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SIP16 contains a list of required information which must be disclosed to creditors in all 
cases and this includes, amongst other things; the source of the administrator’s initial 
introduction, the extent of the administrator’s involvement prior to his appointment, 
marketing activities or valuation carried on in respect of the business or its assets, the name 
of the purchaser and the price paid.267 The requirement of full disclosure is meant to guard 
against dishonesty and fraud in the sale of the business and to ensure that creditors are fully 
informed about the process. However the process has been heavily criticised for its lack of 
transparency.268 
These criticisms and the fact that it appeared that the SIP 16 had not done enough to assuage 
concerns, led the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills on the 31st of March 2011 
to announce proposals to introduce greater transparency and engender confidence in the 
process. On the 26th of July, 2011, the draft Insolvency (Amendment) (No 2) Rules (the 
Draft Rules) were published as a result of a consultation on the modernisation of the 
Insolvency Rules. The Draft Rules were intended to amend the Insolvency Rules 1986 to 
include extra regulations dealing with pre-pack insolvency cases.269 Under the proposed 
amendments, insolvency practitioners would have had to give three days’ notice to creditors 
prior to the pre-packaged sale of a significant part of a company’s assets, or its business to 
a connected party, so as to enable creditors challenge the sale if the need arises. 270 
Following consultation with stakeholders and having taken into consideration all the issues, 
the Government decided not to introduce new legislative control on pre-packs.  
                                                          
267 Ibid., para 9 for detailed list of required information.  
268Swain (n 255) at 32; S Frisby, ‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’ (2006) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegisl
ation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.pdf>  p72,  accessed 1st  June 2014;  Hyde & White (n 259) 
for further information on these criticisms. 
269 Available online at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/785/made  
270 See Ministerial Statement on Improving Transparency and Confidence in Pre-packed Sales in 
Administration (Pre packs) 31st March 2011. 
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The Government was concerned that the new measures would have impacted on other 
businesses aside from micro-businesses，the sector in which most of the concerns relating 
to pre-packaged administration rested.271 Rt. Hon. Edward Davey MP, the Minister in 
charge of Business, Innovation and Skill at the time, stated that； 
“The Government is not convinced that the benefit of new legislative controls 
outweighed the overall benefit to business of adhering to the moratorium on 
regulations affecting micro-business”.272  
 
As a result, the Government choose not to implement the proposed changes. Nevertheless, 
the Government was of the opinion that, if used appropriately, pre-pack sales can offer a 
flexible and speedy framework within which a business can be rescued and they can 
maximise returns for creditors.273 It has however been suggested that a suitable alternative 
to pre-packs in the form of DIP financing would ensure transparency in addition to 
providing the much needed liquidity. 274  The belief is that funds injected through DIP 
financing would enable a more organised and open sale process for the benefit of the 
creditors275 and the possible rescue of the company. 
In 2013, the UK government launched an independent review headed by Teresa Graham 
into the use of pre-pack administration. In her review report published on the 16th of June 
2014, Teresa Graham acknowledged that while pre-packs could save jobs and cut 
insolvency costs, there was a need to address the lack of transparency and boost creditor 
confidence. 276  She rejected the idea of having legislative control over pre-packs and 
                                                          
271 See Ministerial statement on Pre-Packaged Sales in Insolvency, 26th January 2012. 
272 G Ruddick, ‘Pre- pack Administration Overhaul Dropped’ The Telegraph (London, 26 January 2012). 
273 See Ministerial Statement on Improving Transparency and Confidence in Pre-packed Sales in 
Administration (Pre packs) 31st March 2011. 
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276 See Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration – Report to the Rt. Hon V Cable, June 2014 available 
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advocated a series of voluntary measures277 to oversee how pre-packs are managed. These 
measures were primarily targeted at sales to connected parties such as a director, shadow 
director or company officer of the insolvent company; an associate of a director, shadow 
director or company officer of the insolvent company; and an associate of the insolvent 
company who becomes a director, officer of the new company or exercises control over the 
new company or an associate of a director of the new company or an associate of the new 
company. This is because research had shown that creditor pay-outs were often worse and 
the new business was less likely to succeed following pre-pack sales to connected parties.278 
It is expected that a revised SIP16 would be introduced in May 2016 which would ensure 
that pre-packs can only be done with strong justification.  
 
 
3.4.3 Calls for reforms to the UK corporate rescue procedures 
 
                                                          
277 The Graham Review’s six recommendations were: (a) Create a pre-pack pool of experienced business 
people where, on a voluntary basis, details of a proposed sale to a ‘connected party’ could be disclosed to an 
independent person prior to the sale taking place. The aim of this recommendation is to increase 
transparency and give greater confidence to creditors that the deal has undergone independent scrutiny. (b) 
Request connected parties to complete a ‘viability review’ for the new company, stating how the company 
will survive for at least the next 12 months. A short narrative will also be provided, detailing what the new 
company will do differently from the old company in order that the business does not fail again. (c) The 
Joint Insolvency Committee to consider, at the earliest opportunity, a redrafted SIP 16 (found in Annex A of 
the Graham report). It is proposed that the documents required by the preceding two recommendations (i.e. 
a report by a pre-pack pool member and a viability review by a ‘connected party’) be sent with the redrafted 
SIP 16 statement.  (d) All marketing of pre-pack businesses to comply with six ‘good marketing’ principles 
(stated in the report) in order to maximize sale proceeds and that any deviation from these principles be 
brought to creditors’ attention. (e) SIP 16 to be amended to require valuations to be carried out by a valuer 
who holds professional indemnity insurance (‘PII’), to increase confidence that the sale is for a fair price. (f) 
The Insolvency Service to withdraw from monitoring SIP 16 statements. Monitoring to be picked- up 
instead by the recognized professional bodies (RPBs), as they have the right level of practical experience to 
further improve compliance rates.  
278 See P Walton, C Umfreville & P Wilson, ‘Pre-pack Empirical Research: Characteristic and Outcome 
Analysis of Pre-pack Administration- Final Report to Graham Review, April 2014. See also The Insolvency 
Service, ‘Annual Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16’ January/December 2011 
which states that nearly 80 % of pre-pack sales were to connected parties. 
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The UK Insolvency regime has been criticised for being too biased towards creditor 
interests when compared to other jurisdictions, and for not offering enough protection and 
opportunity for troubled companies to rehabilitate.279 Consequently there have been calls 
for reforms to UK insolvency laws. One of the subjects that has generated a lot of 
controversial debate and a call for reforms, has been super-priority post-commencement 
financing. Although the Insolvency Act 1986 makes provisions for priority financing within 
the purview of the administration expenses, there are no provisions for Chapter 11 style 
super-priority financing that would encourage new and pre-existing lenders to extend credit 
to the company.  
A system of funding was proposed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
Insolvency Service in 1993. After consultations, the initiative was abandoned in 1995 on 
the grounds that it might encourage large ineffective incentives to lend and unjustifiable 
financing.280 In 2000, a review group was set up by agreement between the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to review company rescue 
and business reconstruction mechanisms. Their terms of reference included reviewing and 
recommending the means by which businesses could resolve short to medium term 
financial difficulties in order to preserve maximum value, avoid liquidation and, where this 
was not possible, preserve as many businesses as possible as  going concerns.281  
In its report the review group acknowledged that the issue of financing was central to any 
discussion of a rescue culture in the UK 282  and unless finance was made available, 
businesses would fail and assets would have to be sold piecemeal with the end result being 
                                                          
279 L Hiestand & C Pilkington, ‘Time for (some) Chapter 11’ (2008) 27 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 40. 
280 DTI Consultative Documents, ‘Company Voluntary Arrangements and Administration Orders’ (1993) & 
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281 Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanism, Report by 
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that the company would be forced into liquidation.283 While companies can raise new funds 
to sustain the rescue process with the support of existing creditors and unencumbered 
assets, the dominance of fixed and floating charges makes the availability of unencumbered 
assets a rarity in corporate insolvencies. 
In making recommendations on how to finance companies or business rescues, the 
committee looked to Chapter 11 for guidance. It was acknowledged by the committee that 
a direct transplant of the DIP funding mechanism would be unsuitable to the business 
culture and environment in the UK. Nonetheless, the basic principle of providing additional 
finance to a distressed business in a properly considered recovery plan in order to enhance 
its value would fit in with the purpose of financing business rescue in the UK. This therefore 
formed the basis of their recommendations to introduce super-priority financing. 
In spite of the recommendations of the review Group, the initial draft of the Enterprise Bill 
neglected the issue of post-commencement finance.284  During the debates prior to the 
passing of the Enterprise Act, Lord Hunt (Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of 
Health) who was in support of the introduction of super-priority financing, argued that if 
an enhanced form of administration was to be used successfully as a rescue tool, it was 
necessary to tackle the issue of funding as it was important to have a mechanism that 
provides companies with access to on-going finance during the rescue process. 285  He 
further proposed provisions for super-priority financing, where priority is given to a lender 
who is willing to advance money to a business to keep it going while a rescue is being 
worked out, and he stated that a failure to introduce super-priority financing would 
undermine the ability of administration to operate as an effective tool.286  
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In contrast, the House of Lords decided that the issue of lending to a company in 
administration was purely a commercial one, which was best left to the dictates of the 
lending market. It was felt that the issue of super-priority was beyond the abilities of the 
courts and the presence of floating charges made it impossible to have free unsecured assets, 
which would have made the idea of DIP financing more attractive.287 As to the availability 
of sources of post-commencement financing, the company’s existing bankers and asset 
financiers were suggested as possible suppliers of credit.288 On the whole, the Government 
was cautious of creating a situation whereby guaranteed priority payments would 
encourage lenders to advance funds regardless of the viability of the rescue proposal.289 
The unwillingness of Parliament to delve into the issue of super-priority financing did not 
put an end to calls for its introduction. Following the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002, 
and with the economic recession biting hard with more businesses failing, the debate for 
and against the introduction of super-priority financing was revived. The issue of super-
priority financing attracted political attention when Prime Minister David Cameron, at the 
time leader of the  opposition, called for US-style bankruptcy protection laws as well as 
super-priority financing in a speech to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI)290 on the 
15th of July 2008.291  
In addition, the Insolvency Service in its 2009 consultation on ‘Encouraging Business 
Rescue – a Consultation’ 292  put forward two main proposals aimed at increasing the 
availability of rescue finance. Firstly, it proposed that a range of increasingly enhanced 
                                                          
287 Ibid, per Lord McIntosh of Haringey at para 789. In the US there are no floating charges to hamper the 
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288 Ibid.  
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security should be offered to lenders of rescue finance as an incentive to lend to companies 
that would otherwise have difficulty attracting finance,293 and that finance costs properly 
incurred during the rescue process294 should have priority over administration expenses.295 
In addition, the review group296 opined that the attachment of super-priority repayment to 
new credit would attract banks, other financial institutions and trade and services suppliers 
to extend credit to the company.297 It was suggested by the review group that this would 
make it easier for the rescue of the business as opposed to a piecemeal sale.298 
Secondly, the review group suggested that an administrator should be able to secure new 
post-commencement financing against any unencumbered property or an additional fixed 
charge on any property and this will be subordinate to the original charge on the property. 
It was also recommended by the review group that there should be scope for the 
administrator to place a first charge or equal charge on a property which is already subject 
to a fixed charge.299 Views were also sought as to whether prior to securing new finance, 
the administrator must be satisfied that (a) the granting of such security for rescue finance 
is necessary in order to obtain the finance (b) the interest of existing secured creditors are 
adequately protected (c) obtaining the rescue is in the best interests of creditors as a 
whole.300 
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An underlying theme runs through most of the proposals put forward regarding the 
introduction of rescue funding into the UK insolvency system, and this theme is identifiable 
in three main areas. Firstly, there is a recognition that a vacuum exists regarding post-
commencement funding. While the Insolvency Act 1986 has, in a roundabout way, made 
provisions for post-commencement funding, these provisions are not as detailed as the US 
Chapter 11 or the CCAA provisions on interim financing in Canada. The lack of expansive 
case law on issues of rescue financing under the Insolvency Act 1986, means that the UK 
rescue funding provisions have not been put to rigorous test to assess its adequacy and to 
ascertain if it measures up to its US Chapter 11 and Canadian CCAA counter-parts.  
Secondly, it does appear that there is a general pre-disposition towards the US Chapter 11 
style financing as most of the recommendations are fashioned after it. Perhaps the reason 
why the US Chapter 11 style financing is being advocated as the model to emulate lies in 
its detailed provisions for the diverse financing needs of the debtor. Not only does section 
364 of the US Bankruptcy Code offer incentives to encourage would-be lenders, it also 
protects the debtor from dubious DIP lenders, thereby offering, to some extent at least, a 
balanced platform for DIP financing. Besides, a system which has been tested overtime 
may be the pertinent model to follow.  
Thirdly, those calling for reforms to UK rescue funding provisions have advocated a change 
in the priority accorded rescue funding. It was proposed that finance which has been 
properly incurred during the course of the rescue should enjoy super-priority over other 
administrative expenses and remunerations and not rank pari passu. The danger in 
introducing this sort of priority in the UK lies in its greater creditor focus and the fact that 
the rescue is managed by an administrator, unlike the US Chapter 11 which retains 
management at the helm of the rescue process and is more debtor-oriented. Thus if rescue 
funding is made to enjoy super-priority, it may have a far-reaching effect on continued 
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trading during the rescue process because it would rank ahead of important trading 
expenses, and this may result in parties being less willing to continue to trade with the 
company.301 The adoption of super-priority status for rescue funding may also impact on 
the cost of ordinary credit which may rise in view of the danger of losing priority to post-
commencement financiers. Also, administrators may be reluctant to take up appointments 
if they feel their fees may be in jeopardy as a result of super-priority finance.302 
Whilst the proposed reforms appear to advocate a change that would bring the Insolvency 
Act 1986 in line with the other jurisdictions that have adopted super-priority rescue funding, 
there are underlying logistics which would make the implementation of super-priority 
rescue financing challenging. In the US there are specialised bankruptcy courts which deal 
with bankruptcies and its attendant issue. Consequently, bankruptcy judges in the US are 
versed in the complexities of DIP financing, unlike the judges in the UK303 who may have 
no experience in such complex financial dealings. 
 
3.5 Is the UK ready for the US Chapter 11-style rescue funding? 
 
The idea of introducing super-priority financing into the UK insolvency regime has been 
criticised for trying to impose a feature of the debtor-friendly US Chapter 11-style 
proceeding304 upon the creditor-friendly UK system. On the other hand, it has been stated 
that the idea of looking to the US Chapter 11 is not premised on a wholesale duplication of 
it, but an adoption of only the best features of the process,305 which would complement and 
                                                          
301 Response of the Insolvency Law Committee of the City of London Law Society to the Consultation 
Document on Proposals to Encourage Company Rescue (8th September 2009). 
302 Ibid. 
303 In the UK there were specialist bankruptcy courts (the London Bankruptcy courts) which had exclusive 
jurisdiction to deal with bankruptcy matters until the Bankruptcy Act 1883 merged these courts with the 
high courts. See section 2.1.3 (p23-24) of the thesis.   
304 Hiestand  & Pilkington (n 279). 
305 Speech by David Cameron (n 291).  
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add value to the administration process. 306  There are difficulties associated with 
transplanting a legal system or norm from one society to another as no one legal system is 
an exact model of another.307 While it is acknowledged that legal transplants bring about 
legal change, there are only two options to legal transplants; an adoption and assimilation 
of the transplanted law or total rejection and failure of the transplant.308  
Most legal systems are shaped by historical, political and economic factors that cannot 
necessarily be duplicated in another jurisdiction.309 Attempting a direct transplant may have 
unintended negative consequences which may cut across other social structures.310 The 
practical implication of this may be a failure of the transplant of the intended legal norm; 
this then defeats the initial purpose of reforming the existing laws. During the House of 
Lords debates on the Enterprise Bill in 2002, it was recognised that the judicial structure in 
the UK may not be able to support the introduction of rescue financing because of the 
absence of specialist courts and / or judges with experience in such complex financial 
matters.311 In addition, Lord McIntosh alluded to the impact the introduction of super-
priority rescue financing could have on business and economic structures, and stated that 
the decision to lend money to a distressed company during the rescue period should be left 
to the commercial judgement of the lending market.312 It can therefore argued that the 
differences between the economic, business and legal structures of the UK and the US may 
make it impracticable to attempt a direct transplant of the US Chapter 11-style rescue 
funding.  
                                                          
306 Hiestand  &  Pilkington (n 279). 
307 UNCITRAL Guide, p15 at para 17 
308 M Graziadei, ‘Theoretical Inquiries in Law’ (2009) 10 Theoretical Inq. L. 723. 
309 M Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ in  M Reimann & R 
Zimmermann (eds.) Oxford Handbook on Comparative Law (Oxford, 2008). 
310 D Berkowitz, K Pistor, J Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 163. 
311 HL Deb 28 July 2002, vol 638, cc763-806 at 789. 
312 Ibid. 
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Those against Chapter 11-style reforms have always reiterated that the Insolvency Act 1986 
already makes provisions for rescue funding. Under the 1986 Act, an administrator has 
access to unencumbered assets and floating charge assets313 which he may deal with to raise 
money. This asset pool has further been augmented as a result of the decision of the House 
of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus314 which changed book debts from fixed charges to floating 
charges, making them available for administrators as a possible source of finance. 
Moreover, it has always been pointed out that the administrator can secure loans on behalf 
of the company, and these will enjoy priority repayment as part of the administration 
expenses. 315  The priority of administration expenses under the Insolvency Act is not 
materially different from the priority of payment that takes place under the US Chapter 11 
procedure and the Canadian CCAA. Under the US Bankruptcy Code, a DIP manager is 
authorized to obtain unsecured loans during the ordinary course of business and these loans 
enjoy priority as part of administrative expenses over other priority claims and unsecured 
claims.316 Likewise, under the Canadian CCAA post-commencement lenders who advance 
money to a debtor company to support its restructuring process enjoy priority repayments 
over other claims.317 The cost of managing a company’s rescue therefore enjoys the same 
priority repayments across the three jurisdictions.318   
Supporters of a Chapter 11-style reform have contended that there should be scope for 
“priming liens”. In other words, the administrator should be able to grant security over 
encumbered assets. While the 1986 Act319 authorises the administrator to raise or borrow 
money over the company’s property, it is not clear if this can be extended to encumbered 
                                                          
313 See generally, Re Spectrum Plus, [2005] UKHL 41. He still has powers to deal with these assets during 
the ordinary course of business until it crystallises. 
314 [2005] UKHL 41. 
315 Insolvency Act, Sch. B1 para 69, 99 and Schedule 1. 
316 11 U.S.C., s 364(2). 
317 CCAA 1985, s 11.2(1). 
318 See section 3.6 of the thesis, where a detailed analysis of the different types of priority repayments 
during rescue is discussed. 
319 See Insolvency Act 1986, para3, Schedule B1. 
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assets. It has been suggested that, in principle, nothing stops an administrator from being 
able to secure new financing by means of a subordinate fixed charge, a possibility which 
the administrators may already be exploring on a consensual basis, with the permission of 
the pre-existing secured creditor.320 The same principle can arguably also be applied to 
priming the existing rights of a secured creditor for that of a new lender, as long as it is 
agreed upon by all parties involved. It may be an uphill task getting senior creditors to agree 
to such an arrangement, as no creditor may be willing to give up their place of priority, 
especially in an insolvent company. However if an “adequate protection” concept, 321 
similar to the one provided for by the US Bankruptcy Code, is adopted to recompense senior 
creditors for their loss of priority, it may encourage them to give up their place of priority 
to a new post-commencement lender. 
In addition, DIP financing is well entrenched within the US legal system and it has been 
forged from the tracks of railway receiverships to modern day corporate re-organisation, 
such that the US judiciary has a wealth of experience to draw from and the judges are 
accustomed to dealing with commercial decisions. The UK may have a long way to go in 
order to attain the level of expertise needed to handle such complex commercial matters, 
especially considering that there are no specialised bankruptcy courts and judges as is the 
case in the US. The position of the bankruptcy judge in the US has been in existence since 
1978, when Congress established the position as part of reforms to bankruptcy 
legislation.322 Bankruptcy judges in the US develop their expertise on the job as there is no 
requirement for prior experience in bankruptcy or commercial matters for a judge to be 
                                                          
320 Yeowart (n 245). 
321 See 11 U.S.C., s 364(d). See also p87-89 of the thesis for a detailed discussion on “adequate protection” 
under the Bankruptcy Code. Adopting the CCAA style of granting a priming lien over the objections of 
senior creditors may not work in the UK as the jurisdiction is creditor-friendly and may not wish to 
introduce a concept which interferes with creditors’ interests. Moreover, priming a lien over the objections 
of senior creditors may increase the cost of borrowing for healthy companies and more so for distressed 
companies.   
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appointed to the bankruptcy courts. 323  Arguably, spending fourteen years 324  as a 
bankruptcy judge presiding exclusively on bankruptcy matters might develop specialist 
knowledge and skill in that area, an advantage bankruptcy judges in the US have over 
judges who handle bankruptcy matters in the UK. 
Typically, in the UK, corporate insolvency disputes are heard in the High Court with the 
Chancery Division specifically assigned to handle bankruptcy matters. The Chancery 
Division is not a specialist bankruptcy court. It also deals with a range of other cases relating 
to business, trade and indusial disputes; the enforcement of mortgages; disputes relating to 
trust property; intellectual property matters, copyright and patents and contentious probate 
matters relating to wills and inheritance.325 Therefore judges assigned to the Chancery 
division may have to sit on a wide range of cases unrelated to insolvency, unlike their US 
counterparts, making it difficult for these judges to get specialist experience or knowledge 
in complex issues such as DIP financing. 
 
 
3.6 Does the UK offer super-priority financing? 
  
One of the incentives that make DIP financing attractive is the super-priority status it gives 
post-commencement lenders.326 By attaching priority status to post-commencement loans, 
prospective lenders are given an assurance of repayment. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
priority as the situation where two persons have comparable rights in relation to the same 
subject matter and one of them is entitled to exercise his right to the exclusion of the 
                                                          
323 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 1984, s 120(c) (2)-(7). 
324 The tenure for bankruptcy judges in the US is fourteen years, see 28 U.S.C., s 152 (a) (1). 
325 Information available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-to-court/high-court/ 
accessed 19th July 2014.   
326 11 U.S.C, s 364. 
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other.327 Although there is no evident definition of super-priority under insolvency laws, 
from the wording of section 364 of the US Bankruptcy Code,328 super-priority is used to 
describe a claim which has precedence over another claim that has priority over other 
claims. Stated differently, where there are two conflicting interests in an asset and one of 
these interests has precedence over the other, the holder of the preferred right is forced to 
give up its priority to another party who may, or may not be part of the initial network of 
interests.329  
Super-priority financing has been identified as one of the features of model insolvency 
laws330 and while the UK insolvency regime provides a modest avenue for funding rescues 
within the purview of the administration expenses and the administrator’s power to enter 
into contracts, at first glance, the Insolvency Act 1986 appears not to have made provisions 
for super-priority financing. This is because the provisions which deal with post-
commencement funding under the Insolvency Act 1986 is not as structured as the US 
Chapter 11 post-commencement financing provisions which clearly provides for super-
priority financing. In keeping with the functional equivalence thesis of the research, it is 
pertinent to examine if the UK post-commencement financing provisions suffices as super-
priority financing. 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the US Chapter 11 gives super-priority status to unsecured 
credit obtained as part of administrative expenses over all other claims except secured 
claims331 and where it is not possible to attract finance for administrative expenses on this 
basis, it gives an “elevated” super-priority332 status to credit obtained for this purpose, over 
                                                          
327 B A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006). 
328 11 U.S.C.   
329 See section 5.3 of the thesis for a detailed analysis of creditors’ interest and the rule of distribution. 
330 McCormack (n 13) p176. 
331 11 U.S.C., s 364(a)-(b). 
332 A priority which takes precedence over a super-priority status. 
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all administrative claims333 as well as secured creditors’ interests in some cases. 334 In 
Canada, the CCAA makes mention of interim financing having super-priority over the 
interests of secured creditors335 and critical suppliers having the same priority as interim 
financing, ahead of secured creditors.336 In addition, the CCAA provides that where a 
previous order for interim financing has been made and there is need for further finance, 
the court may make an order priming 337  the pre-existing charge or security from the 
previous interim financing order, thus conferring an “elevated” super-priority status on the 
additional finance. 
While not detailed in the scope of its application, section 19(5) and schedule B1 paragraph 
99(3)-(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 give room for manoeuvre and may arguably be relied 
on as a basis for super-priority repayments. Under the Insolvency Act 1986, administration 
expenses and the administrator’s remuneration have equal priority over all other claims 
except secured claims. 338  This confers super-priority status on expenses (which may 
include post-commencement financing) incurred in respect of the administration order. 
Section 19(5) and schedule B1 paragraph 99(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 also provide 
that contracts entered into by the administrator in the course of carrying out his functions 
will enjoy priority payment over the administrator’s remuneration, administration expenses 
and all other claims except secured claims.339 This seems to indicate that if an administrator 
enters into a contract which may include post-commencement financing, the contract will 
enjoy an “elevated” super-priority status over all other claims including the administration 
expenses and the administrator’s remuneration. McCormack acknowledged this window of 
                                                          
333 11 U.S.C., s 364 (c) (1) & (d). s 364(d) covers priming liens which has already been discussed under 
section 3.2.3.2 of the thesis . 
334 See In re National  Litho, LLC, 2013 WL 23037865, 5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013). 
335 CCAA 1985, s 11.2(2) (3). 
336 Ibid, s 11.4(1-4). 
337 A term used to describe the subjugation of a pre-existing lien or security interest. 
338 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, para 99(3), (4)-(6). 
339 Ibid., Schedule B1, para 99(3), (4)-(6).  
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opportunity and argues that interest and capital repayments under a loan can be classed as 
liabilities arising out of a contract340and can be charged on and be payable out of property 
under the administrator’s control 341  thus enjoying super-priority over administration 
expenses and the administrator’s remuneration.  
While this provides a sound argument for recognition of the presence of a means for super-
priority financing within the Insolvency Act 1986, an argument can be made to the contrary. 
One of the rules of statutory interpretation requires that when a law is ambiguous without 
any clear or direct meaning, an interpretation can be adduced from the intentions of 
Parliament at the time of drafting the law. It is clear from debates preceding the enactment 
of the Enterprise Act that it was never the intention of Parliament to create provisions for 
super-priority financing. According to Lord Hunt, quoting Lord Sainsbury; 
 “. . .  the government’s position is essentially that the decision to lend to a company 
should be left to the commercial judgement of the lending market...”342    
 
Despite government’s refusal to give legislative backing to super-priority financing, in 
theory there is nothing that precludes English judges from relying on paragraph 99(4) to 
assign super-priority financing, just as their Canadian counterparts did prior to the 
introduction of interim financing statutes. The use of precedents has played a considerable 
role in the creation of laws in the UK. It therefore seems that relying on history, paragraph 
99(4) and the inherent jurisdiction of the courts; progress can be made in the area of super-
priority financing. 
Superficially, it appears that all three jurisdictions accord the same kind of priority to post-
commencement finance. On further analysis, there are slight variances in how super-
                                                          
340 G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law- an Anglo American Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2008) p198-
199. 
341 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1 para 99(4) (a). 
342 HL Deb 21 October 2002 vol 639 cc1098-143 at 1114. 
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priority status is conferred in all three jurisdictions. Generally, under the CCAA post-
commencement finance may be granted precedence over the claims of secured creditors.343 
However in the US, it is only under special circumstances, where the company has not been 
able to borrow under section 364 (a) & (b) of the Bankruptcy Code that super-priority 
finance is given precedence over secured claims. Under the UK Insolvency Act, there is no 
provision for special circumstances under which post-commencement financing or 
administration expenses may take precedence over secured claims. Secured creditors 
maintain their place of priority and do not lose their position to any other claim including 
administration expenses/post-commencement financing.344 This is not unexpected as the 
UK is known for giving precedence to creditors’ claims and interests,345 therefore any 
action which will undermine the interests of creditors will not be readily adopted. 
 
3.7 Comparison of financing available under the Insolvency Act 1986, 
the CCAA 1985 and the Bankruptcy Code  
 
In comparing and analysing the relevant statutes, i.e. the UK Insolvency Act 1986, the US 
Chapter 11 and the Canadian CCAA, expenses incurred during the ordinary course of the 
debtor’s business are classified as administrative expenses, and such expenses enjoy some 
sort of priority. As a result, it is fair to state that all three statutory frameworks recognise 
the importance of maintaining the status quo of the business, and they have made 
allowances for its basic expenses to be met. In the US, provision is also made for expenses, 
other than those usually classified as administrative expenses,346 to be borrowed with the 
                                                          
343 CCAA 1985, s 11.2(1) (2).  
344 The effect of funding on the ranking of creditors’ claims is discussed in section 5.4 of the thesis. 
345 See section 2.7 of the thesis for discussion of the UK’s preference for creditors’ rights. 
346 Administrative expenses under the US Bankruptcy Code may include taxes, wages, penalties and fines. 
See 11 U.S.C., s 503(b) & s 507 (b). See also section 3.2.3 (p85-86) of thesis for detailed description of the 
difference between administrative expenses incurred during the ordinary course of business and that 
incurred outside the ordinary course of business.  
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court’s permission during the rescue process,347 and this expense enjoy the same priority as 
administrative expenses. In the UK, on the other hand, the situation is quite different. 
Expenses such as credit obtained for expenses incurred outside the ordinary course of the 
debtor’s business, are lumped together with administrative expenses and enjoy the same 
level of priority as the administrator’s remunerations.348  
Canada appears to have categorised its administrative expenses in the manner in which the 
US has. However, Canada recognises two forms of expenses, namely “critical suppliers” 
and “required expenses”. “Required expenses” may constitute part of the administrative 
expenses incurred during the ordinary course of the debtor’s business. Conversely, a 
“critical supplier” (as described by the Canadian CCAA) is a person who supplies goods 
and services that are critical to the company’s continued operations and these suppliers 
enjoy priority over secured creditors. What the CCAA has done by this classification can 
be seen as an inclination to ensure that all factors necessary to ensure a company’s 
successful rescue are in place.  
In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish critical suppliers from the general 
body of administrative expenses. Expenses for critical supplies may be inferred from the 
provisions of section 364(a)349 which takes care of administrative expenses incurred during 
the ordinary course of business. Administrative expenses could be termed as operating costs 
incurred during the rescue process which are essential to its continuity. Arguably, critical 
suppliers play a vital role in the day to day running of a distressed company and it may not 
be far-fetched to say that their continued support ensures that the company keeps on trading 
during the rescue process. Therefore expenses incurred to ensure that supply lines are kept 
open can be classed as administration expenses and the provisions of section 364(a) would 
                                                          
347 11 U.S.C., s 364(b).  An example of this kind of expense could be insurance premium. 
348 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 99 & Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.67. 
349 11 U.S.C. 
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apply.  Critical suppliers could easily be classed under section 364(b). However it may be 
ill-advised to do so because the provision of section 364(b) requires authorization from the 
courts before expenses under this section can be incurred. The term “Critical” engenders 
the need for speed, and arguably, the debtor may need immediate access to cash to keep 
supply lines open. Waiting to get the court’s approval may cause unnecessary delays. 
In recognition of the important role suppliers play in the rescue of the debtors’ company 
the UK Business Minister, in a consultation launched on the 8th of July 2014, announced a 
series of proposals aimed at preventing suppliers from holding insolvent companies to 
ransom by demanding increased charges and payment of existing debts owed as a condition 
of the continued supply of services. 350 Consequently, suppliers of critical utilities will now 
have to continue providing their services during the rescue process and safeguards that 
“adequately protect” suppliers have also been introduced.351 While the present consultation 
relates to utilities suppliers and IT providers, it is hoped that eventually the proposals will 
be extended to all other suppliers that are critical to the rescue of insolvent companies. This 
is because the continued support of critical suppliers would ensure that the debtor continues 
trading while it restructures.352 With these new proposals relating to critical suppliers, it is 
hoped that funding corporate rescues in the UK will gain some common ground with the 
Canadian CCAA and the US Chapter 11 procedures. 
Further comparison between the Canadian CCAA and the US Bankruptcy Code shows that 
their funding provisions allow for the priming of existing liens with the court’s permission, 
in order to raise the required funds. Detailed analysis throws up a clear difference in how 
existing interests can be primed. Under the US Code, a lien can be primed where the debtor 
                                                          
350 J Brazier, ‘New Insolvency Measures Announced’ Insolvency News (London, 8th July 2014). Available 
online at http://www.insolvencynews.com/article/17219/industry/new-insolvency-support-measures-
announced- accessed 5th August 2014. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
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cannot obtain unsecured credit, and this is often the case where, at the point of 
commencement of the rescue process, the debtor has little or no unencumbered assets. 
Section 364(d) permits the priming of an existing lien or granting of a lien on an equal basis 
to an existing lien. This is different from what is permissible under the Canadian CCAA. 
Section 11.2 allows the priming of an existing lien as allowed under the US Bankruptcy 
Code, but it makes further provisions for the priming lien permitted under section 11.2(1)-
(2) to be primed by another lien. It is not clear if this ability of “double priming” is 
permissible under the US Bankruptcy Code. 
In acknowledgment that approval of a priming lien interferes with a secured creditor’s 
interest, which is not permissible under the US law of security interests, 353  the US 
Bankruptcy Code places a caveat on the priming of liens by debtors. The Bankruptcy Code 
requires that the debtor must show its inability to obtain any other loan, and that the existing 
lien holder’s interest is adequately protected. It is not a requirement under the Canadian 
CCAA to demonstrate an inability to obtain loans, neither is it required for a debtor to show 
that the existing lien holder is adequately protected. All that the debtor needs to do is to put 
the existing lien holder on notice354 and, in the case of a “double priming lien”, obtain the 
lien holder’s permission.355  The only concession the CCAA gives to the existing lien 
holder’s interest is the prohibition of cross-collateralization,356 which acts to improve the 
new priming lien holder’s pre-insolvency unsecured/under-secured position. Therefore, 
lenders hoping to use DIP financing to consolidate their pre-commencement exposure will 
not be permitted to hitch this exposure to the DIP super-priority charge. It does appear 
unfortunate that the US Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid cross-collateralization, 
                                                          
353 Chapter 4 discusses security interests in the US, UK and Canada. 
354 See CCAA 1985, s.11.2. 
355 Ibid, s.11.2(3). 
356Ibid, s 11.2 and  p112 of the thesis for the Canadian stance on cross-collateralization. 
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which could undermine the “adequate protection” requirement. It has been left to the courts 
to reject the practise of cross-collateralization under DIP financing.357 
How then does the UK funding system measure against this structure of super-priority 
priming lien financing found in Canada and the US? Under the UK structure, there are no 
provisions for priming liens. This is not surprising considering that creditors’ interests have 
historically been paramount during insolvency in the UK,358 and any provision that will 
interfere with this interest may likely not be welcomed. What is available under the 
Insolvency Act 1986 is the power of the administrator to raise or borrow money and grant 
security.359 Whilst there is no provision for priming liens within the UK framework, the 
administrator can grant security over the company assets. To this extent, all three 
jurisdictions share a commonality. Furthermore, any money borrowed by the administrator 
during the rescue process enjoys priority over floating charge holders and unsecured 
interests as part of the administration expenses, alongside the administrator’s remuneration. 
Two things may be pointed out here. Firstly, unlike the Canadian CCAA and the US 
Bankruptcy Code which gives priority over secured interest to some classes of rescue 
expenses, administration expenses in the UK enjoy no such priority and, secondly, it can 
be deduced that rescue funding under the Insolvency Act 1986 acknowledges two types of 
funds;  
 General administration expenses incurred during the ordinary course of business 
and  
                                                          
357 See Otte v Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp (In re Texlon Corp.) 596 F. 2D 1092, 1094; 
Shapiro v Saybrook Manufacturing Co. 936 F. 2nd 1490 (11th Cir. 1992). See also section 3.2.5 for 
discussion on cross-collateralization under Chapter 11 DIP funding. 
358 See section 2.7 of thesis for discussion on the UK’s preference for creditors’ rights.. 
359 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1para 99 (3). 
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 Money that can be borrowed by the administrator which may be used for expenses 
which fall outside the ordinary course of business.  
It can therefore be assumed that, although the UK system does not have specific categories 
of expenses, all essential funds needed for the rescue are provided for under the provisions 
set out in the Act. 
 As regards the issue of priority, before the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002 the 
expenses of administration were debts and liabilities incurred under contracts entered into 
by the administrator, and no provision was made for the order in which they could be 
paid.360 However, the issue of priority is addressed under rule 2.67(1) of the Insolvency 
Rules, 1986. The Insolvency Rules 1986 has a list of administration expenses payable in 
order of priority; it begins with expenses properly incurred by the administrator in 
performing his functions in the administration of the company,361 and followed closely by 
the cost of any security provided by the administrator in accordance with the Act or 
Rules.362 Thereafter, the Rules list seven other expenses which are to be paid in order of 
priority.363  
Whilst it appears that the Insolvency Act 1986 has in place a general provision that permits 
an administrator to raise funds for the rescue process, there are no incentives (such as the 
ability to prime existing charges, or accord “elevated” super-priority status without the 
consent of the creditor concerned), to open up more avenues in accessing rescue funding. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the provisions of paragraph 99(4) of Schedule B1 
of the Insolvency Act provide an opportunity for super-priority financing in the UK. This 
                                                          
360 Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1990] BCC 859 and Centre Reinsurance International Co v Freakley 
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361 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.67(1) (a). 
362 Ibid., r 2.67(1)(b). 
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provision permits a debt or liability arising out of a contract entered into by an administrator 
(albeit after he has left office) to be paid in priority over administrator’s remuneration and 
administration expenses.364 Although retroactive in principle, nothing prevents the existing 
administrator from taking advantage of this provision to obtain super-priority financing by 
entering into a contract with a potential lender.365 
In light of the above, it appears that all three jurisdictions offer, or may have an avenue to 
offer, priority payment as incentives for credit obtained (be it administrative or otherwise) 
post-commencement. By implication there is arguably room for super-priority repayments 
within the administration procedure. It can be argued that paragraph 99(4) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 acts as the functional equivalent of the super-priority financing found in US 
Chapter 11 procedure and the Canadian CCAA, with the exception of priming liens. The 
major difference to be found between paragraph 99(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 on the 
one hand and super-priority financing under US Chapter 11 and the Canadian CCAA is the 
required supervision of the courts in super-priority financing in the US and Canada. While 
the supervision of the courts may be viewed as an advantage because it adds structure and 
consistency to the whole process, the lack of court intervention in paragraph 99(4) may be 
seen as advantageous in that a post-commencement financing arrangement could be quickly 
reached between an administrator and a proposed post-commencement lender.  
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
364 See section 3.4.1 of the thesis for discussion on statutory provisions for post-commencement financing 
in the UK and section 3.6 above for the super-priority nature of post-commencement funding in the UK. 
365 See Powdrill v Watson [1994] 2 All ER 513 at 522. 
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As it has been argued above, one of the most fundamental issues relevant to the success of 
corporate rescue is the availability of funds.366 Post-commencement financing provides the 
debtor company with working capital which gives it leeway to continue trading while it 
identifies and remedies the source of its financial distress. 367  It is clear that all three 
jurisdictions in drafting frameworks for corporate rescue have taken this into consideration 
and, in varying degrees, have made provision for how the rescue process can be funded. 
Although the mechanisms available within the US and Canada are not without their 
disadvantages,368 despite some obvious failings they have been able to provide a means 
which compliments their individual economic, cultural and political environment for the 
effective funding of the rescue of failing businesses.  
 The UK, on the other hand, lacks the same structured statutory provisions. Arguably, what 
is available is a skeletal foundation for super-priority financing which the Government may 
have missed various opportunities to build on. Examples such as Bibby Trade Finance Ltd 
v McKay369 and Freakley v Centre Reinsurance International Co370 have shown that super-
priority financing is something that can be done. It may however be argued that the 
prevalence of pre-packs negates the urgent necessity for post-commencement financing, as 
these arrangements will have been concluded before the formal administration process 
begins. This is based on the assumption that all issues of financing rest with the buyer who 
will have made his own arrangements. However, pre-packs are not suitable in all cases and 
in some instances a trading administration will be desirable. Consequently, it may be 
                                                          
366 See introduction to thesis and p74-77 of the thesis for the relevance and importance of rescue funding. 
367 J Sarra, ‘Governance and Control: The Role of Debtor-in possession Financing under the CCAA’ (2004) 
ANNREVINSOLV p 118- 172. 
368 Post-commencement funding may increase the cost of lending because of its interference with the 
hierarchy of distribution to creditors and in the case of priming liens, creditors’ interests in security. Also, 
under the US Chapter 11 DIP financing, post-commencement lenders could gain an unfair advantage over 
other creditors through cross-collateralization. The lack of adequate compensatory protection for senior 
creditors, whose liens are primed under the CCAA, is another drawback. 
369 [2006] All ER 266. 
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beneficial to have a clearly defined alternative in place to fund the rescue process, a 
possibility highlighted by UNCITRAL; 
“An insolvency law can recognise the need for . . . post-commencement finance, 
provide authorisation for it and create priority or security for repayment of the 
lender, the central issue is the scope of the power, and in particular, the inducements 
that can be offered to a potential creditor to encourage lending”.371 
 
The major difference that can be identified from all three jurisdictions is that both Canada 
and the US have incentivised their funding framework by attaching priority over existing 
secured creditors’ interests to such funds, and in so doing have structured the availability 
of funds. Incentivized rescue funding such as that provided in Canada and the US opens up 
different avenues on how the rescue process can be funded. 
Equally, it can be argued that the while the UK offers super-priority repayments by default, 
there is no scope for priming liens under its statutory framework. The ability to prime 
existing liens may be regarded as an important mechanism for raising rescue funds, as it 
opens up avenues for post-commencement funding where all the company’s assets have 
been encumbered. It may be assumed that the lack of such an incentive means that presently 
new secured finance is only available to support a rescue procedure in the UK to the extent 
that existing secured creditors agree, and / or if the company has uncharged assets (or 
charged assets with sufficient equity) that can be offered as fresh security.372  
In addition, the use of pre-packs, despite their perceived failings, has in some cases taken 
away the need for incentivised rescue funding. Despite calls for super-priority financing to 
be introduced in the UK, there have not being any substantive moves to do so. Presently, 
the existing post-commencement funding mechanism in the UK takes sufficient care of the 
                                                          
371 UNCITRAL Guide. 
372 Review Report (n 281). 
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need for post-commencement finance. Rescue funding appears to be a company rescue 
issue and more often than not, a business rescue as opposed to a company rescue is achieved 
in the UK and this perhaps fits into the existing funding framework. Another important 
consideration is how the introduction of post-commencement funding will fit into existing 
lending structures in the UK, which is quite different from the lending structures in the US 
and Canada. 
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Chapter IV: Secured lending and its relevance to rescue funding 
 
Introduction 
During the House of Lords debates prior to the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002, it 
was suggested by one of the Lords that the lending structure in the UK made it 
impracticable to introduce DIP financing provisions into the Insolvency Act 1986.1 In the 
UK, security which forms the basis of lending, is structured differently from its US and 
Canadian counterparts and as such, when a company becomes insolvent, these security 
interests are treated differently by the laws of these countries. The presence of these security 
interests play an important role in the resolution of the company’s insolvency especially as 
it relates to an insolvent company’s ability to raise funds to support continuous trading 
during rescue. Consequently, it is essential to evaluate the lending structures of the three 
jurisdictions. While it is acknowledged that credit can be extended on an unsecured basis, 
the use of collateral is crucial to lending and plays an important role in how credit is 
accessed.2 In addition, the use of collateral as security appears to be highly prevalent in 
corporate borrowing, therefore this chapter will focus on secured lending. Particular 
emphasis would be on the effect of the UK’s lending structure on the accessibility of rescue 
funding.  
In line with comparative legal analysis, which not only seeks to produce similarities 
between two distinct concepts, but also to illustrate differences and highlight divergent 
characteristics between two phenomena,3 both in the nature and content of rules and in their 
operation, the ensuing discussion will revolve mainly around the floating charge. This is 
                                                          
1 Per Lord McIntosh of Haringey, HL Deb 29 July 2002, vol 638 cc763-806 at para 788-789, especially at 
789. 
2 F Lopez-de-Silanes, ‘Turning the Key to Credit: Credit Access and Credit Institutions in F Dahan & J 
Simpson (eds), Secured Transactions Reform and Access to Credit (Elgar Publishing, 2008) p 9-10. 
3 J W Cairns, ‘Development of Comparative Law in Great Britain’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds) 
The Oxford handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford, 2008). 
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because the floating charge stands as a clear disparity in the lending practice in all three 
jurisdictions and this difference was acknowledged by Lord McIntosh during the House of 
Lords debates prior to the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002.4 
The chapter begins with a general outline of secured lending, followed by an examination 
of secured lending structures in all three jurisdictions. Thereafter a comparative evaluation 
of lending structures in the three jurisdictions is carried out to establish the differences and 
similarities that underline secured lending in the UK, US and Canada. This is followed by 
an examination of the UK lending structure to ascertain if it can support a US-style super-
priority funding or any form of rescue funding.  
 
4.1 Secured Lending 
 
The US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defines a security interest as an interest in 
personal property that secures either a payment of money or the completion of an obligation 
and, also the interest of a buyer of accounts.5 The UK, on the other hand, has no statutory 
definition for security interest; however security has been held by the courts to have been 
created, where a creditor acquires rights against the debtor’s property in order to enforce 
the discharge of the debtor’s obligation to the creditor.6 In Canada, a security interest is 
defined as an interest that secures payment or performance of an obligation.7  
Generally, creditors insist on having security interests in real and personal property in 
exchange for allowing debtors to obtain access to goods, services, land and money on 
credit.8 Accordingly, security taking is seen as the norm in the majority of commercial loan 
                                                          
4 HL Deb, see n1. 
5 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 2001, article 1-201(37). 
6 Per Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Re Paramount Airways Ltd [1990] BCC 130 at 149. 
7 Personal Property Security Act, RSO 1990, c P.10 (PPSA), s.1. 
8 PR Moo, ‘The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy’ (1973) 47 Am. Bankr. L.J 23. 
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arrangements agreed to by banks.9 The fundamental principle of secured credit is that the 
debtor’s proprietary interest in one or more of his assets is assigned to a creditor as an 
indemnity against any subsequent default10 of the loan.  
Obtaining security/collateral as part of a loan agreement gives the creditor a superior claim 
to payment of the debt out of the debtor’s assets in the event of the debtor’s insolvency.11 
This is because the rules of distribution in insolvency provides a hierarchy of payment of 
creditors’ claims out of the debtor’s assets and secured creditors’ claims are at the top of 
the hierarchy. Therefore, taking security minimises risk as far as the creditor is concerned 
and maximizes his prospects of recovery in the event of the debtor’s insolvency.12 Debtors 
also benefit from the use of collateral as its inclusion in a loan agreement may lower the 
cost of servicing the loan13 in terms of interest payable on the loan.14 
 
4.2 Secured lending practices in the UK15 
 
Secured lending in the UK is centred on two major types of security; the fixed charge and 
floating charge.16 A fixed charge confers real rights on the creditor over a class or classes 
of the debtor’s assets, and in secured lending this offers the most protection to the creditor, 
most especially during insolvency. This is because the assets which are subject to the fixed 
charge cannot be dealt with or disposed of without the permission of the fixed charge 
                                                          
9 Cork Report, ch 34. 
10 RCC Cuming, C Walsh & R J Wood, Personal Property Security Law (2nd edn, Irwin, 2012) p1. 
11 G McCormack, ‘Secured Transactions Law Reforms, UNCITRAL and the Export of Foreign Legal 
Models’ in N Orksun Akseli (ed) Availability of Credit and Secured Transactions in a Time of Crisis 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) p35-36.  
12 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) p5. 
13 G McCormack, ‘Reforming the Law of Security Interests: National and International perspectives’ (2003) 
Sing. J. Legal Stud. 1. 
14 Creditors are likely to charge a higher interest rate in the absence of collateral because of the high risk 
involved in leaving themselves exposed to the debtor’s default or insolvency.  
15 Material in this section and ensuing sub-sections (4.2- 4.2.2) has previously been incorporated in an 
article published in the Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2013. See appendix for details. 
16 McCormack (n13) at p39 - 58. 
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holder.17 This acts as a source of encouragement for financial institutions such as banks to 
make funds available to companies. Added to this, at the point of insolvency, enforcement 
issues are quite simple,18 as the secured creditor may be able to enforce his security with 
the permission of the court.19 
While the fixed charge plays an important role in how security supports lending practices 
in the UK, the floating charge has traditionally been regarded as the workhouse of secured 
credit20 and its significance in English lending practice was acknowledged by the Privy 
Council in Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.21 The Cork Report22 also recognized 
the importance of the floating charge when it noted that its use was so prevalent that a high 
portion of credit obtained by companies involved a floating charge. Notwithstanding the 
significant role the floating charge plays in lending practices in the UK, its presence has 
generated so much debate; some have called for its abolition while its advantages have been 
exalted by those who see it as a beneficial security device.23 Its use has since declined with 
the virtual abolition of administrative receivership, but it is still a well-established part of 
lending practices in the UK and stands as a distinctive feature in comparison to lending 
practices in the US and Canada. 
 
4.2.1 Floating charges 
 
                                                          
17 R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) p12-14. 
18 See generally I Snaith, The Law of Corporate Insolvency (Waterlow, 1990). 
19 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 43(2). It should be noted that in company liquidation, creditors who 
are fully secured can remove their security from the pool of assets and realise it to satisfy their claim with 
any surplus going to the liquidator. However when the company is in compulsory liquidation certain 
restrictions apply, see R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn Sweet and Maxwell 2010) 
p206. When a company is in liquidation and a creditor wishes to institute proceedings against the company 
he must obtain leave of court to do so, see Insolvency Act 1986, s 130(2).  
20 McCormack (n 13). 
21 [2001] 2 AC 710. 
22 Cork Report. 
23 See section 4.2.2 of the thesis for further discussion on the abolition of floating charge security.  
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A floating security is a type of secured lending which has its origin in equity.24 It developed 
as a response to the growing needs of commerce. As the UK economy evolved from one 
focused on agriculture to a more industrialized one, there were few assets such as buildings 
and immovable equipment available as collateral for secured lending. Assets which were 
readily available were raw materials, manufactured goods or goods yet to be manufactured 
and due to their transient nature, this could not form the basis upon which secured lending 
could be procured. In addition to this change, industrialization meant that limited liability 
companies were formed.25 Extending credit to these companies on an unsecured basis was 
precarious as partners or investors could not be held personally liable for the debts and 
obligation of the company in the event that these could not be met.26 These developments 
formed the setting for the emergence of the floating charge. This charge was developed at 
a time when there was a strong need to bridge a gap in how credit could be secured, and it 
did this by making it possible to create a security interest over the present and future assets 
of a debtor.27 
Ryall v Rolle28 was the first case that showed equity’s intervention in bridging the gap 
created by the common law.29 Although the case had the markings of a floating charge 
security, it was not recognized as a floating charge at the time. 30  An assignment of 
machinery and implements of his mill was made by a debtor to a trustee for his creditor. 
The deed of assignment had a redemption clause and provided that the trust so created, 
would extend  to all other future machinery and implements which should be brought into 
the mill, in addition to or in replacement of the original items. Some of the items were 
                                                          
24 G Fuller, Corporate Borrowing: Law and Practice (3rd edn, Jordans, 2006). 
25 Limited Liability Act 1855. 
26 Ibid.  For further discussions, see also, McCormack (n 13) p47. 
27 Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co [1870] 5 CH App 318. 
28 (1749) 1 Atk. 165. 
29 R Penninghton, ‘The Genesis of the Floating Charge’ (1960) 23 Mod.L.Rev.630 at 634. 
30 Ibid. 
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thereafter seized by a judgement creditor of the debtor and the ownership of those items 
was called into question. The question was whether the secured creditor, who had never 
taken possession of the new machinery, had a prior claim. The House of Lords held that 
the secured creditor had a prior claim to the machinery. 
A floating charge is said to be “floating” because it does not attach to any particular asset 
and it hovers over assets which are not subject to a fixed security. Although not defined,31 
because the creditor cannot precisely state that the assets are the subject of a loan 
agreement, the security floats over the debtors’ assets both present and future. 32 
Nevertheless, it is an existing security which is real and present33 despite the fact that some 
of the assets it may cover are future assets which have not yet been acquired by the debtor.  
The floating charge is a comprehensive and effective security over some or all of the 
debtor’s company and assets34 and the fundamental feature of a floating security which sets 
it apart from a fixed security is the ability of the debtor to deal freely with the assets covered 
by the security in the ordinary course of its business, without interference from the 
creditor.35  The ability of the debtor to deal with the charged assets during the ordinary 
course of business does not act to negate the security interest, but simply delays its 
attachment as long as the debtor’s power of management continues.  
In spite of the importance of the floating charge as a component in the security available to 
creditors, it is seldom taken on its own. It is usually taken in conjunction with fixed charges 
over assets.36 Historically, the floating charge security acted as a control device in the UK  
as most assets of value could be covered by fixed security, which was preferable because 
                                                          
31 Floating charge assets are not ascertainable because of the ever changing nature of the class of assets that 
make up a floating charge. 
32 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1901] 2 KB 979.  
33 Ibid, at 999 per Buckley LJ.  
34 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710. 
35 Ashborder BV v Green Gas power Ltd [2004] BCC 634. 
36 R Calnan, Taking Security: Law and Practice (2nd edn, Jordan, 2011) p135. 
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of the priority status it gave creditors therefore the floating charge assets were more 
function than security assets.37 
Whilst the floating security, at its creation, hovers over the assets of the debtor, it has the 
capability to transcend from a floating security to a fixed security. It becomes a fixed charge 
over relevant assets38 upon the occurrence of an event39 (in most cases insolvency) or where 
the creditor takes steps to “crystallize” the security. However, due to the fact that the 
floating security is a creation of equity, the resultant fixed security only takes effect in 
equity.40 It must be mentioned here that crystallization does not necessarily put an end to a 
company’s ability to continue its business. The consequence of crystallization is that the 
authority of the debtor to deal with the assets is brought to an end. What this then means is 
that the debtor relinquishes his quasi-ownership of the assets while the creditor assumes 
authority over the assets. Therefore, without the consent of the creditor (who cannot give a 
blanket permission without re-floating the charge), the debtor cannot dispose of the charged 
assets.41  
Crystallization can only mutate a floating security into a fixed security at the point of 
insolvency or upon the occurrence of a specified event and not otherwise. Once the debtor 
embarks on any insolvency procedure, either with the intention to rehabilitate or liquidate, 
and a moratorium is in place, crystallization cannot occur.42 It has been argued in favour of 
the floating charge that, it gives a broad spread of security together with priority over 
unsecured creditors.43 In addition, because it permits the creation of security over the 
                                                          
37 See generally R Mokal ‘The Floating Charge- An Elegy’ in S Worthington (ed) Commercial Law and 
Commercial Practice (Hart, 2003) p483-485. 
38 Ferrier v Bottomer [1972] 126 CLR 597. 
39 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd [1904] AC 355 at 358. 
40 Fuller (n 24). 
41 Calnan (n 36). It should be noted that an administrator is authorized by the Insolvency Act to dispose of 
floating charge assets after the company enters into administration, see Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 Para. 
70. 
42 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 42 & 43. 
43 See V Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?’(1999) Modern Law Review 5 at 643. 
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debtor’s entire property, it provides the company with an easy and effective way to borrow 
money, thus making it an attractive way to secure loans. Coupled with this is the fact that 
it is less intrusive in the debtor’s operation and management.44  
 
 
4.2.1.1 The Enterprise Act 2002 and its effect on floating 
charge 
 
Before the coming into force of the amendments to the Insolvency Act 1986 introduced by 
the Enterprise Act 2002, the floating charge played a very important role in lending 
practices in the UK. The impact that floating charges had on lending practice was 
influenced by the possible insolvency of the debtor. Prior to the amendments, a floating 
charge holder could, on the default of the debtor, appoint an administrative receiver whose 
main function was to maximise economic value for the appointing creditor, thereby 
protecting the creditor’s position to the possible detriment of other parties.45  
 As a result, it became common practice prior to the Enterprise Act 2002 for lenders who 
were already heavily secured by fixed charge over the debtor’s most valuable assets, to take 
a floating charge over those same assets.46 Lenders relied on this duo-combination because, 
while the fixed security gave superior cover to their exposure to a debtor, the possession of 
a floating security meant that the holder of that security could forestall the appointment of 
an administrator and appoint an administrative receiver. The resulting effect of this 
legislative provision was the strengthening of the floating charge in lending practices in the 
UK,47 however, this creditors’ paradise was short-lived. 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982). 
46 Re Croftbell Ltd [1990] BCLC 844; F Oditah, ‘Lightweight Floating Charges’ [1991] JBL 290. 
47 McCormack (n 13). 
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The Enterprise Act 2002, in a bid to reform the administration process into a more collective 
corporate rehabilitation procedure, significantly restricted the powers a floating security 
holder had over the debtor. With the introduction of the new administration procedure into 
the Insolvency Act 1986, the main focus shifted from protecting the interest of one creditor 
to those of the general body of creditors. The reforms stripped the floating charge holder of 
the ability to appoint an administrative receiver except for floating charges created before 
15th September 2003 and specifically narrow exceptions such as those securing lending 
agreements in respect of utility companies.48  
In addition, the Enterprise Act 2002 introduced the ring-fencing of a portion of floating 
charge recoveries (the prescribed part) for distribution to unsecured creditors in the event 
of a company’s insolvency.49 Whilst the ring fencing of a portion of the floating charge 
assets appear to have placed the floating charge holder at a disadvantage, in reality what it 
did, was to prevent the inadvertent benefit of the abolition of crown preference50 going to 
floating charge holders;51 thereby maintaining neutrality ( i.e. neither better nor worse off) 
for the floating charge holder.52 Although the amendments brought by the Enterprise Act 
appear to have stripped the floating charge holder of some enviable powers, they did not 
eliminate all the appeal that a floating charge holds for both creditor and debtor. It may not 
be wrong to presume that taking away such a major source of control from the floating 
charge holder would sound the death knell. This appears not to be the case; the lure for the 
sustained presence of the floating charge can be traced to the fact that some assets are 
                                                          
48 The holder of a qualifying floating charge has the power to appoint an administrator out of court under a 
fast track procedure. See Insolvency Act 1986 Sch B1, para 14. In addition where an administrator has been 
appointed by the directors of the company or the company itself, the holder of a qualifying floating charge 
has the power to veto such appointment and appoint his own. See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 36.  
49 Ring-fencing is not applicable to all insolvency proceedings. See Insolvency Act 1986, s 176 A (3)-(5) 
for a list of circumstances under which a ring-fencing of a prescribed part will not take place.  
50 The abolition of the crown preference was also part of the measures introduced by the Enterprise Act 
2002 to reform the insolvency proceedings in the UK.  
51 Enterprise Act 2002, s 252 and the Insolvency Act (Prescribed Part) Order 2003. 
52 R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn Sweet and Maxwell 2010) p167-168.  
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unsuitable for fixed charge security. For the debtor, the power it gives to continue dealing 
with charged assets in the course of its business seems to make it an attractive option, and 
the unsecured creditors are not left out from the benefits ensuing from a floating charge, as 
the prescribed part due to them is carved out from proceeds of a floating charge security.53 
 
4.2.1.2 Changes to the floating charge over book debts in 
the UK 
 
Book debts owing to a company are an important asset to a company, especially small and 
medium sized enterprises.54 This is because, a meaningful fraction of the company’s wealth 
can be tied up in its debt and a creditor who is able to take a fixed charge over these debts 
will be able to acquire its full value, rather than queuing behind the administrator’s 
expenses, preferential creditors and unsecured creditors.55 As a result, charges over book 
debts, while not a conventional form of collateral, proved to be a standard form of obtaining 
fixed security. Although charges over book debts appear to be fixed charges on paper, in 
reality they operated as floating charges because the debtor may, as part of the ordinary 
course of doing business, require the use of the proceeds of their debt. The decision in Re 
Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd56  supported the notion that where a debtor is free 
to deal with proceeds of a debt, then it is a floating charge.  
The position of treating a charge over book debts as a floating charge (Re Yorkshire 
Woolcombers Association Ltd) was rejected by the court in Siebe Gorman v Barclays Bank 
Plc57 when it supported the practice adopted by banks to circumvent the debtor’s ability to 
                                                          
53 Calnan (n 36) p134-135. 
54 Report of the Law Commission on Company Security Interests (Cm 6654, 2005) page XII at no 14. 
55 Ibid. 
56 [1904] AC 355 at 358.  
57 [1979] LLoyds LR 42. 
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deal with proceeds of debts. Banks as major creditors produced charge documents which 
were aimed at giving them control over the book debts, by requiring the debtor to pay the 
proceeds of its debt into its account with the bank. In Siebe Gorman’s case, the court held 
that a debenture which required the proceeds of book debts to be paid into the company’s 
general trading account, with no express restrictions on the company’s ability to withdraw 
deal with the account, created a fixed charge over book debts. This decision diminished the 
value of floating charges by recognizing that it was possible to create a fixed charge over 
book debts.  
The issue of book debts has continued to be a contentious element of creditors’ security as 
the decision in National Westminister Bank v Spectrum Plus58 reverted back to the earlier 
decision in Yorkshire Woolcombers’ case. The House of Lords stated that although a charge 
over book debts was expressed to be fixed charge, because the debtor was able to deal with 
the proceeds, it was in fact a floating charge. With the decision in Spectrum Plus, it is 
theoretically possible to create a fixed charge over book debts as long as the debtor has no 
power to deal with the proceeds. But where the debtor has free rein over the proceeds and 
can remove them from the security until enforcement, then the charge is a floating charge 
even if expressed to be otherwise.59  
 
4.2.2 Possible abolition of floating charge 
 
Despite the genius of its origin and its expediency as a financing tool, the floating charge 
has become weighed down with case law and as a result has given rise to complexities.60 
                                                          
58 [2005] 2 AC 680. 
59 Calnan (n 36) p142. 
60 A good example is the issue with book debts. 
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This has led to calls for the UK to abolish the floating charge security61 and abolishing the 
floating charge would have placed the country at par with Canada and some other 
jurisdictions 62  which have abolished the floating charge. It has been argued that, 
considering that the floating charge is a product of judge made laws (which consisted of a 
patchwork of cases), it has done remarkably well, however it cannot serve as a substitute 
for a well-defined personal security law.63 Goode states that, despite all its advantages, the 
floating charge has become a relic and this is due to the fact that English personal property 
security is made up mainly of a combination of judicial artefacts with unique legal 
characteristics64 which makes the floating charge unsuitable in this modern era. It therefore 
appears to be that English personal security law is stagnated and may not represent modern 
commercial realities.  
The possible abolition of the floating charge has been a fiercely debated topic with the 
proponents equally divided on the pros and cons of abolishing or retaining the floating 
charge. A 1971 committee on Consumer Credit in considering the issue of abolishing the 
floating charge observed that the floating charge plays an important role in commercial 
lending practice; accordingly its abolition should not be seriously contemplated.65  More 
recently the City of London Law society issued a discussion paper on the need to reform 
secured transactions and one of the areas touched on was the uncertainty attached to 
drawing a distinction between a floating charge and fixed charge security. While not 
necessarily pushing for the abolition of the floating charge, they were of the opinion that a 
clear distinction had to be made classifying which assets fall under which security, and this 
                                                          
61 It was one of the issues raised during consultations prior to the publication of the Report of the 
Committee on Consumer Credit, (Cmnd 4596, 1971). Roy Goode has also called for a unified concept of 
security which would mean the end of the floating charge security, see R Goode, ‘The exodus of the 
floating charge’ in D Feldman & F Meisel (eds) Corporate and Commercial Law; Modern Developments 
(LLyod’s of London Press, 1996). 
62 New Zealand for example. 
63 Calnan (n 36). 
64 Goode (n 61). 
65 Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit, (Cmnd 4596, 1971) at para 5.7.7.7. 
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should perhaps be done within a statutory framework, as existing case laws have come up 
with conflicting classifications.66 
 The observation of various commentators has been that the floating charge is integral to 
the secured-credit industry with most banks’ lending reliant on it.67 It therefore seems that 
its total abolition may have a negative effect on access to credit.  On the other hand, in 
Canada, where a unitary concept was introduced after the abolition of the floating charge, 
there seems to be no adverse effect on access to credit.68 Therefore, it is possible that the 
abolition of the floating charge in the UK may not have any adverse effect on lending 
structures. Perhaps a consensus could be reached on how the floating charge could be 
adapted to fit modern commercial needs. This view is supported by McCormack who 
suggests that the benefits of the floating charge,69  in terms of its comprehensiveness, 
simplicity and uncomplicated process could be retained if English law adopted the Uniform 
Commercial Code article-9 style reforms.70   
 
4.3 Secured lending practices in the US 
 
The concept of secured and unsecured lending in the US appears relatively more structured 
in general when compared to the arrangement found in the UK. Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) is the body of laws which governs securities/lending and it 
establishes a unitary conceptual structure for security interests in personal property and 
fixtures. As a result, article 9 UCC does not distinguish between fixed and floating security 
                                                          
66 The City of London Discussion Paper: Secured Transactions Reform 21st November 2012. 
67 J Ziegel, ‘The New Provincial Chattel Security Regimes’ [1991] 70 Canadian Bar Reviews 681 at 712. 
68 J Ziegel, ‘Floating Charges and the OPPSA: a Basic Misunderstanding’ (1994) 2 Canadian Business Law 
Journal 470. 
69 Historically, the floating charge security acted as a control device in the UK  as most assets of value 
could be covered by fixed security, which was preferable because of the priority status it gave creditors 
therefore the floating charge assets were more function than security assets. 
70 McCormack (n 13). 
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interests. Whilst the floating charge, as it is found in the UK, is absent in the US, article 9-
202 UCC, recognises and authorizes a security concept similar to the floating charge in the 
form of a blanket security interest on shifting collateral.71 The acceptance and recognition 
of a floating security device within the US lending practices is a clear departure from their 
pre-article 9 stance.  
Before the introduction of the UCC, US law did not accept the concept of a security which 
floated without attaching to any assets, on the grounds that the freedom it gave the debtor 
to deal with the secured assets without interference from the creditor conflicted with the 
nature of a security interest.72 It is quite easy to appreciate why the US choose to reject the 
floating charge as a fixed security. A security interest is seen as a right in rem which gives 
the creditor the right to dispose of or remove the assets subject to the security from the 
possession of the debtor.73 But with the floating charge that right is suspended until the 
occurrence of an event, therefore in the US’s thinking, the floating charge does not tick all 
the right boxes to fit into the definition of a fixed security. 
In addition, the idea that a security interest could be created by a debtor over property he 
did not already own was unacceptable under US law.74 The argument that a debtor should 
have some assets free upon which general creditors could depend for payments also 
contributed to the rejection of a floating security,75 by the Americans because the presence 
of a floating charge meant that all assets may be encumbered. Consequently, what existed 
at the time was a proliferation of diverse devices such as the trust receipt and factor’s lien 
which allowed the debtor to give security over stock. 76  The 1950s however saw the 
                                                          
71 G Gilmore, ‘Security Law, Formalism and Article 9’ (1986) 47 Nebraska LR 659 at 672. 
72 Benedict v Ratner (1925) 268 US 354. 
73 H E Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’ (2011-2012) 125 Harv. L.Rev. 1691. 
74 Zartman v First National Bank of Waterloo [1907] 189 NY 267. 
75 Ibid. 
76 RJ Wood, ‘The Floating Charge in Canada’ (1988-89) 27 Alta. L. Rev. 191. 
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adoption of a unitary concept of security which synthesized these devices under article 9 of 
the UCC.77 
 What the introduction of article 9 did was to acknowledge that the freedom of the debtor 
to deal with secured property in the ordinary course of business was not fundamentally 
incompatible with fixed security interests.78 The Code recognises a debtor’s right or ability 
to “use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the collateral; collect, compromise, enforce 
or otherwise deal with collateral;79 accept the return of collateral or make repossession; or 
use, comingle or dispose of proceeds”.80 This flexibility of the debtor to deal with secured 
assets is broadly what constitutes a floating charge. In effect, the security interest granted 
under article 9 is a fixed charge with a license to deal81 and acts as a functional equivalent 
of the English floating charge except that it avoids all the complication of a floating charge 
by allowing the immediate attachment of the security interest. 
Therefore a debtor can acquire a floating lien, as it is termed in the US, but this device will 
have the features of a fixed charge. It is usually taken over proceeds, after acquired property 
or collateral subject to future advances82 and it plays a very important role in modern 
lending.83  Under the floating lien, the debtor agrees to grant a security interest to the 
creditor in the future property he is to acquire, to secure a present debt.84 Once the property 
is acquired, it attaches automatically. 
                                                          
77 Ibid. 
78 McCormack (n 13). 
79 See UCC 2001, article 9-205; see also McCormack (n 16). 
80 UCC 2001, article 9-205. 
81 McCormack (n 13). 
82 R L Miller, Fundamentals of Business Law, Summarized Cases (Cengage, 2013); See also UCC 2001, art 
9-204. 
83 A J Harrington, ‘Insecurity for Secured Creditors - the Floating Lien and Section 547 of the Bankruptcy 
Law (1980) Marquette Law Review vol 63:447 pg. 447-488. 
84 Ibid. 
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What characterises it as a fixed security is the fact that it attaches automatically and does 
not hover over the debtor’s assets until crystallization occurs.85 Consequently, what is 
available under article 9 is a synthesis of the virtues of a floating security and a fixed charge. 
This is so because a debtor may be able to dispose of assets which are subject to a fixed 
charge during the ordinary course of business; a trait which is elementary to floating 
security. The distinction here between the article 9 security and the floating charge is that 
article 9 embraces the concept of attachment, which is; once a security interest attaches to 
collateral it becomes a fixed security interest notwithstanding the nature of the original 
collateral.86 
  
4.4 Secured lending practices in Canada87 
 
Early lending practices in Canada mirrored the system found within the UK and this is not 
surprising considering that Canada is a common law country and relied largely on the UK 
for guidance on most of its laws.88 The effect of this reliance by Canada on the UK for law-
making directions was the exportation of the same lending concepts to Canada and a 
wholesale acceptance of English authorities.89 As a result, lending practices in Canada 
entailed fixed security with the floating charge as a sub-component. It was recognised by 
the Canadian courts that a fixed specific interest may be taken in future goods.90 The courts 
                                                          
85 UCC 2001, art 9-204(1). 
86 J Ziegel, ‘The Nature of Floating Charges’ (1994) Can. Bus. L.J 474. 
87 Material in this section has previously been incorporated in an article published in the Annual Review of 
Insolvency Law. See appendix for details. 
88 G McCormack, ‘The Floating Charge in England and Canada’ in  De Lacy (ed.) The Reform of the United 
Kingdom Company Law (Cavendish, 2002) p 398. 
89 Wood (n 76). 
90 Holroyd v Marshall [1862] 10 H.L.C. 191, II E.R. 999 (applied by the court in Fraser v Imperial Bank of 
Canada [1912] S.C.R. 313). 
166 
 
in Canada also recognized the possibility of a fixed charge over stock which gave the debtor 
licence to dispose of the charged assets during the course of business until default.91 
Whilst the basic concept of English personal security law was borrowed by the Canadians, 
it was not a wholesale adoption of the English practices. A major difference could be found 
in how secured charge was categorized. In the UK, the practice was to have a fixed security 
and/or a floating charge security. In Canada on the other hand, a close study of the cases92 
reveals a clear distinction in the securities available. The security devices previously 
available in Canada were; fixed charge assets, a floating charge on book debts and a fixed 
and specific charge on book debts with a licence that allows the collection of the debt free 
from charge.93 Thus unlike the UK, in Canada there was a clear distinction between a 
floating charge and a fixed charge with licence to deal. 
Another significant difference was how the boundary between a fixed charge and floating 
charge was determined. In the UK, it was (and still is) clear that what sets a fixed charge 
apart from a floating charge was (and is) the debtor’s power to deal with the charged 
assets.94 This was far from the case in Canada which relied on the intention of the parties 
to determine if a floating charge or a fixed charge with licence to deal was created.95 
Accordingly, while the floating charge in Canada shared a common ancestry with its 
English counterpart, they were to some extent different in theory.96 This untenable test, 
which relied on the parties’ intention rather than the ability of the debtor to deal with the 
                                                          
91 Graveley v Springer (1898) 3 Terr. L.R. 120; see also J.I Case Threshing Machine Co. v Gouley [1914] 7 
WWR. 584 (Sask. Dist. Ct.). 
92 See Nourse v Canadian Canners Ltd. [1935] O.R. 361 (C.A); see also Meen v Realty Development Co. 
Ltd. [1954] 1 DLR. 649 (Ont. C.A.); Re Zegalski [1973] 1 WWR 728 (Man.Q.B.) 
93 Wood (n 76). 
94 Ashborder BV v Green Gas power Ltd [2001] 2AC 710. 
95 In the UK, it is the debtor’s ability to deal with the charged property that creates a floating charge and not 
the intention of the parties, see National Westminster Bank v Spectrum Plus (Supra). 
96 Wood (n 76). 
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assets, was later abandoned and the courts in Canada reverted to the English way of 
determining the difference between a floating charge and a fixed charge.97 
Sweeping reforms to personal property security legislation enacted in the style of the US 
UCC article 9 brought to an end the existence of the floating charge as it was in Canada.98  
The new legislation, the Personal Property Securities Act, R.S.O 1990 (PPSA), got rid of 
the distinction between fixed and floating charges (even in cases where parties may have 
relied on the old law).99 It should be noted that each of the provinces in Canada have 
enacted their own provincial PPSA. For ease of analysis, and because Ontario appears to 
be one of the first provinces to reform its security laws and was the model upon which other 
provinces carried out reforms, in the discussion that follows reference will be made to the 
Ontario legislation unless otherwise stated. The new Canadian property legislation 
followed in the footsteps of the article 9 in adopting a fixed charge which allowed the debtor 
licence to deal with the assets during the ordinary course of business. The position of the 
courts on this issue, as could be implied from the relevant law, is that, as a matter of public 
policy, it is not abhorrent to have a fixed charge which gives the debtor licence to deal with 
the assets.100 
The various PPSAs across Canada radically changed the way the concept of a “security 
interest” is defined in Canada. It changed the definition by adopting a practical approach 
which focused on the substance rather than the form that a particular security took.101 It 
effectively eliminated the distinction between floating and fixed charges, all security 
interests including those previously characterized as floating charges, would attach 
                                                          
97 R in Right of British Columbia v Federal Business Development Bank [1987] B.C.L.R. (2d) 273. 
98 G McCormack (n 13). 
99 R v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075. 
100 Ibid. 
101 See PPSA Ontario, R.S.O 1990. 
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immediately upon the satisfaction of statutory requirements for attachment.102 This unitary 
concept of security replaced the pre-existing common law’s complex system of security 
forms and devices and, in doing so, adopted the US framework which supported the notion 
that all security devices perform a similar purpose and should therefore function under a 
common legal framework.  
The courts also endorsed the change to a unitary concept of security. In Credit Suisse 
Canada v 1133 Yonge Street Holdings,103 the court stated that the floating charge was a 
liability which did not meet the financial needs of the 19th century. Therefore it was 
considered that there was no justification or historical basis, for including the floating 
charge security in the new PPSA, as the Act creates a flexible single security interest which 
accommodates all the needs of the business community. Although it is an acknowledged 
fact that the US UCC article 9 had a huge influence on the structure and a lot of the 
fundamental concepts of the Canadian PPSA, some commentators have observed that it 
would be a mistake to assume that the introduction of article-9 style reforms revolutionised 
Canadian security provisions.104  
Despite the presumed abolition of floating charge security, an instrument, the General 
Security Agreement (GSA), which mimics the functions of a floating charge as a blanket 
security over real and personal property is still in use in some parts of Canada.105 Although 
the PPSA provides no definition of this form of security, it may be assumed that recognition 
                                                          
102 C Walsh, ‘The Floating Charge is Dead; Long Live the Floating Charge- a Canadian Perspective on the 
Reform of Personal Property Securities Law in  A Mugasha (ed) Perspectives on Commercial Law, 
(Prospect Media, 1999) p129-150. See also Credit Suisse Canada v 1133 Yonge Street Holdings (1996) 28 
O.R. (3d) 670 (Gen.Div.), reviewed (1988) 41 0.R. (3d) 632 (C.A.), where the Court of Appeal held that the 
PPSA treated floating charge security as it would any other security however it does not recognise the 
concept of crystallization. 
103 (1998) 14 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 61 (Ont. C.A.); Affinity International Inc. v Alliance International Inc. (1995) 
9 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 174 (Man. C.A.). 
104 R CC Cuming, ‘Personal Property Security Law’ (1981) 31 U Toronto L.J 249. 
105 See Nova Scotia v. IPS Invoice System Corporations 2010 ONSC 2101 (Ont. S.C.J.); Silverman 
Jewellers Consultants Canada Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada 53 O.R, (3d) 97, 143 O.A.C. 375, 2001 
CarswellOnt 633 (Ont. C.A.). 
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of its validity is on the basis that section 2 of the PPSA106 states that the Act will “apply to 
every transaction without regard to its form and without regard to the person who has title 
to the collateral, that in substance creates a security interest”. Also the PPSA recognizes the 
ability for a security agreement to secure future advances;107 one of the elements that 
characterize a charge as a floating charge. What is more, the PPSA allows the debtor a 
reasonable amount of control over collateral within its possession, an important feature of 
a floating charge agreement.108 In a similar vein, the occurrence of an event such as the 
debtor ceasing to carry on its business has a crystallizing effect on the GSA.109  Accordingly 
it can be argued that the GSA and the floating charge are one and the same except in name 
because they have the same attributes and functions.110 
 
4.5 Comparative analysis 
 
The nineteenth century development of personal property security law in the US took a 
remarkably divergent path from its UK counterpart.111 The American courts’ strong distrust 
of a mortgage over stock-in-trade (which they regarded as a fraudulent conveyance) may 
be responsible for what led the Americans down a different route.112 In the UK, in contrast, 
the courts proved to be quite receptive of a device that could give                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
security over the debtor’s entire undertaking (both present and future). Although no 
tangible reason has been given for the US rejection of the floating charge, one of the 
suggestions put forward is that the UK may have been more understanding than their US 
                                                          
106 Personal Property Security Act Ontario, R.S.O 1990. 
107 Ibid, s 13. 
108 Ibid., s 17(1) &(2) and s 17.1. 
109 A&B Landscaping & Interlocking Ltd. v Bradsil Ltd (1993) 6 P.P.S.A.C (2d) 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.) 
110 (a) They are blanket securities (b) They secure future assets (c) They can be crystallized upon the 
occurrence of an event, like the debtor’s insolvency. 
111 Wood (n 76). 
112 G Gilmore, Security Interest in Personal Property (Little Brown & Co 1965) 2 Vols. Pp. xxxiv, xiii, 
1508 at 39-47.  
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counterparts towards banks’ and other financial institutions’ attempts to obtain security 
over stock-in-trade113 and as such were more accommodating to their needs. 
While the American lending practices enable the disposal of assets subject to a fixed charge 
during the ordinary course of business,114 in the UK such practices are not permissible 
under typical lending terms. A debtor who attempts to dispose of assets which are the 
subject of a fixed charge may be held liable for a breach of a covenant in the loan agreement. 
In addition, the English courts have clearly reiterated that a floating charge is distinct from 
a fixed charge and should not be regarded as a fixed charge with a license to deal.115 The 
license attached to the floating charge permits the debtor to dispose of properties in his 
possession which are the subject of a floating charge. 
It is interesting that Canada and the US are both common law countries which borrowed 
laws from the UK, but took divergent paths. While Canada initially adopted the floating 
charge security, as is found in the UK, the Americans questioned the validity of such a 
security interest and did not acknowledge it until the introduction of article 9 of the UCC, 
which accepted the concept of a floating lien or blanket security, albeit ingrained with the 
fixed charge concept of automatic attachment. The requirement of automatic attachment 
with regards to floating liens is one of the things that distinguish the US floating lien from 
the English floating charge. Auxiliary to this is the lack of the element of crystallisation; a 
floating charge would in most cases crystalize (i.e. attach) upon the debtor’s insolvency, 
but because of the requirement that the article 9 floating lien attaches upon creation, the 
main element (the ability to hover over assets) that characterizes a charge as floating, is 
                                                          
113 Wood (n 76). 
114 UCC 2001, article 9-205. 
115 Evans v Rivals Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2KB 979 at 999. 
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missing. It then appears to beg the question, if indeed the article 9 floating lien can be 
classed as a floating security. 
Canada has experienced two sides of the coin; the English style floating charge was initially 
adopted by the Canadians in substance but not in form, as there was a clear deviation from 
the English model in the test applied by the Canadians courts to determine what constitutes 
a floating charge. Thereafter Canada adopted a UCC style article-9 style personal property 
securities law. With this new law, the distinction between a floating charge and the fixed 
charge is extinguished and all security interests are expected to attach automatically or, 
where postponed, a definite date has to be set for the charge’s attachment. Notwithstanding 
this, the GSA116 which mimics the floating charge is still in operation in some parts of 
Canada and appears to derive its authenticity from the PPSA. 
There have been calls for the UK to abolish the floating charge security and jump on the 
article 9 train as Canada and a host of other jurisdictions have done. A lot of questions have 
to be considered by the UK before any reforms can take place. The most pertinent being; 
will an article 9-style reform be conducive to economic and commercial realities in the UK? 
According to Zeigel, apart from the high cost of reforming security laws in the UK, there 
are so many other factors at play as to why the UK has resisted the introduction of 
comprehensive reforms.117 He further stated that the powerful interest of City of London 
law firms have “a huge intellectual and professional investment through their mastery of 
the intricacies of the existing English rules”118 and may be hesitant adopt new and untested 
statutory regimes. 
                                                          
116 See p167-168 of the thesis for discussion on the GSA. 
117 See R Calnan, ‘What is wrong with the Law of Security?’ in J De Lacy (ed) The Reform of UK Personal 
Security Law: Comparative Perspectives (Cavendish, 2010) p162-187. 
118 J Ziegel ‘A Canadian Academic’s Reaction to the Law Commission’s Proposals’ in J De Lacy (ed) The 
Reform of UK Personal Security Law: Comparative Perspectives (Cavendish, 2010) p119. 
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The floating charge may have lost a major part its appeal after the virtual abolition of a 
floating charge holder’s power to appoint an administrative receiver, but it still has some 
appeal because there may be situations119 where it may appear to be the only type of 
security available for the creditor to rely on to raise funds.  
 
4.6 Is the secured lending structure in the UK an obstacle to rescue 
funding?  
 
The analysis in this section is centred on the lending structures in the UK and the US. This 
is because of the disparity in how lending is structured in both countries with particular 
reference to the floating charge, which was one of the reasons given by Lord McIntosh120 
during the debates prior to the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002, as to why DIP 
financing may not be suitable in the UK. The UK secured lending structure is currently 
made up of two main devices; the fixed charge and the floating charge. The US structure 
on the other hand, recognizes and operates a unitary concept of security, which is the fixed 
charge.121 Nevertheless, the US secured lending structure accommodates a type of security 
device which mirrors the UK floating charge’s ability to hover over future and existing 
assets of the debtor,122 therefore giving an outward appearance of similarity. 
A closer examination of the functions of the two charges reveals ‘a false similarity’ between 
the charges. Whilst the UK floating charge hovers over all of the debtor’s uncharged assets 
and only attaches by agreement, on the debtor’s default or insolvency,123 the US floating 
liens is treated as a fixed charge and attaches immediately to a class of assets.124 The key 
                                                          
119 For example where there are no existing assets, expected future assets may be used as collateral. 
120 HL Deb 29 July 2002, vol 638 cc763-806 at para 789. 
121 See section 4.3 above for discussion on secured lending in the US. 
122 UCC 2001, article 9-202. 
123 See section 4.2.1 of thesis for discussion on floating charge security. 
124 UCC 2001, article 9-203. 
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difference in both charges lies in how they operate with regards to available assets after a 
company becomes insolvent. In the US, future assets acquired after a debtor becomes 
insolvent do not form part of the assets that are covered by a floating lien held by a 
creditor.125 Once the company becomes insolvent, the scope of the floating lien does not 
extend beyond the point of insolvency; therefore all assets which are not subject to a fixed 
charge belong to the company free and clear. McCormack sees this as advantageous and 
suggests that the limitation of the floating lien over after acquired property may be one of 
the factors which encourage a pre-commencement lender to continue funding the company, 
thus encouraging post-commencement financing.126   
In the UK, once a company becomes insolvent, the floating charge crystallizes and fastens 
on all existing and future assets of the company,127 most likely leaving the company with 
virtually no free assets. Arguably, this is likely to result in the company having no 
uncharged assets to offer as collateral to raise money to fund its rescue. This distinct feature 
of the UK lending structure gives credence to Lord McIntosh’s view that the UK lending 
structure may not be suitable to super-priority financing. However it can be argued that US 
Chapter 11 DIP funding provisions does not necessarily apply to only debtor companies 
that have collateral to offer potential lenders. There are various financing options 128 
available under section 364 which insolvent companies can take advantage of, including 
those with heavily leveraged assets.129 
Whilst the presence of the floating charge reduces the likelihood of the company getting 
potential lenders to raise money, the floating charge can also be a potential source of 
                                                          
125 See 11 U.S.C, s 552 of the Bankruptcy Code There are however exceptions to this. See 11 U.S.C., s 
552(b) (1)-(2) for list of exceptions. 
126 G McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and Corporate Rescue’ [2007] JBL 701-732. 
127 L Gullifer & J Payne, ‘The Characterization of Fixed and Floating Charges in J Getzler & J Payne (eds) 
Company Charges Spectrum and Beyond (OUP 2006) at p61. 
128 See section 3.2.3 of the thesis for discussion the various financing options available under section 364. 
129 See 11 U.S.C, s 364(c) & (d).  
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funding corporate rescues. The Insolvency Act gives the administrator the carte blanche to 
deal with floating charge assets for the benefit of the company.130 This in effect means that 
all floating charge assets are within the sole control of the administrator. The significance 
of this is that, while a creditor maintains his interest in the fixed charge due to the 
restrictions on the ability of an administrator to wilfully trade off secured assets without 
leave of the court,131 the administrator can make use of funds or assets resulting from the 
floating charge to continue to run the business during administration proceedings.132 The 
Insolvency Act does provide some protection for the floating charge holder by requiring 
that the floating charge holder shall have the same priority in respect of acquired property 
of the company which directly or indirectly represents the property disposed of.133 
Floating charge assets especially book debts, may be crucial to the administrator’s ability 
to successful run the business during corporate rescue unless he has access to other external 
sources of funding, which may be difficult or expensive to find.134 The Review Group, of 
the former Department of Trade and Industry and HM Treasury in its report published in 
2000, recognised this by suggesting that a statutory reversal of the decision in Siebe 
Gorman135  could be achieved by doing away with the fixed charge on the class of a 
company’s present and future book debts.136 The group said this would mean that at the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings, all the book debts due to a company and any 
                                                          
130 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 70. 
131 Ibid, Sch B1, para 70-72; where the administrator disposes of assets subject to a fixed charge without the 
permission of the court, he is liable to be sued personally in tort for conversion, see Hachette UK Ltd v 
Borders(UK) Ltd [2009] EWHC 3487 (Ch). However there are exceptions where an administrator can 
dispose of secured assets. The court would approve such disposal if it considers that disposal will serve the 
purpose of the administration, see Sch B1, para 71(2) (b), 72(2)(b). Nevertheless, the priority of secured 
creditors is still preserved as regards the proceeds of such disposals which must be turned over to the 
secured creditor. 
132 This is analysed in section 3.5 of the thesis. 
133 Insolvency Act Sch B1, para 70(2)-(3). 
134 L Guillifer & J Payne (n 127). 
135 See p158-159 of the thesis for the discussion on Siebe Gorman case. 
136 Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanism, Report by 
the Review Group’ (DTI, 2000) (“Review Report”) at para 134. 
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arising thereafter would be available to finance continued trading.137 The Review Group 
added that crystallising the fixed charge on book debts could possibly be an efficient way 
of ensuring that additional finance is available for financing company rescues. This is 
because crystallization would function as a means of identifying the book debts that were 
subject to a fixed charge security138 so that book debts arising after this can be channelled 
towards funding the rescue process. 
Another alternative could be the arrangement suggested by the City of London Law 
Society. The Society acknowledged the possibility of funding the administration process 
out of assets subject to security in its consultation on secured transactions.139 The City of 
London Society was of the view that to some degree administrations will need to be funded 
out of secured assets; however the difficulty in relying on this source of funding lay in the 
identification of what those assets should be.140 The Society came up with at least three 
possible ways to ascertain what portion or class of the debtor’s assets can be used to fund 
administrations and these are;141 
 Clarifying the distinction between fixed and floating charges (especially as it relates 
to areas not covered by existing case law or where court decisions have introduced 
ambiguity). 
 Identifying specific classes of assets which would be available to the administrator. 
 Allowing the administrators to use a percentage of all of the company’s charged 
assets up to a fixed limit.   
The option of allowing the administrator to use a percentage of the company’s charged 
assets would mirror the priming lien found in the US and Canada which allows the debtor 
                                                          
137 This has effectively now been done as a result of the decision in Spectrum Plus. 
138 Review Report (n 136) at 133 & 134.  
139 The City of London Discussion Paper (n 66). 
140 Ibid., at para 4.22.  
141 Ibid., at para 4.23. 
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create another security interest in a charged property.142 There is some advantage to be 
gained from this, because giving the administrator powers to create another security interest 
in a charged property would open up an alternative for companies whose assets are fully 
charged, to raise funds. However it is debateable if this can take root in the UK without 
some measure of protection143 for the pre-existing security holder as UK is a jurisdiction 
that upholds the interest of the creditor above others. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The issue of security interests and corporate rescue are closely related, as the presence or 
absence of one (security) may determine the success or failure of the other (corporate 
rescue). To successfully achieve a rescue, a debtor company may need to have access to 
ready cash. One way of doing this will be to rely on company assets to raise these funds. In 
Canada and the US, there are clear provisions in the Bankruptcy Code and CCAA 
respectively, enabling the debtor to raise funds. The absence or presence of leveraged assets 
does not stand in the way of the debtor’s ability to raise funds because of the presence of 
concepts like priming liens. In this, the two jurisdictions clearly stand apart from the UK.  
Arguably, the lending structures in these jurisdictions (the US and Canada) facilitate the 
provision of funding as there are no floating securities to crystallise upon insolvency and 
this may or may not leave the debtor with some free assets which can then be used to fund 
the rescue process. A good argument can however be made on behalf of the English 
                                                          
142 See section 3.2.3(US) and section 3.3.5 (Canada) of the thesis. 
143 In the US, the Bankruptcy Code provides that where an existing lien is primed, the debtor company must 
adequately protect the pre-existing lien holder. See p87-88 of the thesis for discussion on the US position on 
adequate protection. This is in contrast to Canada which does not offer any protection, but requires that the 
court in approving a priming lien takes into consideration whether a creditor would be “materially 
prejudiced” as a result of approving the charge. 
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jurisdiction that the presence of the floating charge assets is not an impediment to rescue 
operations in the UK; rather it aids the administrator in raising funds for rescue procedures 
as the administrator has powers under the Insolvency Act 1986 to dispose of floating charge 
assets as if it was not the subject of a charge. Arguably, floating charge assets provide a 
convenient means for funding the rescue process and until statutory alternatives are found, 
it may provide a useful avenue for funding rescues 
On the other hand, the recommendations made by the City of London Law Society suggest 
that administrators should be given more powers to be able to use charged (secured) assets 
to raise rescue finance. This would bring the UK in line with the US and Canada where 
rescue funding can be raised from charged assets by way of priming liens.  
On the whole, each jurisdiction has its own distinct lending practice which is supported by 
enabling laws which gave rise to them. The security interests created within these three 
jurisdictions by their individual lending practices confer rights which are attached to the 
debtor’s assets, on creditors. A debtor’s insolvency in more ways than one impacts on these 
rights. For example the secured creditor’s right to enforce his security is waived when a 
debtor enters into any of the formal rescue procedures available under US Chapter 11, the 
CCAA and the Insolvency Act 1986. Conversely, some rights are acquired by creditors at 
the point of the debtor’s insolvency e.g. the right of a creditor to place a debtor in any of 
the rescue proceeding or even liquidation. Selected aspects of creditors’ rights are explored 
in the succeeding chapter. 
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Chapter V:  Selected aspects of creditors’ rights and participation in the 
corporate rescue process 
 
Introduction 
 Insolvency proceedings bring a suspension of many of the entitlements of creditors to 
enforce their claims. This suspension is necessary in the collective interest of all creditors; 
however creditor interest should not be unduly exploited. Arguably, in order to give 
purpose to insolvency legislation as it relates to corporate rescue, a balance has to be 
achieved between ensuring the success of the rescue process and mitigating any impact the 
process may have on creditors’ rights. Therefore, creditors may have to adjust some of their 
rights for the overall success of the rescue. 
Challenges to creditors’ rights during corporate rescue can be seen from the time when the 
debtor signifies an intention to commence any of the rescue processes1 to the time when a 
plan is put in place. It is acknowledged that in order to ensure the successful rescue of a 
distressed company, an enabling environment which facilitates the rescue needs to be 
created. Concepts such as DIP/rescue/interim financing and statute-backed mechanisms 
which suspend creditors’ rights to enforcement of their security make this possible. 
However these mechanisms pose some challenges to the rights that creditors would 
otherwise enjoy. 
On the other hand, the important interest of creditors can be seen to give rise to various 
entitlements in the rescue process and this extends from the initial proposal of a plan of 
reorganization to funding the rescue process. Arguably, without their vital support rescue 
may be an unattainable goal. This is because a debtor company which has securitized most 
                                                          
1 This is in relation to the interim moratorium put in place when an application to court is made for an 
administration order. 
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of its available assets2 and is without cash to continue in business while it is devising a 
reorganization plan, may find that liquidation may be the only option left to it without the 
support of creditors. Support from creditors can come in the form of agreeing to 
compromise their claims and/ or being a source of rescue funding for the debtor company. 
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to analyse the inter-relationship between creditors’ 
rights and the corporate rescue process. The first part of this chapter will focus on 
identifying the role of creditors during corporate rescue; this will be followed by an analysis 
of mechanisms such as the “moratorium”, “automatic stay” and “cram down” which are 
used to restrict the rights of creditors during the rescue process. An evaluation of the impact 
of rescue funding on creditors’ rights and a consideration of its inter-relationship with the 
ranking of creditors’ claims will also be undertaken, followed by a conclusion. 
  
5.1   The role of creditors in corporate rescue 
 
5.1.1 Canada 
 
Under the CCAA, a debtor company proposes to its creditors a compromise or arrangement 
with the intention of achieving a rescue/reorganization of its affairs.3 For this purpose 
creditors are typically divided into two main classes; unsecured4 and secured.5 The legal 
rights held by claimants determine the class within which the various claimants are 
grouped.6 As such, creditors with similar claims are classed together as a group. A court 
order is then sought for the purpose of calling a creditors meeting to approve the plan. 
Under the CCAA, creditors do not have an inherent right to a meeting or to put forward a 
                                                          
2 See generally L R Lupica, ‘Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic’ 
(2001) 9 A.B.I .L. Rev. 287 at 291. 
3 See generally CCAA 1985, s 4. 
4 Ibid, s 4.  
5 Ibid, s 5. 
6 San Francisco Gifts Ltd. (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 92 (Atla. Q.B.).  
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proposal, what is available to creditors is a right to seek a court order, to call for a creditors’ 
meeting.7 Once a meeting has been called and in deciding whether to approve a plan, each 
class of creditors will evaluate what they are being offered in comparison to what they 
could obtain in liquidation.8 If a majority in number representing two thirds in value of the 
creditors, present or voting by proxy at the meeting approve the plan, and the court then 
sanctions the plan,9 the plan becomes binding on all creditors.10 This therefore means that 
all dissenting creditors’ rights, which can make up a minority of up to one third, will be 
compromised and those creditors will be bound by the terms of the plan as sanctioned by 
the court. Once a plan has been approved by the requisite majority it may permanently 
modify the contractual rights of creditors who dissented.11 
Whilst the underlying theme of the CCAA is to assist financially distressed companies to 
come to a sort of compromise or arrangement with their creditors with the aim of returning 
to profitability,12 under the CCAA, the rights of creditors may only be comprised in the 
following circumstances;13 
                                                          
7 Although this order is generally sought by the debtor, see CCAA 1985, ss 4 & 5. See also Canadian Red 
Cross Society (Re) (1998) 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J.). It is interesting to note that under the PPSA, a 
creditor can appoint a private receiver who functions very much like the old English administrative 
receiver. The disadvantage of a privately appointed receiver is the lack of protection from the court as his 
appointment does not come with an automatic stay and other creditors can bring enforcement proceedings, 
see PPSA 1990, s 60. The alternative would be to seek the appointment of a court ordered receiver by virtue 
of s 46 or s 47 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and this comes with an automatic stay.  
8 R J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Irwin Law 2009). 
9 CCAA 1985, s 6(1). The CCAA does not identify any factor the court must consider before sanctioning 
the plan. Nevertheless, it has been established through case laws that the court must ensure that the plan is 
reasonable and fair, all legal requirements have been fulfilled and it is in the best interests of the creditors. 
10 Ibid, s 6(1) (a). 
11 See Re Smoky River Coal Ltd (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 94 (Atla. C.A.). On the other hand, the courts have 
held that if a creditor belongs to two different classes for the purpose of approving a plan and the plan is 
approved in one class while being rejected in another class, the creditor is not bound with respect to his 
claim which falls into the class that voted against the plan. See Olympia &York Development Ltd [1995], 34 
C.B.R. (3d) 93, 1995 Carswell Ont 340 (Ont.Gen.Div.). 
12 CCAA 1985, s 1. 
13 LW Houlden & GB Morawetz, ‘Houlden & Morawetz Bankruptcy and Insolvency analysis. Introduction 
to the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act’ (2008) HMANALY N1. 
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 Where the creditor has exercised his right to vote in the appropriate class on a 
proposed rescue plan; 
 Where the creditor’s votes are in conformity with the value of a claim approved by 
a court procedure; 
 Where the creditor has been placed in the appropriate class which voted by a 
majority in number and two-thirds in value in favour of the plan; and 
 Where the court, in consideration of the creditors’ votes, has approved the plan as 
being fair and reasonable.14 
Undoubtedly creditors are important to the rehabilitation of a debtor company as, without 
their approval to have their rights to payment or security compromised, the debtor cannot 
proceed with saving its business or the company as a whole. In most cases creditors would 
be reluctant to give their approval where they feel they are not getting enough in return for 
compromising their claims. In a situation such as this, courts will be reluctant to approve a 
plan if creditors have rejected it. 
 
5.1.2 US  
 
When it comes to steering the rescue process under Chapter 11, the debtor company plays 
a major role and this can be seen in the exclusive right initially granted to the debtor under 
the Code to propose a reorganization plan.15 The proposal is usually expected to take place 
within the first one hundred and twenty (120) days of filing a Chapter 11 petition.16 The 
                                                          
14Menegon v Philip Services Corp. [1999]11 C.B.R (4th) 262, 1999 Carswell Ont 3240 
(Ont.S.C.J.)[Commercial list]. 
15 11 U.S.C 1994, s 1121(c) (3).  
16 Ibid, s 1121(b)(2). 
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Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor to obtain a further extension of this period to no more 
than eighteen months after the initial filing of a Chapter 11 petition.17 Where the debtor 
fails to propose or file a plan within this time scale, it loses its exclusivity to commence a 
Chapter 11 procedure and a creditor is then allowed to file a plan18 to commence the rescue 
of the company. 
For the purpose of approving the reorganization plan and getting the court’s endorsement 
of the debtor company’s reorganization plans, creditors are categorized into classes of 
substantially similar claims.19 This is so that each class of creditors may vote for or against 
the debtor company’s reorganization plans. Creditors’ votes play a very important role in 
facilitating the debtor’s reorganization. The Chapter 11 Creditors’ voting procedure does 
appear somewhat complex when compared with those applicable in the UK and Canada. 
Under a Chapter 11 reorganization, an entire class of creditors is deemed to accept a plan 
if at least two-thirds in value and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims within 
the class vote to approve the plan.20  
Conversely, where there are impaired classes of claims, the reorganization plan will not be 
endorsed by the court unless it has been accepted by at least one class of impaired 
creditors.21 Impaired creditors are those creditors who do not stand to receive the full value 
of their claim because they have had their legal rights against the debtor company changed 
by the reorganization plan.22 The minimum requirement for the endorsement of a Chapter 
11 plan is that at least one class of impaired creditors votes to accept the plan.23 
                                                          
17 Ibid, s 1121(d)(2)(a). 
18 Ibid., s 1121(c). 
19 Ibid, s 1122 & s 1123(a). 
20 Ibid, s 1126(c). 
21 Ibid, s 1129(a). 
22 see 11 U.S.C s 1124 
23 Ibid, s 1129(a) (10). 
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It does appear logical to have a clause that makes it imperative for impaired creditors to 
approve a plan before a court can endorse it. If a creditor’s right is to be altered he should 
be given a say in how this is done, especially where the creditor’s claim would be manifestly 
affected by the debtor’s plan.  
 At first glance, it appears that creditors under Chapter 11 do wield a very influential stick 
post-insolvency/pre-reorganization, 24  through their voting rights. This however is not 
strictly the case. Under Chapter 11, courts in specific circumstances have the power to 
“cram down” objecting creditors who are in opposition to the plan, thus forcing the 
creditors into accepting the plan. However, as will be discussed below in section 5.2.3.1 of 
the thesis, at least one class of impaired creditors must be among the accepting creditors 
otherwise the courts cannot “cram down”. 
 
5.1.3 UK 
 
One philosophy that may be identified behind the UK corporate rescue structure, 
particularly the administration process, which acts as a conduit for some of the rescue 
mechanisms to be found in the UK,25 is that, where possible, there should be minimal 
interference with secured creditors’ rights.26 A close study of the purpose of administration 
as advanced by the Insolvency Act 198627 illustrates this philosophy. On the whole, the 
interests of creditors are paramount and an administrator must place these interests above 
                                                          
24 This distinction is made to demarcate the variety of influence creditors wield during corporate rescue. 
While it appears that Chapter 11 creditors get the short end of the stick, they have been able to, through the 
provision of debtor-in-possession funds sway the control of the corporate rescue process to their side as will 
be seen later in the chapter. 
25 Such as the company voluntary arrangement (CVA) and scheme of arrangement, see also p 33-34 for 
explanation of the administration procedure. 
26 R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) p 329 at 10-23. 
27 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 Para. 43. 
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others.28 The debates in the House of Lords prior to the enactment of the Enterprise Act 
2002 formed the context of this duty placed on the administrator.  
During the debates, Lord McIntosh, a labour party peer was of the view that an 
administrator should not rescue a company if it is to the detriment of creditor value.29 
Consequently, Schedule B1, section 3(1) (b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 enjoins the 
administrator to achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would 
be likely if the company was liquidated without first being administration. This duty on the 
administrator is further augmented by the overall obligation placed on the administrator of 
a company to perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole.30  
It therefore comes as no surprise that an administrator can in some circumstances, be 
appointed by or at the behest of creditors in the UK. There are two routes by which creditors 
can appoint an administrator; out of court appointments (i.e. without a court order) and 
court ordered appointments. Powers to appoint an administrator out of court are however 
restricted to creditors who are qualifying floating charge holders.31 This is in contrast to the 
procedure for court ordered appointments which permits any one or more creditors of the 
company to petition the court to appoint an administrator.32 Once an administrator has been 
appointed, a proposal for achieving the aims of the administration is prepared by the 
administrator and a copy is sent to the Registrar of Companies, every creditor and member33 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 HL Deb 29 July 2002, vol 638 cc 763-806 at 765. 
30 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch B1 s 3(2). This provision is subject to the administrator performing his 
functions as quickly and efficiently as reasonably practicable, see Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 s 4. 
31 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 14(1) & (2). A qualifying charge is one created by an instrument 
which (i) states that para 14 of Sch B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 applies to the floating charge (ii) aims to 
empower the holder of the floating charge to appoint an administrator of the company or (iii) aims to 
empower the holder of the floating charge to make an appointment which would be the appointment of an 
administrative receiver within the meaning of s 29(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986. See also p159 of the 
thesis which discusses reforms by the Enterprise Act 2002 to floating charge. 
32 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 12(1)(c). 
33 Ibid, Sch B1 para 49(4). 
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as soon as is reasonably practicable34 or within a maximum of eight weeks35 after the 
company has entered into administration. At this point the administrator calls the initial 
creditors’ meeting36 at which he presents the proposal to the creditors.37 
At the meeting, the creditors deliberate on the proposal and either approve or modify the 
proposal.38 Where the aim of the administration is to act as a conduit for corporate rescue, 
the proposal may incorporate a proposal for a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) 
under Part 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 or a scheme of arrangement under section 895 
Companies Act 2006.39 It is the administrator’s duty to prepare and present a proposal to 
creditors, and the proposal cannot be modified by the creditors without his consent, 
however the proposal may not include any act which would interfere with the right of a 
secured creditor or would amount to one preferential creditor getting a smaller return on 
his debt than another preferential creditor.40 However where the creditor consents to such 
modification or the proposal includes a scheme of arrangement, then such alteration of the 
creditor’s rights would be permitted.41 
Voting to approve an administrator’s plan is an important part of the rescue process and it 
is in this area that the creditor’s influence can be felt. A creditor who is entitled to vote can 
use his vote to influence the direction that the rescue process takes.42 His vote43 is one of 
the deciding factors that determine if a debtor company goes ahead with its rescue plans. 
                                                          
34 Ibid, Sch B1 para 49(5)(a). 
35 Ibid, Sch B1 para 49(5)(b). 
36 Ibid, Sch B1 para 51(1). 
37 Where it is a pre-pack administration, these procedures are significantly eroded as the sale of the 
company is negotiated before the appointment of an administrator who concludes the sale shortly after his 
appointment and presents the pre-pack sale to the creditors’ meeting.  
38 Ibid. Sch B1 para 53. Any modification to the proposal must be done with the consent of the 
administrator. See para 53(1) (b). 
39 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 49(3). 
40 Ibid, Sch B1 para 73(1)(a)&(c). 
41 Ibid, Sch B1 para 73(2)(a)-(c). 
42 Goode (n 26) p 393 at 10-120. 
43 And that of members in the case of CVA, see Insolvency Rules 1986, r.1.20 (1). However it is 
permissible for a decision approving the administrator’s plan to be made by only the creditors’ meeting and 
this is subject to an order of court made under s 4A(2)(b) Insolvency Act. 
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Generally, at the creditors’ meeting a majority vote by the creditors is required for a 
resolution approving the proposal to be passed in support of the debtor company’s rescue. 
The required majority is dependent on the rescue mechanism contained in the proposal and 
this could either be a CVA or a scheme of arrangement.44 For ease of analysis, the thesis 
will focus on the CVA. 
Where the administration order is in conjunction with a CVA, creditors voting in the 
creditors’ meeting must vote to approve the terms of the CVA in a majority exceeding 
three-quarters in value of the creditors voting in person or by proxy.45 All creditors entitled 
to vote,46 voting to pass a resolution approving the administrator’s proposal are bound by 
their votes,47 even where a creditor is entitled to vote and did not receive notice of the 
meeting or received notice but chose not to attend or to vote by proxy, he is bound by the 
decision of the other creditors entitled to vote. 48  Therefore once a CVA has been 
approved,49 it binds creditors who voted in its favour, creditors who attended the creditors’ 
meeting but did not vote, creditors who were entitled to vote but did not attend the meeting 
and creditors who were not given notice of the creditors’ meeting, even though they were 
entitled to be notified. 50  The effect of an approved CVA is such that it also binds dissenting 
creditors who voted against it.51 On the other hand, a creditor not entitled to vote is not 
bound by the by the CVA52 but may have his right to obtain any leave required to enforce 
his claim affected by the terms of the CVA.53 
                                                          
44 Under the scheme of arrangement, the approval of at least 75% in value of each class of the members or 
creditors, also being a majority in number in each class is required. See Companies Act 2006, s 899(1). 
45 Insolvency Rules 1986, r.1.19 (2). 
46 Those who have filed a claim. 
47 Insolvency Act 1986, s 5 (2) (b). 
48 Ibid. 
49 See n 43 for requirement for the approval of a CVA. 
50 Insolvency Act 1986, s 5 (2) (b). 
51 It should be noted that secured and preferential creditors cannot be bound without their consent; therefore 
this rule is not applicable to them, see Insolvency Act 1986, s 4(3) & (4). 
52 Insolvency Act 1986, s 5 (2) (b). 
53 Goode (n 26) p 400 at 10-127. Generally CVAs do not alter the rights of secured creditors. However 
where the creditor is an unsecured creditor, the court may be reluctant to grant him leave to pursue his claim 
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Whilst it does appear that once a CVA has been approved creditors entitled to vote are 
bound by the CVA, provisions have been made by the law to allow creditors to challenge 
the CVA on grounds of unfair prejudice or material irregularity in relation to the creditors’ 
meeting.54A creditor who wishes to challenge the CVA must make an application to the 
court within twenty-eight (28) days of the court receiving the report on the CVA, from the 
nominee appointed for the purpose of supervising the implementation of the CVA.55 The 
court can revoke or suspend any decision made by the meeting and/or direct that further 
meetings be held where it is satisfied that the creditor had sufficient grounds to challenge 
the CVA.56 
 
5.2  Analysis of mechanisms that impede creditors’ rights to enforce 
security 
 
The main objective of most corporate rescue mechanisms is to save the company or its 
business. However it is expected that the position of creditors should not be worsened and 
as a result of this process, the creditor is expected to obtain more than they would have 
received in liquidation.57 Creditors are therefore asked to support the rescue proposal. The 
success of a company’s rescue depends on a variety of factors and the debtor company’s 
ability to guard against a race by creditors to realise their securities and strip the debtor of 
a possible means of financing the rescue process, is an important factor. In recognition of 
                                                          
without reference to the terms of the CVA, because if the creditor pursues his claim to judgment and is 
allowed to enforce the judgment without reference to the CVA, he may be placed in a more advantageous 
position at the expense of the general body of creditors. See also Re TBL Realisations Ltd, Oakley-Smith v 
Greenberg [2004] B.C.C. 81. 
54Insolvency Act 1986, s 6(1)(2). 
55 Ibid, s 6(3). 
56 Ibid, s 6(4). 
57 See G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law- an Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar 2008) p3-6. 
Liquidation of a company results in the cessation of business, sale of the company’s assets and proceeds 
from the sale is then used to settle its debts and liabilities, after which, the company ceases to exist. 
Corporate rescue on the other hand is aimed at enabling the survival of a company as a whole or parts of it. 
The principle behind rescue mechanisms is that a business may be worth more if preserved or sold off as a 
going concern than if sold on piecemeal basis as the case would be in liquidation. 
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the importance of providing a more conducive environment for potential rescue to take 
place, a lot of jurisdictions have made provisions for a restriction of creditors’ rights during 
the rescue process58 especially as it relates to the enforcement of their claims. 
 To achieve an effective rescue of a company or its business, creditors’ rights are often 
compromised and one notable example is the stay on a creditor’s ability to enforce his 
security or to demand repayment from the debtor. The suspension of a creditor’s right of 
enforcement is an important aspect of the process of ensuring that the debtor is given all 
available opportunities, where feasible, to explore all avenues for rescue. This can only be 
effectively done when the debtor is given a reprieve from creditors’ demands, which, if 
yielded to, may sound the death knell for the debtor. UNCITRAL has also recognised the 
need for debtors to be protected from the immediate demands of creditors when a company 
is facing insolvency and wishes to reorganize its affairs. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
on Insolvency Law proposes that a company rescue can be funded from the debtor 
company’s existing cash flow through the operation of a stay and the termination of 
payments on pre-commencement liabilities.59 
In the UK, US and Canada, insolvency legislations have in place measures which check 
creditors’ ability to strip the debtor of assets through the enforcement of securities, or, 
where applicable, act to postpone demands for payment. In essence the debtor is provided 
with a statute-backed protective shield which restricts creditors’ rights to enforce security 
or make demands on the assets of the debtor company. This restriction lasts for a fixed 
timescale or the duration of the rescue process and this insulates the debtor company from 
                                                          
58 For example German Insolvency Code 1994, s 89 and France which gives management opportunity to 
apply for a stay where creditors attempt to enforce claims. 
59 UNCITRAL Guide at 114. 
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creditors’ demands. Two arguments have been put forward which underline the overall 
benefit to creditors of having a protective shield in place.  
The utilitarians argue that to permit a frantic free-for-all grab of the debtor company’s assets 
to occur at a time when it is apparent that the debtor company cannot meet its obligations, 
is not in the interests of the general body of creditors.60 Their argument is founded on the 
utilitarian philosophy that accepts the ‘rightness’ of an action when it contributes to general 
happiness, to the greatest number of people.61 Therefore the presence of a stay, which 
interferes with creditors’ rights, sometimes to the detriment of a few, is viewed as the right 
action to take because, in the final analysis, the presence of a stay is justified by potentially 
higher returns to creditors than would perhaps have been the case without the stay. To this 
end, having a protective shield in place to preserve the debtor’s assets for the general body 
of creditors should not be viewed solely as an infringement of the rights of a few affected 
creditors.  
Collectivists proffer an argument which is not entirely different from the utilitarian 
argument; they argue that a well-ordered determination of the various claims from creditors 
may result in the most cost-effective outcome.62 Their argument is based on the premise 
that bankruptcy provides a collective mechanism for unscrambling rights and liabilities that 
has its origin outside of bankruptcy. Also, a collective distribution is in the interests of the 
body of creditors because it prevents the pool of assets from shrinking when a debtor 
becomes insolvent.63 In other words, individual claims should be subject to the overall goal 
of making distributions to creditors under the collective scheme and this may only be 
                                                          
60 D Milman, ‘Moratoria in UK Insolvency Law: Policy and Practical Implications’ [2012] Co. L.N. 317, 1-
4. 
61 LB Curzon, Jurisprudence (Macdonald & Evans, Plymouth, 1979) p93-94. 
62 Milman (n 60). 
63 T H Jackson, ‘Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum’ in J S Bhandari and L A 
Weiss (eds), Corporate bankruptcy, economic and legal perspectives (Cambridge University Press 1999) 
p59. 
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effective with a stay in place to prevent a diminution in returns to the general body of 
creditors. Accordingly, it becomes imperative that the collective desire of the group is put 
before individual claims, so that distribution to creditors is then done efficiently.  
The utilitarian and collectivist arguments emphasize the underlying tenet of corporate 
rescue, which is the creation of a framework within which a debtor could resolve his 
financial difficulties. This framework acts as a collective medium through which the debtor 
reaches a compromise with his creditors. One the other hand, it has been stated that while 
bankruptcy laws should collectivize the distribution of assets among creditors in fulfilment 
of rights created by non-bankruptcy law, it should not modify or nullify these rights and 
duties except where it is necessary to facilitate collective distribution.64 
 
5.2.1 The UK moratorium 
 
In the UK, the administration procedure is designed to give the debtor a framework within 
which to achieve a rescue, and this is enhanced by the presence of a statutory moratorium 
which prevents creditors from enforcing their rights against the debtor without prior 
authorization. This limitation placed on the rights of creditors, especially secured creditors 
who, in the ordinary course of corporate dealings, should be able to rely on their security 
as buffer against perceived losses, is given legislative backing in the Insolvency Act 1986 
under paragraph 43, Schedule B1. The effect of this piece of legislation is such that, once 
a debtor company enters into administration, creditors are barred from pursuing claims 
against the debtor and all the creditors’ rights of enforcement are frozen by the automatic 
presence of a statutory moratorium.65 The moratorium provides the debtor with breathing 
                                                          
64 Ibid at p72. 
65 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 42-44. 
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space in which to reorganize its affairs without interference from its creditors who may 
want to enforce security. The effect of the moratorium is absolute and covers all rights 
including the commencement of an alternative insolvency proceeding.66 
The effect of the moratorium is intended to be comprehensive in nature;67 nevertheless its 
effect can be lifted with either the prior consent of the administrator or the court.68 Although 
the 1986 Act has not made clear the conditions under which the court may lift the effect of 
a moratorium and grant leave to a creditor to enforce security, a set of guidelines has been 
established by the Court of Appeal in Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc.69 What the law 
aims to do with the moratorium is to suspend creditors’ rights of enforcement and not to 
alter their substantive rights.70 Consequently, whatever rights a creditor had prior to an 
administration order are left unchanged by the effect of a moratorium. 
The main objective of administration is the rescue of the company as a going concern and 
where this is not feasible, the second objective is resorted to; that is, the achievement of 
better results for creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company was immediately 
liquidated. Where these two objectives are not practicable, the administrator is enjoined to 
realise property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential 
                                                          
66 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 42(3). 
67 When a moratorium is in place, no resolution may be passed or order made for the liquidation of a 
company which is in administration, except under s 124B (SEs), s 124A (public interests) and s 367 of the 
Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (petition by Financial Services Authority), see Insolvency Act 
1986, Sch B1 para 42. Also, when a moratorium is in place, no action may be taken to enforce security over 
the company’s property except with the consent of the administrator, or with the permission of the court, 
see Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 43(2). It also bars the appointment of an administrative receiver, see 
Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1para 43(6A). 
68 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 42(2). Note that it is possible to obtain a retrospective consent from the 
court or administrator, see Bank of Ireland (UK) plc. v Colliers International UK plc. [2012] EWHC 2942 
(Ch). 
69 [1992] Ch 505 at 542-544. Nicholls L.J listed eleven guidelines which the court may take into 
consideration before granting leave to enforce security and they include but are not restricted to; (a) the 
party seeking leave of court to lift stay must prove his case. (b) If granting leave to a lessor of land or a 
lessor of goods to exercise his right is unlikely to interfere with the achievement of the purpose of the 
administration, leave would be given. (c) Where significant loss will occur, the court is more likely to lift 
the stay.  (d) Conduct of the parties.  (e) The financial position of the company etc. On the whole, moratoria 
are lifted where the proprietary rights of a creditor is at stake and not a personal claim. In other words, it is 
done to protect proprietary claims. 
70 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v SIBEC Developments Ltd [1993] BCLC 1077. 
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creditors.71 In most cases it is the second purpose that is achieved. Where it is possible to 
save the company as a going concern or a substantial part of its business, continuing finance 
is pivotal to this happening72 and one of the possible sources of finance for any company 
going through the rescue process are its available assets.73  
Consequently it is important that the administrator has access to the debtor’s assets without 
interference from creditors.74 Either way, for the administrator to effectively carry out the 
purpose of an administration order, whether it is the survival of the company as a going 
concern or making returns to creditors, it is essential that creditors’ rights to enforce their 
security are placed on hold so that assets which could be used to raise funds to continue the 
business as a going concern are not eroded, or where the second purpose of the 
administration is pursued, an equitable distribution is then achieved for the general body of 
creditors. The UK moratorium plays an important role in ensuring that the purpose of 
administration is achieved by the administrator.  
Consequently, it appears that in order to get returns from the debtor, creditors are expected 
to concede some of their rights to the debtor; however this is done in the collective interest 
of the body of creditors. Although it appears that creditors are deprived of their fundamental 
rights of enforcement, it has been held that the presence of a moratorium does not affect 
the fundamental rights of the creditors, but restricts the exercise of these rights.75 The 
implication of this therefore, is that, whilst creditors retain the rights to their security, the 
                                                          
71 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para.3. 
72 See section 3.1 of this thesis for discussion on the importance of corporate rescue in general.  
73 In most cases, these assets are fully encumbered and do not provide any source of finance for the debtor. 
In the US and Canada both of which allow priming liens, this may not be a problem.  In the UK, priming 
liens are not part of the insolvency process; however, assets subject to a floating charge can be disposed of 
by the administrator thereby providing a source of finance, see Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 70(1). It 
should be noted that where a floating charge asset is disposed of in reliance of para 70(1), the floating 
charge holder retains his priority, see Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 70(2). 
74 Bristol Airport v Powdrill [1990] Ch 744 at 758-759. 
75 Barclays Mercantile Business supra (n 70). 
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inherent automatic entitlement to exercise that right is suspended by the presence of a 
moratorium.  
 
5.2.2 Interim stay in Canada 
 
A debtor making an initial application under the CCAA is afforded some protection under 
section 11.02(a)-(b). The Act authorizes the court to make an order 76  suspending all 
proceedings, action or suits against the debtor for an initial period of thirty (30) days thereby 
giving the debtor respite from creditors’ claims and an opportunity to come up with a rescue 
plan.77 In effect, a creditor’s right to make demands on the debtor is put on hold while the 
status quo is maintained. The stay suspending creditors’ claims or actions against the debtor 
does not automatically come into operation on the filing of a CCAA petition by the debtor, 
the court has to make an order before a stay can take effect.78 Generally, the application of 
the stay is more challenging for secured creditors whose rights to the seizure and realisation 
of specific assets for their recovery, are directly curtailed by the presence of the stay.79 
Whilst the purpose of the stay is to preserve things the way they are, it is also aimed at 
enabling the successful rescue of the debtor company.80 
In addition to this, the stay checks any undue advantage which any creditor may attempt to 
get or gain over the other creditors while debtor tries to restructure its affairs.81 It has been 
suggested that the purpose and effect of the stay is to re-balance the negotiating power 
between the debtor and the creditors.82 Debtor companies are afforded a level playing field 
                                                          
76 This order to stay proceedings is usually granted at the same time an order is granted to commence a 
CCAA proceeding. 
77 Sairex GmbH v Prudential Steel Ltd [1991] 8 C.B.R (3d) 62, 1991 Carswell Ont 215(Ont.Gen.Div.). 
78 See CCAA 1985, s 11.02. 
79 K P McElcheran, Commercial Insolvency in Canada (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2011) at 7-10 
80 Re Stelco Inc. [2005] 2005 CarswellOnt 6283, 15 C.B.R. (5TH) 288 (Ont. C.A.) 
81 Re Woodward’s Ltd [1993] 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236, 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257, 1993 CarswellBC 530 (S.C). 
82 J Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Thomson Carswell 2007) p33. 
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in which to negotiate with their creditors, since the power of creditors to enforce claims 
which if unchecked would inevitably drive the debtor into liquidation, is temporarily 
curtailed. On the other hand, it can be argued that the re-balancing of negotiating powers 
interferes with the legal rights of creditors, particularly those rights acquired prior to 
insolvency in heavily negotiated security agreements and commercial documents.83 
Although the initial stay is intended to last for a period of thirty days,84 the debtor can bring 
an application to have the stay extended for a further period; the length of the subsequent 
stay is usually at the discretion of the court.85 It has been held by the courts that a stay 
would only be ordered where there is a good possibility that the debtor company can carry 
on its business as a going concern.86 Attention must be drawn to the fact that although the 
stay order provided for under the CCAA is aimed at creating an enabling environment for 
rescue, by suspending all actions which may interfere with the rescue of the debtor; the stay 
order is not all embracing.  
Unlike secured creditors, who often endure the full effect of a stay87 under section 11.01 of 
the CCAA, the rights of suppliers are exempted from the effect of the stay. The section 
provides that where a person supplies goods or services after an order has been made by 
the court regarding the debtor, any such order or a section 11.02 stay order cannot prohibit 
that person (the supplier) from making demands for immediate payment for such goods and 
services or prevent him from the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable 
consideration88 or prevent the requirement for further advance of money or credit.89  
                                                          
83 McElcheran (n 79) p8. 
84 CCAA 1985, s 11.02. 
85 Ibid, s 11.02(2)(a). 
86 Re Stephanie’s Fashions Ltd [1990] 1 C.B.R.(3d) 248, 1990 CarswellBC 373 (B.C.S.C.). 
87 A stay has a more direct effect and limits the rights of secured creditors who would want to rely on their 
right to seizure of certain assets as a means to recoup. 
88 CCAA 1985, s 11.01(a.) 
89 Ibid, s 11.01(b).  
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It would seem that any supply or provision of credit post-insolvency and during the rescue 
period is exempt from the effect of the stay. Therefore it appears that the debtor’s entry into 
insolvency is the cut-off point, thus any claims arising from supply made prior to this time 
would be affected by the stay. The implication of this provision appears to reiterate the 
emphasis that Canada places on suppliers as important elements in ensuring the successful 
rescue of the debtor. More examples of how highly rated suppliers are, can be found in the 
interim/rescue financing provisions found in the CCAA.90 Arguably, a supplier who is 
willing to maintain a business relationship with a debtor company by ensuring that critical 
lines of supply are left open, should be given the option of demanding advance or 
immediate payment from the debtor without interference. Without this protection, the 
rescue would be effectively carried out at the expense of the supplier. In addition, a supplier 
may hold a monopoly on goods or services which are vital to the continued operation of 
the debtor’s business and this may make it near impossible for the debtor to restructure 
without a guarantee that these goods or services will continue to be available.91 Therefore, 
giving suppliers the right to demand payment may prevent the supplier holding the debtor’s 
rescue to ransom. 
Although there is no statutory provision as to when or under what conditions a stay may be 
lifted, it has been suggested by the Canadian courts that regard should be had to the 
objectives of the CCAA, balance of convenience, the relative prejudice to the parties and 
the actions of the debtor company.92 In Re Canwest Global Communication Corp,93 the 
                                                          
90 See p108-109 for discussion on critical suppliers’ priority as DIP financiers. 
91 Wood (n 8). 
92 Re Canwest Global Communications Corp. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7882, 61 C.B.R. (5th) 200 (Ont. 
S.C.J.  
4 [Commercial List]; Re Azure Dynamics Corp. (2012), 2012 CarswellBC 1545, 2012 BCSC 781 (B.C.S.C. 
93 (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7882, 61 C.B.R. (5th) 200 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]. 
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court outlined several circumstances under which the court may lift a stay order and these 
include where; 
 the plan is likely to fail. 
 the party proposing that the stay be lifted shows hardship. 
 the applicant shows necessity for payment. 
 the applicant would suffer substantial prejudice if the stay is kept in place and there 
would be no consequential hardship to the debtor company or the position of other 
creditors. 
 it is essential to allow the applicant take necessary steps to protect a right which 
could be lost by the passage of time. 
 the debtor company is no closer to a proposal after the lapse of a significant time 
following the commencement of the stay period. 
 there is a real risk that the creditors’ loan will become unsecured during the stay 
period. 
 it is essential to allow the applicant to perfect a right which existed prior to the 
commencement of the stay. 
 it is in the interests of justice to do so. 
Two core principles appear to be highlighted by these circumstances identified by the court 
in Re Canwest and they are fundamental to any rescue operation by the debtor. Firstly, the 
plan put in place for the company’s rescue should have a high forecast of succeeding. 
Where the court is convinced that the rescue plan would not achieve its purpose, it may lift 
the stay. Justification for this circumstance can be found in the fact that, stays are put in 
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place to suspend creditors’ rights while the company is being rescued. Therefore if the 
purpose of placing a stay on creditors’ rights is not achievable (i.e. the rescue of the 
company is not feasible), it becomes futile to have one in place and this may amount to an 
imposition on creditors’ right to demand satisfaction of their claims. 
Secondly, the court in identifying these circumstances recognizes that there are occasions 
where a stay could have an adverse impact on a creditor and this could place the creditor in 
an inauspicious position. Thus, where a creditor can show that he would suffer an 
irreparable wrong that cannot be redressed, the court may, within that context, lift the stay. 
Generally the court will try to act in the interest of fairness and justice in relation to both 
the creditor and debtor and will ensure that if the stay is to be lifted, it would have no 
consequential hardship on the debtor. 
 
5.2.3 Automatic stay under US Chapter 11 
 
The filing of a Chapter 11 petition by the debtor94 acts as an automatic stay which suspends 
the commencement or continuation of any action, or proceeding by creditors against the 
debtor.95 Essentially the Chapter 11 stay freezes all actions or claims by creditors against 
the debtor which arose before the commencement of the Chapter 11 petition.96 It therefore 
means that the filing of the petition acts as a cut-off point and all creditors’ claims and 
actions originating from the debtor’s pre-filing state would be estopped. On the other hand, 
the blanket effect of the automatic stay does not impede post-commencement actions by 
creditors against the debtor.97 This is because the provision of section 362(1) generally 
applies to actions which were commenced or could have commenced before the debtor 
                                                          
94 See 11 U.S.C 1978, s.301. 
95 11 U.S.C 1978, s 362 (a) (1). 
96 See generally, 11 U.S.C 1978, s 362 (a) (1-8). 
97 Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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filled a Chapter 11 petition. Thus any claim arising after the filling of a Chapter 11 petition 
is not affected by the stay. 
As is the case in the UK, no court order is needed for the operation of an automatic stay 
under Chapter 11. The automatic stay is regarded as an integral part of the Chapter 11 
process which acts to further the objectives of Chapter 11 reorganization and these are; the 
maximization of going concern value and equal distribution among similarly placed 
creditors. 98  The stay furthers going concern value by preventing the stripping of the 
debtors’ assets by creditors. The prevention of any act of seizure on the part of creditors 
means that the existing value of the debtor company’s assets is kept as a whole and the 
debtors’ business is given a shot at survival. Flowing from this, creditors too, do not lose 
going concern returns. The automatic stay protects the body of creditors by ensuring that 
no one creditor is placed in a more advantageous position over another creditor with similar 
claims.99 Unlike that which obtains in Canada, the Chapter 11 automatic stay does not have 
a time limit. It perpetuates until the assets which are the subject of the stay cease to be part 
of the company’s property100 or until the case is closed,101 dismissed102 or a discharge is 
denied or granted.103 To all intents and purposes, creditors’ rights to demand recompense 
are effectively silenced, but US creditors have been able to compensate for this in other 
areas.104 
                                                          
98 J A Ayer, M Bernstein & J Friedland, ‘An Overview of the Automatic Stay’ (2004) vol 22 ABI Journal. 
99 Ibid. 
100 11 U.S.C 1978, s 362(c) (1). 
101 Ibid, s 362(c) (2a). 
102 Ibid, s 362(c) (2b). See also s 362(C) (4-5) for more condition where the duration of a stay can be 
limited. 
103 Ibid, s 362 (c) (2c). It should be noted that even where an automatic stay has been terminated due to a 
Chapter 11 confirmation process, s 524 (a) which stays pre-commencement actions against the debtor 
comes into operation when the reorganization plan becomes effective.  
104 See section 3.2.5 of this thesis for discussion of the use of DIP finance by creditors as a corporate 
governance tool to control management. See also the same section (3.2.5) which discusses the use of 
collateralization by creditors as a defensive mechanism against pre-commencement exposures. 
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Although the underlying purpose of the automatic stay is to defer all actions and 
proceedings105 against the debtor company in order to provide the debtor with breathing 
space in which to effectively restructure, Chapter 11 recognises that there may be occasions 
where there may be a need for the stay to be vacated. It therefore makes provision for 
grounds under which creditors may seek relief from the effect of an automatic stay. Section 
362(d) permits a creditor to file a motion seeking relief from an automatic stay and the 
courts must within thirty days hold a preliminary hearing 106  with the final hearing 
concluded within thirty days of the conclusion of the preliminary hearing.107 There are three 
grounds under which the court can terminate, annul, modify or condition the automatic stay, 
however only the two which are relevant to this analysis will be examined108 and these are; 
 Relief from the stay may be granted for “cause”, including the lack of adequate 
protection of an interest in property.109 The requirement for “cause” as a basis for 
granting relief appears all-encompassing with no clear boundary as to the 
parameters of what constitutes “cause”. It therefore leaves the courts a discretion to 
determine what constitutes “cause”. The most likely benefactors of the “adequate 
protection” provision are secured creditors, who have interests in the debtor’s assets 
and are accordingly entitled to adequate protection to guard against reduction in 
value of their security.110 Therefore, where the debtor is incapable of, or reluctant 
to, provide adequate protection to the creditor or where the creditor thinks his 
interest is being eroded, the court can grant relief. 
                                                          
105 There are situations where an automatic stay will not be effective, see generally 11 U.S.C, s 362(b). 
106 See 11 U.S.C, s 362 (e) (1). 
107 Ibid. s 362 (e) (1), it should be noted that under this section there is scope for extension of the thirty day 
period. 
108 Ibid. s 362 (d)(3) which is the third ground and is centred on single-assets real estate bankruptcy cases 
involving less than $4 million in secured debt. 
109 11 U.S.C, s 362 (d)(1). 
110 Ayer, Bernstein & Friedland (n 98). 
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 The court may grant to a secured creditor relief from an automatic stay where there 
is an act against assets which make up the debtor’s estate.111 For a creditor to obtain 
relief on this ground, the property must be free of any equitable interest belonging 
to the debtor and must not be required for the effective reorganization of the debtor 
company.112 
The court is most likely to grant immediate relief from the stay in order to prevent 
irreparable damage to the creditor’s interest.113 Thus, whilst the automatic stay functions 
mainly to protect the debtor’s interest above that of creditors, the court has to strike a 
balance between creating an enabling environment for the debtor’s rehabilitation and 
protecting creditors’ interests from permanent damage, which may in most cases, be a 
devaluation of secured assets. 
 
5.2.3.1 Cram down 
 
Under Chapter 11, bankruptcy courts in some situations may impose a plan over the 
objections of creditors and this is referred to as “cram down”.114 While the court’s power 
to cram down is conditional on the rescue plan complying with the “absolute priority 
rule”,115 it is otherwise discretionary and not mandatory; consequently a court may or may 
not exercise its cram down powers.  It can be argued that the thinking behind the cram down 
procedure is to make provisions for situations where objections of creditors, which are 
perceived as likely to unreasonably derail the reorganization of the debtor, are crushed. It 
is a powerful tool used by the courts to compel dissenting classes of both secured and 
                                                          
111 11 U.S.C, s 362 (d) (2). 
112 Ibid, s 362 (d) (2)(a)&(b). 
113 Ibid, s 362 (f). 
114 11 U.S.C, s 1129 (B). 
115 The rule dictates how distribution in order of priority is to be made to creditors. 
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unsecured creditors to accept the plan. 116  Authorizing the courts to come down on 
dissenting creditors may imply a sort of heavy handedness on the part of the law on 
creditors, in favour of the debtor company.  
In order to mitigate any negative impact of a cram down on creditors, the courts are required 
to ensure that a number of conditions117 are met by the reorganization plan proposed by the 
debtor. Chief among these is that the repayment plan is “fair and equitable” and not unjustly 
prejudicial.118 In addition to this, secured creditors must retain their security or the entire 
value of their claim.119  It should be noted that a cram down cannot be imposed if dissenting 
unsecured creditors have been fully paid or the holder of a claim with less priority receives 
some property as a result of a claim or interest. This requirement protects members of a 
dissenting class of unsecured creditors by enabling dissenting unsecured creditors to be 
provided for in full if any junior class to them is to receive anything at all.120 This acts as a 
sort of check and balance to ensure that the cram down provision is not arbitrarily abused. 
Although the cram down appears to intrude on creditors’ rights, when balanced against the 
need to ensure that a reorganization plan attains the requisite number of votes to ensure that 
it sees the light of day, it does seem to be a fair trade off which may be advantageous to the 
general body of creditors and the debtor as well. On the other hand, it could be argued that 
only the debtor company stands in an advantageous position with regards to a cram down 
as dissenting creditors are made to fall in line, although this is done on fair and equitable 
grounds. It is arguable that it is only dissents which are objectively unreasonable which are 
effectively overridden by a cram down. Some commentators view cram down as an 
                                                          
116 D R Wong, ‘Chapter  11 Bankruptcy and Cram downs: Adopting a Contract Rate Approach’ (2012) vol 
106, No. 4, North Western University Law Review pg. 1927-1958; see also In Re Armstrong World 
Industries., Inc., 432 F. 3d 507, 509-10 (3d Cir. 2005). 
117 See generally 11 U.S.C, s 1129(B). 
118 Ibid, s 1129 (b)(1).  
119 Ibid, s 1129(b)(2)(a)(i); see s 1129(b)(2)(b) for other requirements. 
120 K N Klee, ‘All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code’ (1979) 
53 ABLJ 133-171. 
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advantageous mechanism to have in Chapter 11 corporate rescue because it favours 
settlement,121 effectively ensuring that the debtor company’s reorganisation is given every 
chance of success. 
Unlike the bankruptcy courts in the US, the courts in Canada and the UK do not have cram 
down powers to compel dissenting creditors to accept a rescue plan.  
 
5.3 Creditors’ rights and the funding process 
5.3.1 US 
 
In the US, creditors play a major role in how the rescue process is financed. This may be 
due to the incentivised structure laid down in the Bankruptcy Code which can be seen to 
provide rewards for creditors who take the risk of funding the rescue process.122 Not only 
that, where there is an over-exposure to risk on the part of the creditors, the Bankruptcy 
Code makes it a requirement that the debtor must adequately protect the creditor.123 These 
provisions encourage willing creditors to fully participate in funding corporate rescues in 
the US. The incentivised structure of rescue funding found within the Bankruptcy Code 
when considered in line with the principles which underpin the distribution of assets during 
insolvency,124 throws up a number of issues with regards to the ranking of creditors’ claims 
during the corporate rescue process.  
                                                          
121 See R F Broude, ‘Cram Down and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative’ 
(1984) 39 Bus. Law 441; P Coogan, ‘Confirmation of a Plan under the Bankruptcy Code’ (1982) 32 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 301; I M Pachulski, ‘The Cram Down and Valuation under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code’ (1980) 58 N.C.L. Rev. 925. 
122 See section 3.2.3 of the thesis for detailed explanation. 
123 11 U.S.C, s 361. 
124 The rule requires a pari passu distribution, i.e. all creditors in each class are treated equally in 
accordance with priorities. 
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The two main principles which govern distribution to creditors during insolvency are that 
the hierarchy of claims must be followed125 and that there must be a pro rata allocation of 
returns to creditors in satisfaction of their claims. Theoretically, the funding provision under 
the Code which allows for super-priority payments to creditors willing to advance funds to 
the debtor company as well as the priming of an existing lien126 appears to be inconsistent 
with these principles. However, in practice it seems this is rarely the position, because in 
most cases, existing creditors who already have an on-going relationship with the debtor 
company provide the necessary funds.127 Accordingly, the issue of usurping the position of 
other creditors who rank ahead in the hierarchy of distribution by new creditors may not be 
commonplace. In any case, where it does occur the court ensures that the creditor who loses 
priority is not left worse off than he would have been if the debtor had not obtained super-
priority funding. 
Perhaps the most likely source of threat to creditors during the funding of the rescue process 
is from co-creditors. There is an apparent risk in relying on existing creditors as the source 
of post-commencement financing, and this risk lies in the potential for existing creditors to 
use their willingness to provide post-commencement funding to shore up their previous 
exposure to the debtor. Creditors have used the advantage of negotiating post-
commencement funding to re-negotiate their pre-commencement dealings with the debtor 
company, and this they have done as a cross-collateralization of pre and post-
commencement exposure.128 For instance, in Re Vanguard Diversified, Inc.,129 the debtor-
in-possession, Vanguard, after filing for reorganization under Chapter 11, sought the 
                                                          
125 In insolvency a scheme of priority is followed during distribution to creditors. Secured creditors are 
generally first in line, followed by the expenses of the insolvency proceedings, then unsecured creditors 
(preferential and floating charge holders come before unsecured creditors in the UK). 
126 11 U.S.C, s 364(a)-(c). 
127 D Skeel Jr., ‘The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing’ (2003-2004) 25 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1905. 
128 See section 3.2.5 of this thesis. 
129 31 B.R 364 (1983). 
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court’s approval for a financing order which provided for the cross-collateralization of its 
present and future indebtedness to one of its major creditors; Bank Leumi Trust Company 
of New York. One of the reasons put forward by Vanguard was that Leumi bank considered 
itself under-secured on its pre-commencement loans to Vanguard and therefore sought to 
rectify this. The order was granted by the court after it was shown that the bank would not 
finance Vanguard’s operations unless it received the protection presented by cross-
collateralization. It should be noted that once cross-collateralization has been properly 
noticed and approved by the court, the financing agreement will be protected under section 
364 (e) of the Code.130 
A cursory evaluation of the Chapter 11 rescue process paints a picture of a procedure which 
is very much debtor driven and this can be garnered from the various provisions such as 
the automatic stay, cram down and rescue funding incentives which to all intent and 
purposes relegate creditors to the back seat. However, because debtor companies require 
funds to finance their rescue, and in most cases it falls on existing or new creditors to be 
the source of such finance131 creditors have gradually taken control of the rescue process. 
In exchange for credit, debtor companies often have to cede control of the rescue process 
to the creditor(s) who is financing the process. Chapter 11 has become an instrument of 
corporate governance wielded by creditors.132 The rescue process begins with the debtor 
company being in total control of the whole process; however at some point during the 
rescue process there is a power shift from the debtor to one or more creditors.133   
                                                          
130 Khan & Nate’s Shoes No 2 v First Bank of Whiting 908 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th Cir. 1990). The decision in 
Saybrook (see section 3.2.5 of the thesis) which opposed cross-collateralization is still very much in force 
and not permitted within the districts that make up the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
131 As was the case in Re Vanguard Diversified Inc. 31 B.R. 364 (1983). 
132 See generally, D Skeel Jr., ‘Creditors’ Ball: The ‘New’ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ 
(2003) 152 Uni. Penn. L. Rev. 917, 918.  
133 D G Baird & R K Rasmussen, ‘Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance’ (2006) 
154 U.PA.L.REV. 1209, 1226-28. 
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The instruments of this shift of control are covenants and rights in credit documents which 
set out the basis on which funds are advanced to the debtor company to fund the rescue 
process.134 A number of studies have highlighted the role of covenants as an important 
instrument of control by senior lenders who rely on stringent covenant terms to exert a 
significant amount of control.135 Gibson et al state that a sizable percentage of amended 
bank loan covenants grant banks powers to censure a great majority of managerial decisions 
such as capital expenditures, assets disposition, pay-outs and total borrowing in  
companies.136 Consequently, DIP loan agreements provide powerful corporate governance 
leverage for DIP lenders. 
 
5.3.2 Canada 
 
The Canadian position has some similarity to that of the US since they both have statutory 
provisions for super-priority financing and priming liens. While the CCAA provisions may 
not be as detailed and well-structured as section 364 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which 
provides comprehensive alternatives for post-commencement financing, it allows for two 
types of post-commencement financing; super-priority and a priming lien.137 Although 
there are comparable effects on creditors’ rights138 during the funding of the rescue process, 
Chapter 11 makes clear and precise the need for the debtor company to adequately protect 
the creditors’ exposure to any loss that may occur as a result of depreciation in the value of 
his security; a possible effect of priming liens. The issue of adequate protection of the 
                                                          
134 M M Harner & J Marincic, ‘Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business 
Reorganizations’ (2010-2011) 34 Seattle U. L. REV 1155. 
135 K Ayotte and ER Morrison, ‘Credit Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’ (2009) 2 The Journal of Legal 
Analysis, pp 511-551. 
136 S Gilson, J Kose and LHP Lang, ‘Troubled Debt s’ (1990) Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 315-353. 
137 See CCAA, s 11.2.  
138 In terms of the subjugation of existing pre-commencement rights by post-commencement rights. 
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creditor from the effect of post-commencement financing had drawn a lot of debate in 
Canada,139 as a result of what is required under the CCAA when compared to equivalent 
US laws.  
The CCAA requires that the court takes into consideration whether a creditor would be 
“materially prejudiced” as a result of approving a charge.140 While the CCAA recognises 
that a creditor’s right may be materially affected by the approval of post-commencement 
financing, no clear remedy has been provided to ameliorate any disadvantage the creditor 
may suffer. The reason for this may not be unconnected to the fact that a lot of the powers 
the courts have to assign funds under the CCAA are discretionary. Therefore where a 
creditor may be significantly affected by the assignment of post-commencement funds, it 
does appear that the courts have discretionary powers to protect creditors by disallowing 
post-commencement financing; this however is reliant on a balance of prejudice. 141 
Another point worth mentioning is that under the CCAA, post-commencement financing is 
meant to be a temporary measure designed to keep the debtor trading between when he files 
under CCAA and when a rescue plan is approved.142 Under Chapter 11, DIP financing has 
no particular time slot and can be sustained at any point during the course of the rescue. 
For this reason, it may perhaps seem necessary under US law to have an elaborate 
framework which adequately compensates a creditor who may have to suffer an impairment 
of his right over a substantial period of time. 
As noted, creditors in the US have taken advantage of post-commencement financing 
contracts to favourably re-position their exposure to the debtor company through cross-
                                                          
139 See section 3.3.8 of the thesis. 
140 Ibid. 
141 CCAA 1985, s 11.2(4). 
142 Crystallex (Re) 2012 ONCA 404 (CanLII). See also CCAA 1985, s 11.2. The act recognises the fact that 
there may be situations where, funding may be needed beyond this point and it allows for the priming of 
any lien gotten during the window period between filing and the approval of a rescue plan. This acts as an 
avenue for the debtor to raise more funds. 
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collateralisation.143 This loophole is not available in a CCAA funding arrangement as the 
CCAA expressly forbids the use of cross-collateralisation to achieve a more favourable 
position.144 While the ability to cross-collateralize does appear to act as an inducement for 
post-commencement funding, it may have an impact on other creditors and this seems to 
go against the supporting philosophy of the CCAA; which is to act in the interest of the 
general body of creditors, as opposed to placing one creditor in advantageous position over 
other like creditors. In light of this, the insertion of section 11.2 (4) is a reasonable move 
which ties in with this philosophy and offers some protection to creditors.  
It can be suggested that the advantages which accompany corporate rescue funding 
prejudice creditors, however an argument has been made that, because the CCAA aims to 
further the debtor company’s reorganization and protect a broad range of creditors (such as 
employees, suppliers, and landlords) it cannot be said to be disadvantageous to creditors 
collectively.145 In addition, the outcome of the rescue process is determined by creditors 
who, in the majority, representing two-thirds of the value of credit in each class, must 
approve any planned reorganization before it can be endorsed by the court. Sarra has 
pointed out that the power to approve a plan of reorganization which creditors have over 
the debtor forms the context within which an understanding can be reached about the rescue 
funding debate.146 In other words, creditors control the debtor’s reorganization through 
their ability to approve and finance the process and, in the final analysis, determine 
collectively which creditor’s rights will be prejudiced for the sake of a successful 
                                                          
143 Although this is not expressly provided for under statute and the courts have expressly frowned at this 
practice. 
144 CCAA 1985, s 11.2. 
145 The CCAA has in place different measures which protect not just the interest of secured creditors, but 
also unsecured creditors. S 11.2(4) lists a number of factors which the court must take into consideration 
before approving post-commencement  financing and one of such conditions is that where any creditor 
would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge, the court will not approve an 
application for post-commencement  financing. See J Sarra, ‘Debtor in Possession Financing: The 
Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant Super-priority Financing in CCAA Applications’ (2000) 23 
Dalhousie L.J. 337. 
146 Sarra (n 145) above. 
208 
 
reorganization. In any case, if a plan cannot be formulated, the hierarchy of creditors’ 
claims will be maintained in the realization of the debtor company’s assets, 147  thus 
maintaining the status quo prior to post-commencement financing. 
The approval of rescue funding as part of the reorganization plans of the debtor company 
tends to impinge on creditors’ traditional rights148 in the sense that some creditors may 
have to compromise their priority in order for the debtor to have access to rescue funding. 
Ultimately, the disadvantage suffered by the creditors is usually only of a comparatively 
small dollar value149 and it has been observed that creditors are generally inclined to 
conceding a portion of their claims if they are convinced that the reorganization plan has 
a reasonable prospect of viability.150 Moreover, creditors may be willing to accept losses 
in reorganization mainly because they will lose more in liquidation. 
 
5.3.3 United Kingdom 
 
The UK funding provisions as they are, stand in stark contrast to what obtains in the US 
and Canada. Unlike the CCAA and Chapter 11, which provide clear incentives for creditors 
to get involved in the funding process, the Insolvency Act 1986 deals with the matter 
somewhat cryptically. The Act authorizes an administrator to enter into contracts in the 
course of carrying out his functions and this contract and the administrator’s expenses has 
priority payment over all other expenses and claims except secured creditors’ claims.151 
Thus a contract for post-commencement financing can be inferred to fall under this 
                                                          
147 Ibid. 
148 Re Skydome Corporation, Skydome Food Services (SAI Subco) (27 November 1998), Toronto 98- CL-
3179 (Ont.Gen.Div. [Commercial List]. 
149 Sarra (n 145). 
150 The Insolvency Institute of Canada, Canadian Association of Insolvency and Professionals, Joint Task 
Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform Report, March15, 2002. “Joint Task Force on Business 
Insolvency Law Reform Report”  
151 See Insolvency Act 1986, s 19(5) & Sch B1 para 99. 
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provision and on this basis it would enjoy super-priority.152 Therefore, the UK appears to 
have created an avenue for the debtor to fund the rescue process, albeit that the legislation 
is a bit skeletal when compared to that of the other jurisdictions. There is a dearth of case 
law in interpretation of this provision as administrators have only relied on this provision 
in a few cases153 to apply for post-commencement financing, thus the issues which have 
arisen in Canada and the US in relation to creditors and statute-backed post-commencement 
funding may not be prevalent in the UK. 
This is not to say that creditors are not involved in the funding of the rescue process in the 
UK, in most cases it is done through private workouts154 and there is little or no literature 
on what the terms of these workouts are. They may involve super-priority payments155 but 
it is doubtful if the option of priming liens is permissible without the consent of the secured 
creditor who loses priority. This is because the UK rescue processes is heavily creditor 
driven and insist on a hierarchy of distribution to creditors 156  and the introduction of 
priming liens would interfere with this scheme.  
In addition, a factor which may have hampered a reliance on paragraphs 59 and 99 of 
Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 may be the rise in the dependence on pre-packs 
by debtor companies.157 Pre-packs may eliminate the need for the debtor to seek for money 
                                                          
152  i.e. a priority which has priority over another priority.  
153 See BibbyTrade Finance Ltd v McKay (2006) All E.R 266; Freakley v Centre Reinsurance International 
Co (2006) B.C.C 971. 
154 See J Armour, A Hsu and A Walters, ’The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations and Costs 
in Corporate Rescue Proceedings’, a report prepared for the Insolvency Service, December 2006. 
155 The London Approach involved the use of super-priority as one of its terms for bailing out struggling 
companies. 
156 See below (section 5.4 of this thesis) for discussions on the impact of rescue funding on the hierarchy of 
creditors’ claims. 
157 See generally V Finch, ‘Pre-packed Administrations: Bargaining in the Shadow of Insolvency or 
Shadowy Bargains’ [2006] J.B.L. 568. In recent times, a number of companies have relied on pre-packs, for 
example Dreams the bed company, Power Play Textiles which produces Levis jeans, Blacks Leisure, EMI 
the record company etc. information available on <http://www.insolvencynews.com/browse/55-
78/corporate-recovery>,  on the 9th of May 2013. 
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to fund the rescue process as the responsibility of turning the company round shifts to the 
new owners who would have possibly made their own financial arrangements. 
 
5.4 Rescue funding and its effect on the ranking of creditors’ claims 
 
The availability of funds during the rescue process may contribute to the continued 
existence of the debtor’s company or at least that of its business. Also, it is acknowledged 
that inducements may be offered to potential creditors to encourage them to lend, however 
what is in question is the scope of power the insolvency law has to facilitate rescue funding 
and the extent of the inducement offered.158 Admittedly, while there are protections in place 
for creditors who suffer the effect of a debtor applying for and being granted post-
commencement financing, one of the low points of post-commencement financing is the 
effect it has on pre-existing creditors’ rights especially as they relate to a creditor’s place 
in the hierarchy of claims. The importance of this facet of the creditor/debtor relationship 
is that the ranking or position of a creditor’s claim determines when and how much he 
recoups from the debtor. 
The UNCITRAL Guide recognizes that post-commencement funding may have an adverse  
impact on pre-existing creditors’ rights and states that to the extent that rescue funding has 
an impact on the rights of existing secured creditors, or those holding prior interests in 
assets, it is necessary that rescue funding provisions are balanced against a number of 
factors which include; the general need to maintain commercial bargains, protecting the 
pre-existing rights and priorities of creditors and curtailing any negative effect on the 
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availability of credit, particularly secured credit which may result from tampering with pre-
existing security rights and priorities.159 
Essentially, for a company going through reorganization, it is expected that the company 
would be restored to profitable trading or sold off as a going concern. For the company’s 
creditors, it can be assumed that their main objective in agreeing to a compromise with the 
debtor is a chance to recoup on credit extended to the debtor. This perceived aim of the 
general body of creditors appears to tie in with Baird and Jackson’s point of view. They 
argue that insolvency law has one principal objective, which is; to distribute the debtor’s 
common pool of assets in such a way as to maximise benefits for the general body of 
creditors.160 For this reason, most insolvency regimes have an established criterion for 
ranking the claims of creditors. This ranking is usually done in order of a priority which 
stems from pre-bankruptcy assets and liabilities which bankruptcy laws observe and 
recognise.161 
In the US, creditors who have their interests subjugated to make room for DIP financing 
are protected by statute. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the debtor 
provides adequate protection to guard against any diminution of the value of creditors’ 
collateral which may ensue from DIP financing. This provision appears to be linked to the 
idea that secured creditors should not be denied the benefits of the agreements they have 
                                                          
159 Ibid, at para 97. 
160 D G Baird and T H Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: a Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors’ (1984) 51 Univ. of Chicago Law 
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entered162 and therefore the interests of secured creditors are not to be forfeited for the 
benefit of the debtor or junior creditor.163 
The provision of adequate protection is not easily achievable because of the stringent 
requirements164 imposed by the Bankruptcy Code. Consequently, the security interests of 
senior creditors are seldom subjugated against their will. In any case, a great majority of 
DIP financing is granted by existing creditors who have agreed to subordinate their existing 
security and, where they fail to provide the finance or agree to a subordination of their 
interests, the reorganization is likely to fail.165 
In the UK, the ranking of creditors’ claims is done in order of priority in simplified terms 
beginning with the secured creditors, administration expenses, preferential creditors, the 
prescribed part ( i.e. a portion of any realisation made from floating charge assets set aside 
for unsecured creditors), floating charge holders and then the ordinary secured creditors 
who rank pari passu.166 Generally the pari passu principle of distribution is limited to 
liquidation because this is the only collective insolvency process that primarily aims to 
distribute the assets of the debtor company among the general body of creditors in 
accordance with a statutory pari passu rule that cannot be excluded by contract.167  
However, Schedule B1 para 65 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and r.2.69 of the Insolvency 
Rules 1986, permits an administrator to seek leave of court to apply the pari passu principle 
to administration. Thus an administrator can make distributions in order of priority to both 
                                                          
162 A Resnick & H J Sommer, ‘Collier on Bankruptcy 1’ (15th edn, Matthew Bender & Company 2008) at 
341. 
163 D Light, ‘Involuntary Subordination of Security Interests to Charges for DIP Financing under 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act’  30 C.B.R. (4th) 245 at 4 
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165 M J Ferron, ‘The Constitutional Impairment of the Rights of Secured Creditors in Canada and the United 
States’ Q.C60 CBR-ART 146, para 84. 
166 Insolvency Act 1986, s 175. 
167 See Insolvency Act 1986, s 107; see also R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn Sweet 
and Maxwell 2010) p176. 
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secured creditors, preferential creditors without leave of court and to unsecured creditors 
on pari passu basis with leave of court. Goode states that in practice, the pari passu rule of 
distribution followed in liquidation is not adopted in distributions to unsecured creditors 
under the administration process.168 Instead, what is followed is distribution according to 
CVAs under Part 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 or scheme of arrangements provided for 
under section 895 of the Companies Act 2006. The distribution to creditors would then be 
governed by the terms of either the CVA or scheme of arrangement as the case may be, and 
has to be approved by a requisite majority rather than the pari passu rule of distribution.  
The US on the other hand, ranks its creditors’ claims under two broad categories; secured 
and unsecured. Under the unsecured category, claims are structured in order of priority169 
and rank on a pari passu basis within each class, as in the UK. Under the CCAA the ranking 
of creditors begins with secured creditors, preferred creditors, ordinary creditors, and then 
deferred creditors. Generally the statutory hierarchy of creditors’ claims is maintained and 
respected with secured creditors receiving preferential treatment. 
A debtor who grants security to a creditor is entering into a pledge not to engage in wealth 
reducing transactions170 and as a result, secured creditors are entitled to priority repayment 
and control of their security.171 However, the rescue funding process in the US and Canada 
appears to challenge this position. This is because the positions of priority and control rights 
of creditors in both jurisdictions tend to become vulnerable to subordination as a result of 
the secondary effects of funding corporate rescues and its’ ability to re-assign creditors’ 
priority.172 The re-assignment of priority is triggered by claims made as a result of the 
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16911 U.S.C, s.507. 
170 G G Triantis, ‘Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal 
Studies 225. 
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super-priority incentive given to post-commencement lenders173 who have lent money to 
the debtor to finance his rescue. Thus super-priority means that, all other claims would rank 
behind post-commencement lenders and what is more creditors who already have security 
interest in the debtor’s assets are susceptible to having their priority in those assets 
suppressed by a new post-commencement creditor. 
Conversely in Canada, where there is a request for rescue funding, the courts in balancing 
the interest of all stakeholders, could grant rescue financing which may by implication 
mean the subjugation of some creditors’ security interests. As a result, courts have 
cautioned that compelling evidence that the benefit of rescue funding greatly outweighs the 
disadvantages suffered by subordinated creditors should be shown.174 In other words, it 
must be shown that rescue funding would not place creditors at a significant disadvantage 
and even when it does that, its benefit would offset any burden suffered by the creditors. 
The issue of priority in relation to rescue financing under the CCAA has in recent times 
faced uncertainty. This uncertainty is due to the decision in Re Indalex Limited,175 which 
had called into question the ability of a lender to rely on a court ordered super-priority 
charge granted pursuant to a CCAA application.176  
Ordinarily under insolvency proceedings, the rule is that all unsecured creditors share 
rateably in any available asset after higher priority claims have been satisfied. However in 
Re Indalex the Ontario Court of Appeal enforced a constructive trust on behalf of pension 
fund beneficiaries who were classed as unsecured creditors, thus effectively giving them 
priority over other creditors, who included a guarantor who had become a DIP lender. It 
was observed that the decision reached in Re Indalex suggested that questions of priority 
                                                          
173 See 11 U.S.C, s 362; CCAA 1985, s 11.2 and Insolvency Act 1986, para 99. 
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needed to be addressed by stronger and more precise language drafted into CCAA orders 
which include DIP financing.177 A further appeal to the Supreme Court,178 settled this issue 
as the super-priority status of the DIP lender was affirmed by the court, thus putting an end 
to the precarious position that the Court of Appeal had placed DIP lenders in by its decision. 
Failure to reverse the decision of the lower court could have resulted in some adverse effect 
on the ability of a debtor company to access funding during rescues, as the previously 
guaranteed priority attached to DIP lending would have become unreliable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Creditors play an important role in corporate rescue, from the initiation of a rescue 
procedure (in some jurisdictions) to the approval of a rescue plan and the funding of the 
rescue process and this role is likely to have some influence on the successful rescue of an 
insolvent company. As noted earlier, in Canada, there is no provision for creditors to 
propose a compromise with the debtor company and so cannot initiate a debtor’s rescue 
without an order of court authorizing them to do so. Consequently, the debtor company 
seem to have exclusive rights to propose a compromise (restructure) under the CCAA.  
This is in sharp contrast to both the US and UK jurisdictions where the rescue process can 
be initiated by a creditor. While it is not the obvious first choice in the US, there is room 
for a creditor to present an involuntary petition under Chapter 11179 as well as file a plan, 
after the debtor’s exclusivity period has lapsed without a plan being filed by the debtor.180 
It is remarkable that Canada, which is seen as a jurisdiction which upholds the interests of 
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creditors, has no option under the CCAA for creditors to initiate the filing of a CCAA 
petition. 
All three jurisdictions have in common a type of restriction which suspends a creditors’ 
ability to enforce his security or to demand repayment from the debtor and this restriction 
appears to impede the rights of creditors during the rescue process. However there are some 
differences in the manner in which these different restrictions operate. In the UK, the 
moratorium, which puts an embargo on the ability of creditors to pursue claims against the 
debtor, comes into effect automatically as soon as a petition for administration is filed. The 
moratorium subsists initially on an interim basis and thereafter lasts for the duration of the 
rescue process.  
In Canada, the stay on creditors’ rights of enforcement does not operate in the same manner 
as the UK moratorium.  A court order is required in order for a stay to take effect; the debtor 
company makes an application for a stay of all creditors’ actions and claims along with an 
application for compromise under the CCAA. This stay has a time limit of thirty days with 
an option of further renewal at the discretion of the court. Remarkably, the stay has no 
effect on the rights of suppliers to demand payment after a stay order has been put in place. 
This stands out as a distinctive attribute under the CCAA.181  
Conversely the restriction on creditors’ rights in the US operates in a similar manner as in 
the UK; both jurisdictions operate their stay in the same manner by imposing a 
comprehensive stay on the ability creditors to pursue claims against the debtor. Both 
countries do not single out any class of creditors for exception to the effect of this stay. 
However, all three jurisdictions recognise that there are situations wherein the presence of 
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suppliers in the UK. 
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a stay may manifestly affect the rights of a creditor and in such cases the court may lift the 
stay. 
Generally in all three jurisdictions, secured creditors’ rights cannot be interfered with, 
without their prior approval and this approval is usually given during creditors’ meetings 
where the required majority of creditors vote to approve the rescue plan. However the US 
goes a step further by putting in place a system where the court has the discretion to force 
dissenting creditors into accepting a plan. The “cram down” provision can be viewed as 
both prejudicial and beneficial. This is because the “cram down” may be construed as being 
very intrusive on the rights of some creditors because it forces a few unreasonable 
dissenting creditors into accepting a plan. On the other hand, it can be viewed as a useful 
tool in ensuring that the debtor’s rescue is not hijacked by a few dissenting creditors. 
Moreover it can be argued that “cram down” ensures that the debtor company is given every 
chance of survival.  
The role played by the court in the debtor’s rescue differs between the UK on the one hand 
and Canada and US on the other. The courts in both the US and Canada appear actively 
involved in the rescue process, with their supervision and approval essential for every stage 
of the debtor’s rescue. The same cannot be said of the UK, as the courts appear to have an 
arm’s length approach to the debtor’s rescue, with a leading role played by the 
administrator.  
When it comes to funding the rescue process, creditors play a major role in the US and 
Canada, encouraged by the provisions which incentivize corporate rescue funding in these 
jurisdiction. The US Chapter 11 and the CCAA, makes provisions for a company 
commencing corporate rescue to borrow funds where needed, for working capital, and in 
order to encourage lenders to loan money to distressed companies wishing to restructure, 
incentives such as priority/super-priority over existing creditors, is given to the rescue 
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funding lenders. In the UK, there is an absence of a well-structured, rescue funding 
incentivising provision like the DIP funding provisions under Chapter 11 or the interim 
financing provisions under the CCAA. Nevertheless paragraph 99 of Schedule B1 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 appears to create an opportunity through which administrators can 
assume powers to obtain post-commencement financing and this financing if acquired, will 
enjoy priority repayment as part of administration expenses (as an incentive) almost in the 
manner of the priority found in Chapter 11 and the CCAA rescue financing. 182  
Although creditors are involved in the ad-hoc funding of the rescue process through private 
arrangements, this is not reflected in any formal rescue funding process under the 
Insolvency Act 1986. This Act lacks precise rescue funding provisions which clearly 
provide a structure under which incentivized rescue funding can be accessed. Arguably, 
creditors will be more inclined to fund corporate rescues if there are benefits to be gained 
from the incentives attached to such funds.  
While it has been suggested that paragraph 99 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
provides a possibility for creditors in the UK who advance funds to an administrator to 
enjoy priority payment,183 the lack of expansive case laws suggests that this possibility has 
not been put to rigorous test. It has also been suggested that rescue funding is a feature of 
company rescue184 and what has dominated the UK in recent years is business rescue, 
therefore a structured framework like that found in Chapter 11 and CCAA may not be  
necessary in the UK.185 Arguably, the rise in business rescues in the UK may be linked to 
the increased reliance of distressed companies on pre-packaged administrations, and with 
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the pre-packaged administration, the need for rescue funding is jettisoned. On the other 
hand it can be argued that if the Insolvency Act 1986 had well-structured, incentivized 
funding provisions, perhaps there might be an increased possibility for company rescues as 
opposed to business rescues. 
It is without a doubt that post-commencement financing comes with some attendant issues, 
foremost of which is the ability of the courts to adjust creditors’ priorities within the 
hierarchy of claims. Arguably, rescue funding can interfere with the rights and interests of 
creditors under the provisions that facilitate post-commencement financing. Pre-existing 
rights and priorities of existing lenders are often displaced by the claims of post-
commencement lenders. This potential loss of priority may negatively affect the availability 
of credit. The US has counteracted this problem by requiring that in situations where pre-
existing creditors’ rights are to be subordinated by the claims of new post-commencement 
creditors, the debtor company must show that the pre-existing creditor is adequately 
protected.  
Canada on the other hand, does not have an “adequate protection” clause, rather it places a 
fair and equitable requirement on the actions of the debtor before a pre-existing creditor’s 
interest can be subordinated. Canada is unlikely to incorporate an “adequate protection” 
remedy when it comes to the issue of mitigating the prejudice suffered by pre-existing 
creditors as a result of post-commencement funding, because the clause is viewed as a 
purely American innovation best suited to that jurisdiction.186 Notwithstanding this, it does 
appear to be a very useful provision to have, because of the assurance it gives to pre-existing 
creditors that any prejudiced suffered as a result of the subordination of their claims would 
be adequately compensated.  
                                                          
186 Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform Report (n 150). 
220 
 
Arguably, the insolvency legislations in the three jurisdictions promote a fair and equitable 
resolution of an insolvent company’s obligations to its creditors by ensuring a collective 
process of distribution based on priorities. However, concepts like post-commencement 
financing which facilitate the insolvent company’s rescue come with a price which 
undermines the scheme of equitable distribution to creditors, and unfortunately, creditors 
seem to bear the brunt. Nevertheless, the benefit of creditors having better returns from a 
rescue than if the company is liquidated, perhaps, outweighs any prejudice creditors may 
suffer as a result of the debtor relying on post-commencement financing. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
The rescue culture is well established in each of the three jurisdictions considered in this 
thesis. As far as the UK is concerned, in recent years outcomes have been dominated by 
business rescue, rather than corporate rescue, in spite of the place of corporate rescue in the 
hierarchy of objectives of administration proceedings, as set out in the Insolvency Act 1986, 
Schedule B1, para 3. This raises the question whether a more well-developed system of 
rescue finance is required. One of the most fundamental issues relevant to the success of 
corporate rescue is the availability of funds to support the rescue process. Such funding is 
important where the distressed company is still viable, to enable it to continue trading; not 
only will continued trading send out a positive message to its creditors and customers, it 
will add to the inflow of cash to the company coffers, thereby improving its liquidity. 
Debtor in possession financing provides the debtor company with working capital which 
enables it to continue trading while it identifies and remedies the source of its financial 
distress.1 Notwithstanding the potential benefits of rescue funding to the debtor and its 
creditors, the issue of rescue funding is not specifically addressed in the UK Insolvency 
Act 1986. 
What is available in the UK may be regarded as a skeletal foundation for rescue financing; 
administrators are empowered under the Insolvency Act 1986 to borrow money on behalf 
of the company, by entering into contracts to do so, and such expenses enjoy priority as 
administration expenses.2 Various opportunities have been missed by the Government to 
build on what little scope there is for funding within the 1986 Act. The ability of an 
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administrator to obtain rescue funding is potentially bolstered by the legislative provision 
that such funding may attract priority payment as an administrative expense. This priority 
has not been put to rigorous test, although there is case law authority3 that it is something 
that can be done.  
It has been stated that where insolvency laws support the continued trading of an insolvent 
business, either in reorganization or in a business sale in liquidation as a going concern, it 
is important that the issue of funding is addressed.4 It is unsurprising that the UK, US and 
Canada (the countries under comparison) in drafting frameworks for corporate rescue have 
taken the importance of rescue funding into consideration, and in varying degrees, have 
made provisions for how the rescue process can be funded. The rescue provisions found in 
the US and Canada are far from perfect;5 however, despite some perceived failings they 
have been able to provide means which complement their individual economic, cultural and 
political environments, for the effective funding of the rescues of failing companies. 
The UK lacks the same structured statutory provisions found in the US and Canada. Both 
of those countries have statute-backed, incentivised rescue funding provisions which 
provide the debtor with different avenues for facilitating funding to meet the various needs 
that the debtor may have, for example the continued delivery of goods and services by 
critical suppliers.6 These incentives include priming of liens to make available encumbered 
assets as collateral for post-commencement credit. The major incentive for would-be 
lenders to provide the necessary funding is the priority/super-priority payment they stand 
to enjoy as a result. This type of incentivized rescue funding opens up different avenues on 
                                                          
3 See Bibby Trade Finance Ltd v McKay [2006] All ER 266. See also Freakley v Centre Reinsurance 
International Co [2006] BCC 971. 
4 UNCITRAL Guide, para 97 at p 114. 
5 See section 3.2.5 of this thesis for a critique of rescue funding in the US and section 3.3.8 of this thesis for 
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how the rescue process can be funded. While the UK cannot lay claim to such a precise 
rescue funding structure, it appears evident that the UK does offer priority payments for 
rescue funding.  
The ability to offer some sort of priority is an important consideration in promoting the 
availability of rescue funding. It may not be far-fetched to say that the availability of rescue 
funding revolves around priority as it appears to be the major basis upon which potential 
lenders would advance funds to the debtor. If this is the case, rescue funding in the UK 
which has priority under the administrator’s powers to enter into contracts which are 
classed as part of administrative expenses ought to encourage potential lenders to advance 
money to an insolvent company; however this has not been the case. The answer may lie 
in societal attitudes to debt. The UK appears to have some residual negative view of debtors 
and lenders may be reluctant to financially support a business which is in trouble. This is 
in contrast to the US and Canada where there is more of a view that business failures are 
inevitably a part of a market economy and society is therefore more tolerant of business 
failures. 
The major difference that can be identified in the legislation of all three jurisdictions is the 
way in which rescue funding provisions are structured within their individual 
insolvency/bankruptcy legislations. Canada and the US have well defined rescue funding 
structures and have clearly incentivised their funding frameworks. In Canada and the US, 
the absence or presence of leveraged assets does not stand in the way of the debtor’s ability 
to raise funds because of the presence of the priming lien. The ability to prime an existing 
lien may be regarded as an important mechanism for raising rescue funds, as it opens up an 
alternative avenue for post-commencement financing, especially where all of the 
company’s assets have been encumbered. Admittedly, while not statutorily provided for, 
nothing precludes an administrator in the UK from going into a private arrangement with 
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creditors to raise funds through a charge which resembles in effect a priming lien; 7 
however, statutory backing would authenticate such arrangements. However, since the UK, 
may be regarded as a creditor-friendly jurisdiction, with secured creditors enjoying a place 
of primacy; it does not come as a surprise that any mechanism which would interfere with 
the rights of secured creditors may not be appreciated.  
In the UK, creditors, while involved in the ad-hoc funding of the rescue process through 
private arrangements, have not formally done so through the provisions of the 1986 Act. 
The tools are there but they have not been used in the manner in which the Canadian and 
the US jurisdictions have utilised theirs. Perhaps, this is as a result of the skeletal nature of 
the provisions. The importance of facilitating rescue funding may have been reduced since 
rescue funding is a feature of company rescue and what has dominated the UK in recent 
years is business rescue. However this does not mean that a more developed statutory 
scheme for rescue funding is not required. A well-structured, incentivized framework like 
that found in Chapter 11 and relevant provisions of the CCAA may be worth implementing 
in the UK even if it enables a few companies to be rescued. 
The presence and availability of security can be of pivotal importance to the availability of 
rescue finance. Generally a country’s commercial needs determine the sort of security 
devices available in that country. A major difference between the three countries lies in 
their approaches to floating charge security. Canada has a similar security device to that of 
the UK. However the Canadian charge crystalizes into a fixed charge upon the debtor’s 
insolvency; unlike the UK’s floating charge which does not.  It is uncertain if the absence 
of a floating charge security facilitates the provision of rescue funding in Canada and the 
US. The presence of floating charges in the UK calls into question how such charges would 
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be treated if the UK had clearly structured rescuing framework like Canada and US. Despite 
the ambiguity that the floating charge security creates, it does not impede rescue operations 
in the UK.  
Although the introduction of post-commencement financing may solve the perceived 
problem of how company rescues can be funded, it inadvertently introduces some 
impediments, in particular where there is an ability to re-assign creditors’ claims within the 
hierarchy of claims. Pre-existing rights and priorities are often displaced by those of post-
commencement lenders and this in turn may negatively affect the availability of credit. The 
US has counteracted this problem by requiring that in situations where pre-existing 
creditors’ rights are to be subordinated by the claims of new post-commencement creditors, 
the debtor company must show that the existing creditor is adequately protected. Canada 
on the other hand, does not have an “adequate protection” clause, rather it places a fair and 
equitable requirement on the actions of the debtor before a pre-existing creditor’s interest 
can be subordinated. Although differing in wording these provisions arguably ensure that 
creditors are adequately compensated for any injustice suffered. Moreover, the benefit 
potentially accruing to creditors after the successful conclusion of the rescue process 
appears to far outweigh any prejudice they may have suffered as a result of the 
incentivisation of post-commencement financing.  
 
 Is the UK ready for super-priority rescue funding? 
 
There have been calls in the past for super-priority financing to be introduced in the UK 
and these calls have not been heeded. Perhaps the reason for the UK’s reluctance may be 
that the funding mechanisms which exist within the UK in practice sufficiently take care of 
the jurisdiction’s needs. Added to this, is the increased reliance by companies on pre-pack 
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administration. It may be argued, that the existence of pre-pack administration in the UK 
removes the necessity for post-commencement financing, as the burden of financing the 
rescue would shift to the buyer(s) after the sale of the company via pre-pack administration. 
This is based on the assumption that all issues of financing rest with the buyer who would 
have made his own arrangements for the acquisition of the company’s business and 
financing of its continued trading. 
It might be contended that pre-pack administration addresses the issue of funding, since it 
achieves a business rescue and takes care of funding issues. Nevertheless, the intention of 
Parliament in adopting the recommendations of the Cork Report regarding administration 
and further reforming the Act via the Enterprise Act 2002 was first and foremost to 
encourage and achieve company rescues. While an argument can be made that a pre-pack 
achieves a business rescue, the use of pre-packs is not in the spirit behind the introduction 
of the administration process, which is to achieve the rescue of a company as a whole. 
There seem to be a conflict of purpose as most company rescues in the UK are achieved 
“informally” without resort to formal insolvency structures. In most cases when companies 
have to look to the 1986 Act to reorganize their affairs, the best option available at that 
point may likely be a business sale, asset sale or liquidation, a case in point is JJB Sport.8 
While pre-packs have obvious advantages, such as the preservation of the company’s 
assets, the pre-pack is notably not a vehicle for the rescue of a company, as most buyers 
would rather cherry-pick the profitable parts of the company and reject whatever debt it 
feels it cannot assume. Although UK rescue proceedings have been dominated in recent 
years by the pre-pack administration, there will not always be pressing reasons why a 
                                                          
8 See W Smale ‘What went wrong at JJB Sport’ (BBC News, 1 October 2012) < 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19635988> 8th June 2014.  At the beginning of its financial woes following 
the global financial crisis in 2008, JJB sold off some of its subsidiaries, restructured its debt twice and 
negotiated with its shareholders, all of this outside of formal insolvency procedures. 
227 
 
business must be the subject of a pre-pack sale and corporate rescue may be feasible in 
some instance with appropriate finance. Consequently, alternatives need to be put in place 
to fund the rescue process where pre-packs are not used. 
An important consideration in the call for DIP funding, is how the introduction of DIP 
funding will fit into existing lending structure in the UK, which is quite different from the 
US and Canadian structures respectively. It is acknowledged that transplanting laws 
directly from other jurisdictions which have established these laws and tested their 
feasibility, makes for easy reforms to laws. The borrowing of legal rules and legal systems 
has always been part of the history of law, with lawmakers relying on foreign models, with 
some modification, rather than creating entirely new laws.9  However laws do not happen 
in a vacuum, laws sit within a culture and derive their nuances from the culture and society 
from which they originate.10  
The UK has distinct economic, political and social structures from those in Canada and the 
US, societal needs have an immense influence on political, economic, social and legal 
structures that are put in place and a great part of this is dependent on perceived notions 
held by the society. Most times, laws are a reflection of the society; therefore it may be 
foolhardy to advocate a direct transplant of an exact replica of the funding provisions found 
in either of the comparator jurisdictions into the UK. The flaw in the direct transplant 
approach is that the surrounding elements such as history, economic necessities, judicial, 
political and legislative factors which sculpted the funding provisions in Canada and the 
US cannot be precisely replicated in the UK so as to provide an environment in which the 
same funding provisions may be transplanted. This notion is supported by the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law which states that there is no one model for the design 
                                                          
9 A Watson, Legal Transplant: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press 1974) p107. 
10 E J Eberle ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies 
Law Review 451-486. 
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of insolvency law because of the significant differences in the needs of every country and 
these differences extend to their laws on other matters of strategic significance to 
insolvency.11 
 
Recommendations 
 
Pre-pack administration which appears to be the preferred tool for business rescue in the 
UK will be undergoing some changes in the nearest future when the recommendations 
made by the Graham Review12 are implemented. The Review recommends a series of 
reforms13 which are intended to increase transparency and assuage creditors’ concern. 
Though it is expected that these recommendations will be adopted voluntarily, the UK 
government has suggested that it agrees with the reports’ conclusions that if the 
recommendations are not voluntarily complied with, legislation may follow to enforce 
compliance. As a result, the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 if passed 
will give the Secretary of State the power to make regulations prohibiting or enforcing 
requirements or conditions on sales by administrators to connected parties.  
Some industry players have raised concerns on the cost effectiveness and the time 
efficiency of some of the recommendations proposed by the Graham Review. Majority of 
the concern raised by industry players is focused on the creation of the pre-pack pool, its 
composition and the ability of members to speedily review a pre-pack sale to a connected 
party and give their stamp of approval.14 Added to this is the requirement of a viability 
                                                          
11 UNCITRAL Guide, p15 at para 17. 
12 Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration – Report to the Rt. Hon V Cable, June 2014. 
13 See p126 of the thesis (at n 277) for discussion on proposed reforms to pre-pack sales. 
14 I Johnson, T Vickers, R De Carle & N Ellis, ‘Unpacking the Pre-pack Review’, Slaughter and May, June 
2014. 
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review of the new company (prior to sale to a connected party) showing how it proposes to 
remain in business for at least 12 months from the date of the viability review.  
Unfortunately these requirements do not augur well for the  cost effectiveness and time 
efficiency of pre-pack administrations as one of the main attractions of pre-pack 
administration is that it is cheap, efficient and it enables a business sale quickly without 
attracting too much attention. This contributes to some extent in maximising brand value 
and facilitating staff retention. The Graham reforms may be counter-productive and 
undermine the very elements that make pre-pack administrations attractive and this could 
likely lead to a decline in its use. If this happens, it will become more imperative that 
reforms to funding provisions should be introduced to the Insolvency Act to ensure that 
access to credit to fund corporate or business rescues is readily available as debtor 
corporations may have no other choice than resorting to the administration procedure or 
any other statutory rescue procedure. 
Whilst a direct transplant is not being advocated by this thesis, it may be beneficial to have 
any future reform shaped by international best practices. These practices can then be 
adapted into national insolvency regimes, after considering the realities of the adopting 
system and available human material resources.15 Consequently, in terms of future reforms 
to the funding provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, the following features found in the 
funding provisions available in the Canadian CCAA and the US Chapter 11 are worth 
considering;  
 From the US Chapter 11, the ability to grant priming liens during rescue. This will 
provide administrators of distressed companies with overleveraged assets with a 
means of raising rescue funds, where there are no other alternatives. In addition, if 
                                                          
15 UNCITRAL Guide at p16 at para 19. 
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a provision enabling the granting of priming lien is to be adopted, it would be 
beneficial to have an “adequate protection” clause in place to dispel the fears of 
secured creditors who may feel threatened as a result of the subjugation caused by 
priming liens.  
 From the Canadian CCAA, a provision which gives special recognition to critical 
suppliers/creditors whose support is needed by the company to continue trading and 
this should be distinct from administration expenses. This would ensure an 
obligation on the part of suppliers to keep supply lines open and prevent suppliers 
from holding insolvent companies to ransom by demanding increased charges and 
payment of debts owed, as a condition of continued supply of services. 
Overall, any proposed reforms should adopt a well-structured funding provision which 
clearly facilitates rescue funding through appropriate incentives. Also institutional reforms 
in terms of specialised bankruptcy courts should be re-introduced in order to give full effect 
to any rescue funding reforms which will require specialised commercial judgment.16 
At present, each jurisdiction has been able to adopt a functionally equivalent scheme of 
rescue funding provisions to suit its needs. Whilst relevant provisions may appear not to be 
very effective in the UK, reforms to existing laws may come at a huge cost as other 
underlying issues may have to be taken into consideration. Chief among this is how the 
introduction of DIP funding would impact on the administration process. A balance has to 
be found between assuring administrators of their remuneration and offering post-
commencement lenders priority in return for advancing monies during corporate rescue. It 
appears that the reason why this has not been an issue in the US and Canada is because the 
rescue process is managed by the debtor in those jurisdictions. 
                                                          
16 The UK at a point in its bankruptcy history had specialized bankruptcy courts. See section 2.1.3.1 of the 
thesis. Also see Bankruptcy Act 1883(46 & 47 Vict c. 52, s 93-94. 
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History has shown that a reform to laws is often a gradual process that checks the 
workability of what is available at a particular point in time. Society is constantly evolving; 
insolvency laws cannot remain static, but require reappraisal at regular intervals to ensure 
that they meet current societal needs. As corporate rescue increasingly gives way to pre-
packaged business rescue, this raises the question whether sufficient incentives are 
provided to encourage lenders to support a company’s continued trading in administration. 
Canada and the US arguably point the way as to how this might be done. 
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